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REORIENTING BOWERS V. HARD WICK
MARC S. SPINDELMAN*
This Article challenges the conventional thinking about the
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. It argues that
one need not read Hardwick to have "held" that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords no protection to
private, consensual "homosexual sodomy." Rather, through a
fresh reading, the Article maintains that one can interpret
Hardwick to have avoided a decision on the merits of the
substantive due process claim presented in the case.
This alternative reading permits Hardwick to be regarded as
having established a kind of prudential interpretive rule. If so, for
reasons the Article discusses, lesbian and gay rights advocates
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might choose to defend a reinterpreted Hardwick as a matter of
legal doctrine. Such a defense would provide courts with a basis
for distinguishing between those constitutional claims that do, and
those that do not, offend deeply held and widely shared social
values. From pragmatic and strategic points of view, these are
important distinctions that might otherwise be unavailable as a
matter of constitutional principle alone.
To guide the judicial application of Hardwick, this Article
proposes a modification to an increasingly popular way of
thinking about lesbian and gay rights: the "like race"
miscegenation (or Loving) analogy. Typically, the miscegenation
analogy invokes Loving v. Virginia as a substantive reason for
striking down laws that discriminate against lesbians and gay men.
This Article argues that a reformulated, more historically accurate
version of the analogy can provide courts with a source of
judgment about how to apply Hardwick when understood as a
prudential interpretive rule. It contends that rather than looking to
Loving as the sole (or primary) source of judgment, courts could
look for guidance to the process of constitutional evolution, as
represented by some of the social and legal changes that took place
in the time between the Court's decision in Loving and its
pragmatic non-decisions in an earlier miscegenation case, Naim v.
Naim. Those social and legal changes, which reflect what the
Article calls "the conditions of prudence," can be abstracted and
used, by analogy, to help a court to decide whether, in a particular
case involving discrimination against lesbians and gay men,
Hardwick counsels judicial action on the merits or, in contrast,
judicial restraint.
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"Justice must always question itself, just as society can exist only
by means of the work it does on itself and on its institutions."
Michel Foucault
"Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into
contracts."
Nelson Mandela
INTRODUCTION
Anniversaries prompt reflection. In "a modem life ruled by
haste,"' they give us reason to pause and search for meaning. These
moments invite us to imagine: How our choices have shaped the
course of our lives. What we have done and left undone. Who we
have become and who we could be. In these ways and others,
anniversaries remind us of our relationships with ourselves, with
others, and with time.
This year marks the fifteenth anniversary of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowers v. HardwickV Some, no doubt, will greet the
anniversary with anger or resentment-or both. Those who regard
the event this way may recall that nearly an entire generation has
come of age in moral and legal exile under Hardwick's shadow, and
that another generation, more or less, has died as outsiders while
Hardwick ruled the land. Others, in contrast, will celebrate
Hardwick's longevity. For them, Hardwick's anniversary may be a
1. Letter from Karl Jaspers to Hannah Arendt (Mar. 12, 1946), reprinted in HANNAH
ARENDT KARL JASPERS CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969, at 34 (Lotte Kohler & Hans
Saner eds., 1992).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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time to rejoice over the endurance of a moral tradition that, as they
see it, Hardwick righteously and magnificently affirmed. Still others
will neither quite lament nor celebrate the occasion. They, like or
unlike the others, may recognize that the decision, at its very best, has
had a deeply checkered life and wonder whether the time has come
for Hardwick to go.
Fifteen years is a long time for a decision like Hardwick to
survive. Few Supreme Court opinions have weathered as many
storms as it has. Neither tide nor time, however, has disturbed the
common wisdom about what Hardwick means. Speaking for a closely
divided Court, in an opinion said to have set five against four,3 Justice
Byron White announced Hardwick's now famous holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect
as a fundamental right consensual, same-sex sexual activity between
adults, even when it takes place behind closed, private doors.
This is the Hardwick we have generally come to know. It is but
another way of talking about the "homosexual sodomy" in which
White is supposed to have said for the Court there was not a
fundamental due process right to engage. And so, if we reflect on
Hardwick at all this year, it seems likely that we will reflect on it
defined in this particular way.
But anniversaries being moments to remember, we should not
forget: What we say when we say what Hardwick means is not at all
preordained. It is, instead, the product of an ongoing process of
interpretation. It may be nothing (or not much) more than that. As
we have it, Hardwick is-and has been-the result of the choices we
make when reading the several opinions in the case.
Fifteen years after the Supreme Court wrote and published the
full text of Bowers v. Hardwick, the project of interpreting it
continues. Indeed, that project calls out to us for special attention on
an occasion such as this, with interpretive questions such as these:
What exactly did the Court tell us in Hardwick, and in deciding the
case, what did the Court do? No sooner might we begin to formulate
an answer than may other questions come into view: How does our
interpretation of the choices the Justices made in Hardwick speak to,
and define, us as readers, as people, or as citizens? And how does it
define the Justices who wrote and decided Hardwick? What choices,
3. The 5-4 spread in Hardwick is conventionally rendered this way: Joining Justice
White in the "majority" were Chief Justice Warren Burger, and Justices Lewis Powell,
William Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O'Connor. The "minority"-or "dissenting"--
Justices were Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, and John
Paul Stevens.
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if any, have we made when orienting our thinking about the case?
How has that thinking, wittingly or not, oriented us? Perhaps more
basically, what is Hardwick anyway-and what could it be? Is it too
late to re-orient our thinking about the case? How is Hardwick's text
related to time?
In the pages that follow, I set out to provide some thoughts on
these, among other, questions. Prominently along the way, is a basic
challenge to the standard interpretation of Hardwick, presented in
the form of an extended argument that Hardwick can be read
differently than, until now, it (mostly) has been. We can read
Hardwick, I maintain, as having not decided what sex, constitutionally
speaking, lesbians and gay men can rightfully have in the privacy of
their homes. In slightly more technical terms, I contend that
Hardwick can be interpreted as a prudential constitutional decision,
in which the Court decided not to adjudicate whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a broad right
to sexual privacy that would have shielded from state prohibition the
same-sex sexual activity in which Michael Hardwick had engaged.
My efforts begin in Part I by putting the existing academic
commentary on the Court's decision in Hardwick into perspective. In
this Part, I examine and question the commonly held notion that the
Hardwick Court "held" there is no substantive due process right to
engage in private "homosexual sodomy."4 To understand why that
interpretation has become, and remains, so pervasive within the legal
academic literature, I suggest that one cannot look simply at the text
of Justice White's Hardwick opinion, but rather one must look
beyond it.
Throughout Part I, I argue that Hardwick's readers may do well
to reconsider their individual and collective commitments to the idea
that there is one and only one plausible reading of Hardwick-the
standard one-that the text of the case will support. It is worth
emphasizing at the outset that in making these observations, I will not
insist that the standard reading of Hardwick necessarily was (or is)
"wrong." Nor will I ask readers to give up their general commitments
in any grand sense when I make my interpretive claim that the
4. There are various conceptual problems with the definition of "homosexual
sodomy" that I will not deal with here. Is it, for example, redundant in the cultural
imagination to speak of "homosexual sodomy"? What, exactly, makes the practice
"homosexual": the sexual identity (or identities) of those who engage in the practice or
the body parts and gendered bodies of those who ostensibly engage in the activity? What,
if anything, does (or should) distinguish between "homosexual" and "heterosexual
sodomy"? For some further discussion of my use of related terms, see infra note 15.
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standard reading of Hardwick may have gained ascendancy, at least in
part, because of prior or subsequent commitments Hardwick readers
might have had when interpreting its text. I start with the
commentary on Hardwick and locate it within a conceptual and
historical context with a different purpose in mind: to attempt to
make it easier for readers with diverse commitments to see and
consider the possibility that the dominant interpretation of Hardwick
is in some important sense distinguishable from the text of Hardwick
itself. My hope is that pointing to that distinction will facilitate a
fresh reading of Hardwick after all these many years.
I provide that fresh reading in Part II. Through a close
examination of Chief Justice Burger's, Justice White's, and Justice
Powell's Hardwick opinions,5 I argue in this Part that one can read
Hardwick to have decided not to decide the merits of the substantive
due process claim Michael Hardwick raised. In Part II.A, I discuss
Chief Justice Warren Burger's Hardwick opinion, which relied on
historical disapproval of homosexuality as the sum and substance of
its reasoning. That historical rationale, as I note in Part II.B, is not
the same as the one found in Justice Byron White's Hardwick
opinion, notwithstanding the suggestion sometimes found lurking in
the academic commentary that it is. As I demonstrate in considerable
detail in Part II.B, White's Hardwick opinion relied primarily, if not
exclusively, on a controversial theory about the proper relationship
5. I have chosen throughout my text, particularly in my footnotes, to resist the
standard, formalistic references to the various opinions the Justices filed in Hardwick. See
THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 67 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et
al. eds., 17th ed. 2000) (requiring that "[w]hen a case is cited for a proposition that is not
the single, clear holding of a majority of the court (e.g., ... dissenting opinion; plurality
opinion; ... ), indicate that fact parenthetically"). In an important sense, relying on the
standard references (which I do not), and citing the various Hardwick opinions strictly in
accordance with their "official" designations found in the pages of the U.S. REPORTS (or
the opinions themselves), is to deny that there are a number of significant interpretive
questions to ask about the meaning and authority of those opinions. Is it, for example,
accurate to treat Justice White's Hardwick opinion as the "opinion of the Court" or Chief
Justice Burger's opinion as a concurrence in that opinion? Is it appropriate to treat Justice
Powell's Hardwick opinion as a concurrence in the-or "a"-holding of White's text?
Perhaps. But, as I will argue, the matter may be more complicated than that. A
formalistic interpretation of the relevant Bluebook rule begs, while simultaneously
shutting down, questions I will try to open up to investigation through this Article. Thus,
rather than using conventional designations, such as "concurring" or "dissenting," I refer
to all opinions in Hardwick through a simple parenthetical reference to the "opinion of,"
followed by the name of the Justice who authored the opinion being cited. At a minimum,
my designations, which are accurate but imperfect, leave room for questions like these:
What exactly is this or that opinion in relation to our definition of Hardwick? Can we
properly (and definitively) say it is only one thing? What should we make of any
particular opinion in Hardwick and the authority we accord it? And, why?
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between social and constitutional norms. Specifically, White's
Hardwick opinion embraced a certain view of existing social norms
about homosexuals and homosexuality as its central animating
principle. Which, for good or for bad, leaves Hardwick more open to
an alternative interpretation than Burger's opinion does, particularly
as social mores about homosexuals and homosexuality change over
time (a subject taken up, to look ahead, in Part IV.C).
The foundation for my re-reading of Hardwick comes in Part
II.C, where I carefully parse the text of Justice Lewis Powell's
separate Hardwick opinion. It is this opinion, representing as it does
the thoughts of the "swing vote" in the case, on which my new
interpretation Hardwick largely stands or falls.6 In this Subpart, I
explore a certain way of reading Powell's discussion of an Eighth
Amendment theory of the case. For reasons that I elaborate, that
Eighth Amendment theory can be understood as a placeholder for a
non-decision on the merits of the substantive due process claim
Michael Hardwick made.
Viewed from an introductory perspective, the novel reading of
Powell's opinion that I provide in Part II.C chiefly revolves around
Powell's failure adequately to justify a vital aspect of his reasoning.
Powell's opinion, significantly, turned on a distinction between the
Eighth Amendment theory he seemed prospectively to be endorsing
and the due process theory Michael Hardwick advanced. Powell's
opinion, however, contained no justification for that distinction. As
readers familiar with certain basic constitutional norms and notions,
we may overlook this feature of Powell's opinion. But if we do (as
many apparently have), we may fail to see how it is we who inevitably
must make the interpretive choice whether to fill in the (principled)
reasoning Powell did not provide. We thus have choices, I argue,
about how to read Powell's Hardwick opinion. But not only that. We
also have reasons for interpreting it as I argue we can: these include
what I refer to in the course of my discussion as the "intentionalist"
and "consequentialist" equations between Powell's Eighth
Amendment theory and Hardwick's interpretation of the Due
Process Clause. Part I.C, then, details why Hardwick can be read as
having avoided a substantive ruling on the merits of Hardwick's
constitutional claim. Part II.D summarizes the first part of my
argument, looking back and looking ahead.
6. There are alternative moves that (if further developed) could be marshaled to
justify my reading of Hardwick. See, e.g., infra notes 57, 161, 181, 189, 198, & 211.
2001]
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With this, the first aspect of my argument-found in Parts I and
II-is complete. If I am correct, Hardwick need not be read to have
decided the substantive due process claim involved in the case. It can
also (or instead) be read as having avoided passing on the merits of
that claim. The second aspect of my argument-found in Parts III
and IV-provides an example of how the alternative reading of
Hardwick can actually be put to use. Building on that reading, I raise
and discuss a possible compromise that may help advance efforts to
secure federal constitutional rights for lesbians and gay men.
Before describing the structure and analysis of Parts III and IV,
let me pause for a moment to underscore an important conceptual
point. The argument, including the compromise I deal with in these
Parts, relies as it is written on my prudential interpretation of
Hardwick. But it does not do so as any strict matter of necessity.
Though, perhaps obviously, I think it would be a mistake to reject my
new reading of Hardwick out of hand, one could reject it completely
and still be moved to accept many, if not all, of the points I make in
Parts III and IV. The same, naturally, holds true in reverse. One's
position regarding either aspect of my overall argument does not
oblige one to take any particular position on the other.
Moving on, in Part III, I discuss the so-called miscegenation or
Loving v. Virginia7 analogy. I provide some background in Part III.A
and rehearse the analogy (both at the level of theory and legal
doctrine), as well as the arguments of some of the analogy's more
prominent critics. Then, in Part III.B, I lay out how the alternative
reading of Hardwick can be marshaled in an effort to respond to
those critics and to sustain the equality project the analogy has been
thought to entail. I provide the basic outline of a pragmatic
compromise that might be forged by lesbians and gay men and their
centrist allies.
The alternative reading of Hardwick, I propose in Part III.B, can
be used and defended as a pragmatic interpretive rule in cases
involving constitutional claims on behalf of lesbians and gay men.
Were lesbian and gay rights advocates to endorse the alternative
interpretation of Hardwick, the miscegenation analogy-revised in an
important way to respond to its critics-could be invoked to inform a
court's judgment in a case involving lesbian and gay rights about
whether (and when) pragmatic considerations would tend to
authorize a principled constitutional decision on the merits or instead
counsel judicial restraint. Rather than looking to Loving as the sole
7. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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(or primary) source of judgment, a court could look for guidance to
the process of constitutional change, as represented by some of the
social and legal changes that took place in the time between the
Court's decision in Loving and its earlier pragmatic non-decisions in
Naim v. Naim.
I take up these social and legal changes-which I call the
"conditions of prudence"-and analyze some of their implications for
lesbian and gay rights cases in Part IV. In Part IV.A, I introduce
Naim more fully and briefly review an old debate about the Court's
action in the case. Then, picking up where Part H left off, I go on in
Part IV.B to review some of the changes on social and legal fronts
that took place in the years between Naim and Loving-changes that
may have led the Court to finish in Loving the principled business it
pragmatically postponed in Naim. Finally, building on the revised
miscegenation analogy, I generalize my discussion of the conditions of
prudence in the miscegenation context and, in Part IV.C, consider
those conditions (as the miscegenation analogy suggests we can9) in
the context of state prohibitions against private, consensual same-sex
sodomy. I ask, and offer thoughts on the question: What action do
the conditions of prudence today recommend to a court faced with a
constitutional challenge to a state law against sodomy?
In my Conclusion, I specify some of the minimal commitments of
the proposed compromise that may need to be considered,
particularly by those within what we may think of as the lesbian and
gay communities." I end with a reading of my own text, which
reveals its identity-like Hardwick's-as something other (or more)
than what, at first glance, it might appear to be.
I. ORIENTING HARDWICK (THE STANDARD WAY)
As Professor Donald Dripps has observed, "Bowers v. Hardwick
has provoked more scholarly debate than any Supreme Court
decision of the last two decades."" Within that debate,
commentators have explored the Court's Hardwick opinions for a
variety of purposes: to discuss and defend traditional conceptions of
8. 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), vacating and remanding 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.
1955), affd, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956)
(per curiam).
9. See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
10. Instead of the awkward (but perhaps more accurate) locution "what we think of as
the lesbian and gay communities," throughout the remainder of the Article, I shall say,
more simply, "the lesbian and gay communities." See infra note 15.
11. Donald A. Dripps, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Law of Standing: Noncases Make
Bad Law, 44 EMORY LJ. 1417, 1417 (1995).
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the "right to privacy;" 12 to illuminate the political and theoretical
shortcoming of those conceptions; 13 to ask whether, for gays, privacy
is the doorway out of "the closet" or the dim space within it;14 to ask
who gays "are;" to demonstrate the potential for psychoanalytic
readings of judicial texts; 6 to reveal the pervasiveness of irrational,
homophobic, or heterosexist bias within our legal regime; 7 to
12. See, e.g., RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUsTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY,
AND LAW 50-62 (1988). See generally David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and
Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800 (1986) (discussing the constitutional right to
privacy).
13. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 799-802
(1989) (advancing an "anti-totalitarian" understanding of the constititutional right to
privacy); cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(grounding the constitutional right to privacy in "the totality of the constitutional scheme
under which we live," and then suggesting that "the idea of allowing the State th[e] leeway
[to investigate the intimacies of the marital relation] is congenial only to a totalitarian
regime").
14. See, e.g., EvE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 71 (1990)
("The legal couching... of Bowers v. Hardwick as an issue.., of a Constitutional right to
privacy, and the liberal focus in the aftermath of that decision on the image of the
bedroom invaded by policemen ... are among other things extensions of, and testimony to
the power of, the image of the closet."); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1431, 1455 (1992) [hereinafter Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle]
(proposing that "[tjhe problem with the reliance on privacy ... is that 'the closet' is less a
refuge than a prisonhouse," and going on to note that Justice White's Hardwick opinion
was "governed by the same logic" as the "privacy paradigm"); Ruth Colker, Feminism,
Sexuality, and Self. A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L. REV.
217, 262 n.141 (1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
(1987)) ("Privacy" as it was involved in Hardwick is "a shorthand expression for the
liberty interest contained in substantive due process doctrine. It is not an argument for the
right to 'stay in the closet' .... It is an argument for the right to realize ourselves fully as
persons which would include stepping out of the closet.").
15. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Acts and Identity in and
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1723-24 (1993) [hereinafter Halley,
Reasoning About Sodomy] (questioning, inter alia, the coherence and meaning of gay
identity). It is worth specifying the way in which I will be using the terms "lesbian," "gay,"
"homosexual," and so on. I do not mean them in any "essentialized" sense, and I will not
even venture to define the words in terms of sexual proclivities, attractions, desires, or any
of the other standard ways. I use the terms roughly to describe the identities of sexual
orientation or sexual preference (or sexuality) that some people take themselves, or
others, to have. This is not to suggest, as will become clear much later on, see infra
Conclusion, that I think the terms are purely fictive. They are real in some very
experiential sense, especially when backed with the force of law or the force of fists. But it
is worth being clear that if there is such a thing as a "real" "homosexual," I would not
know why or what that means. I generally avoid using the word "queer" because I do not
much care for it.
16. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Corpus Juris (Hetero)Sexualis: Doctrine, Discourse,
and Desire in Bowers v. Hardwick, in A QUEER WORLD: THE CENTER FOR LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 438, 446 (Martin Duberman ed., 1997) (bringing
psychoanalytic insights to bear in reading the text of Hardwick).
17. See, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by Law in the 1990's
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highlight facets of the relationship between sexual orientation
discrimination and discrimination based on sex and race;18 to
articulate the virtues of dignity 9 and civic republicanism;20 to laud the
much-maligned notion of "neutrality;"'21 to evaluate the role of text,
USA: The Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 10
(1994) ("The inescapable conclusion is that the result in Hardwick is about homophobia,
and, given that cause of the result, playing with the facts will not change the outcome; only
a frontal address of the homophobia will do so."); Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy,
supra note 15, at 1770 (describing Hardwick as an "exercise of homophobic power");
Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 648, 655 (1987) (reading Hardwick "strongly [to] suggest[ that the explanation [of
White's opinion] lies in the emotional response of five justices to the subject matter
underlying the case as they perceived it, or rather, as they reconstituted it: the subject of
homosexuality"); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806 (1993) [hereinafter Thomas, The Eclipse
of Reason] (suggesting that Hardwick reflects "homophobic ideology"); Dominick Vetri,
Almost Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lesbians and Gay Men, Their
Families, and the Law, 26 S.U. L. REV. 1, 42 (1998) ("The homophobia of [White's]
Hardwick... opinion... and the [opinion] of Chief Justice Burger is evident in their focus
on homosexual sodomy."); Robin L. West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional
Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531, 540 (1988) (cautiously proposing that "[iun Hardwick, the
Court upheld the group value of family, and arguably the group prejudice of homophobia,
while rejecting a liberal and libertarian vision of the self and of sexual freedom" (emphasis
added)). See generally Mark F. Kohler, Comment, History, Homosexuals, and
Homophobia: The Judicial Intolerance of Bowers v. Hardwick, 19 CONN. L. REV. 129
(1986) (suggesting that Hardwick was the product of homophobia and intolerance of
homosexuality); Yvonne L. Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the
Legitimization of Homophobia in America, 30 How. L.J. 829 (1987) (discussing Hardwick
and its relationship to homophobia).
18. See generally, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 209-20 (1994) [hereinafter
Koppelman, Why Discrimination] (discussing the relationship among discriminations
based on sexual orientation, sex, and race); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 188-96 (examining sex and sexual orientation
discrimination); Cass Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution] (same); Developments in the
Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1579-81 (1989)
[hereinafter Sexual Orientation and the Law] (dealing with the relationship between sex
and sexual orientation discrimination).
19. See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 12, at 49-62 (dealing with Hardwick and laws against
sodomy in relation to the concept of dignity).
20. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1494-99 (1988)
(criticizing Hardwick from a civic republican or a republican-inspired perspective). But
see Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 921 (1990)
(observing that "a republican argument against the ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick-that it
sanctions laws which deny the political process authentic and independent voices-seems
to miss the point" (footnotes omitted)).
21. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex
Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1873 (1997) ("To a
large extent, the liberal conceptual framework of neutrality, equality, and toleration is
well-suited to efforts to repeal sodomy statutes as well as to efforts to deter and remedy
employment and housing discrimination against gays and lesbians."); Michael J. Sandel,
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history, tradition, and precedent in constitutional adjudication;' and
as well as to speak jurisprudentially about "the law."'  As long as this
list may seem to some, it is only an abbreviated one. But if it does
nothing else, I think it amply shows a few of the many directions-
sometimes divergent, sometimes not-in which commentators have
pulled and stretched the Hardwick opinions.
In light of all that has been written about Hardwick, it is not
insignificant to identify a thread that is woven extensively throughout
the expansive scholarly literature on the case. But there is at least
this one: with few notable exceptions, the literature on Hardwick
Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1788 n.52 (1994) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)) ("It is possible to argue for certain gay rights on grounds
that neither affirm nor deny the morality of homosexuality."); id. at 1790-91 ("Those who
oppose anti-sodomy laws of the kind at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick cannot argue that the
moral judgments embodied in those laws are wrong, only that the law is wrong to embody
any moral judgments at all." (footnotes omitted)).
22. See generally, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991) (criticizing White's Hardwick
opinion for its treatment of judicial precedent). But see Peter Mancusi, Administration
Met Many Rebuffs in High Court, BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 1986, at 9 (quoting former
Solicitor General Charles Fried as approving Justice White's Hardwick opinion for
employing the "exact constitutional methodology" Fried had previously urged on the
Court). For whatever it is (or may be) worth, Fried was one of Justice Harlan's clerks the
year that the Justice penned his famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON
READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991) (considering the impact of constitutional text on the
constitutional adjudication involved in Hardwick); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and
Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 631, 643-49 (1999) (considering the role of history
within discussion of constitutional adjudication and Hardwick); Anne B. Goldstein,
History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081-89 (1988) (same); Halley, Reasoning About
Sodomy, supra note 15, at 1756-68 (dealing with the relationship between postmodern
concepts of "text," including Hardwick, and constitutional interpretation); Michael W.
McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665,
669 (1997) (mentioning Hardwick in light of history and tradition).
23. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin
Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 237,282-98 (1996) (dealing with Hardwick in the context of
a broader discussion of sexual orientation, morality, and the law); Ronald Dworkin, Sex,
Death, and the Courts, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 8, 1996, at 44 (discussing Hardwick and
morality); cf John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1049, 1070-76 (1994) (expounding on the relationship between morality and the
legal treatment of homosexuality); Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado
Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L.
REv. 1515, 1516-17, 1601 (1994) (referring to Hardwick in the context of a larger
discussion dealing with both ancient Greek and contemporary American standards of
public morality). For an interesting report on the exchanges between Finnis and
Nussbaum on these questions, see Daniel Mendelsohn, The Stand: Expert Witnesses and
Ancient Mysteries in a Colorado Courtroom, LINGUA FRANCA, Sept. 1996, available at
http://www.linguafranca.com/9609/stand.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
2001] REORIENTING BOWERS V. HARDWICK 371
reflects basic and widespread agreement about what the Hardwick
Court held. Professor Cass Sunstein captures with elegant simplicity
the conventional thinking about Hardwick when he writes that, "[i]n
Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause does not protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy."2 4
To many, the understanding of Hardwick that Sunstein's remark
underscores will seem obvious. Perhaps it will even seem warranted.
The text of Justice Byron White's opinion, styled as the "opinion of
the Court," certainly buoys such a reading.l But one cannot properly
attribute the incredibly warm and widespread reception that this
standard reading has received-and more significantly, continues to
receive-within academic circles solely to its plausibility as an
interpretation of the Hardwick opinions.26 For, as I will explain in
some considerable detail, one can also read those opinions to have
established a different proposition altogether-a proposition that (so
24. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1161
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution]; see also Eskridge,
supra note 22, at 632; Courtney G. Joslin, Recent Development, Equal Protection and
Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling the Legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick, 32 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 225,226 (1997); Mark John Kappelhoff, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There
a Right to Privacy?, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 487, 504 (1988); Tharpes, supra note 17, at 833.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. The academic commentary on the Supreme Court's recent assisted suicide
decisions provides an illuminating parallel. A number of commentators have emphasized
that, in those cases, a majority of the Court, arguably a unanimous Court, "held" that
neither the terminally ill nor anyone else has a due process or equal protection right or
liberty to engage in physician-assisted suicide. See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Democracy-
Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1978 n.17 (1999) ("On physician-assisted
suicide, ... lower courts (or the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision) may be more
attuned to the fact that five members of the Court signed onto the Rehnquist opinion.").
One cannot understand the cases without understanding this agreement. But, as other
commentators have maintained, one cannot understand the cases if one looks only to the
Court's agreement. There were important differences in the Justices' thinking, expressed
in the numerous separate opinions in the case, about what rights at the end of life the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses do and do not protect. See, e.g., Robert Burt,
Disorder in the Court: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Constitution, 82 MINN. L. REV.
965, 968-73 (1998) (considering the various opinions in the assisted suicide cases, along
with their similarities and differences); Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of the
Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MINN. L. REv. 895, 904-10 (1998) (same); Martha
Minow, Which Question? Which Lie? Reflections on the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases,
1997 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 4-18 (same). Perhaps one can view the lack of consensus about the
meaning of the assisted suicide cases, in part, as a reaction to the interpretive hegemony
that has surrounded Hardwick. For an interesting collection of essays on the Court's
assisted suicide opinions, see generally LAW AT THE END OF LIFE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND ASSISTED SUICIDE (Carl E. Schneider ed., 2000).
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far as I am aware) has received no attention in the Hardwick
literature.2 7
How else, though, if not on the "plain meaning" of the text of
Hardwick, might one account for the general acceptance of the idea
that the Hardwick Court "held that the Due Process Clause does not
protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy"? 28 Part of the
answer may be found in the earliest commentary on the case.29 The
27. Nor, accordingly, can one say that the standard interpretation of Hardwick's
holding is the better or the best one, because until now few, if any, alternative readings of
its holding have been proposed. To be sure, there have been various attempts to "limit"
the reach of Hardwick. Sunstein, for example, proposes that it should be understood as
only a "due process" case. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution, supra note
24, at 1168. For their part, the editors of the Harvard Law Review maintain that "[g]iven
its reliance on history, Hardwick should not extend beyond its facts to apply to other types
of same-sex sexual activity that have not been the subject of historic prohibitions." Sexual
Orientation and the Law, supra note 18, at 1525.
28. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution, supra note 24, at 1161; see infra
note 161.
29. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1422 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (describing Hardwick as a
case in which "a five-member majority held that it is 'facetious' even to suggest that two
adult homosexuals engaging in consensual sex in the privacy of their home are carrying on
an intimate association entitled to constitutional protection" (footnotes omitted));
Michelman, supra note 20, at 1495 (describing his "task" as explaining "how an
examination of our constitutionalism from a republican-inspired standpoint might help
invigorate a constitutional discourse that would steel judges against the desertion of claims
like Hardwick's"); Richards, supra note 12, at 807-08 ("In Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice
White, writing for a 5-4 majority, ruled that the privacy protections of the due process
clause do not extend to homosexual activity between consenting adults in the privacy of
their homes." (footnote omitted)); Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution, supra
note 24, at 1161 ("In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause does not protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy." (footnote omitted));
see also, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 74 (1989) ("[I]n Bowers v. Hardwick, the
Court concluded that private consensual adult homosexual activity was not a fundamental
right because it was unsupported by the Constitution's text or a tradition of legal
protection."); Harlon L. Dalton, "Disgust" and Punishment, 96 YALE L.J. 881, 906 n.106
(1987) (reviewing JOEL FEINBERG, 2 OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1985)) (describing Hardwick parenthetically as "holding Georgia
sodomy statute constitutional"); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirmation Process for
Supreme Court Justices in the Modem Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 579 n.101 (1988) ("The
[Court's] cavalier attitude in Griswold may well have led to the result in Bowers v.
Hardwick. ... which held that the state can forbid consensual, private sodomy." (citation
omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 873 n.4 (1987)
(describing Hardwick as a case "where the Court rejected a claim that a state prohibition
of sodomy among consenting adults violated the due process clause"); Mark Tushnet,
Does Constitutional Theory Matter?: A Comment, 65 TEX. L. REV. 777, 782 (1987)
(referring to "the Court's decision holding that the Constitution does not bar states from
prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy" (footnote omitted)); Laurence H. Tribe &
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Cmn. L. REv. 1057,
1066 (1990) ("The majority pigeonholed the [Court's earlier privacy cases] to ensure that
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most well-respected legal academics who weighed in on Hardwick
shortly after it was handed down seemed quite certain about what the
Court concluded on the "bottom line." Who else, thinking Hardwick
might have meant something different, would have failed to be
humbled by the roster of commentators who did-and would-
disagree? And who, seeing all that there was wrong with Hardwick if
these eminent commentators were right, would shag what looked to
be a home run when there were more pressing and convenient balls to
field?
There are, of course, no home runs without rules and no rules
without authority.30 Although it may not have been their intention,
the prominent commentators who came to consensus about
Hardwick's holding early on may have effectively established the
acceptable patterns for academic, as well as popular, thinking about
the Hardwick Court's decision. In discussing Hardwick, these
commentators were engaged in a process of producing, shaping, and
defining Hardwick's meaning. If, as it did, their understanding turned
out to be "the" understanding of Hardwick's holding, it may have
done so (at least to a degree) precisely because it was theirs. One
need not quote Professor Stanley Fish to explain the theory behind
the observation-though one could.31  Justice Anthony Kennedy
made the important theoretical point perfectly well when pressed to
divulge the "meaning" of his decision for the Court in Romer v.
Evans. "It will be interesting," Kennedy replied, "to see how [Evans]
is understood. 32
no right to privacy broad enough to encompass Hardwick's behavior would emerge."
(footnote omitted)).
30. See JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 23 (1986)
(discussing the construction of authority).
31. As Fish has observed in the course of rejecting arguments made by Professor
Owen Fiss about the distinction between literary and legal practice: "In literary studies,
for example, one possible reason for hearkening to an interpretation is the institutional
position occupied by the man or woman who proposes it." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 135 (1989) [hereinafter FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY]. Speaking in a decidedly more legal voice, Dean Terrance Sandalow has
made similar observations about the relationship between authority and interpretation:
"It is of course true, as [Professor Ronald] Dworkin argues, that when Hercules decides he
will not claim that his choice is best because he has chosen it, but that he has chosen it
because it is best." Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1162, 1169-70 (1977) [hereinafter Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities]
(footnote omitted). As Sandalow continued: "In the absence of a controlling external
standard, however, Hercules' claim that his choice is best has no apparent meaning other
than that he thinks it is best." Id.
32. Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 82, 90 (quoting
Justice Kennedy) (citations omitted).
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Various other concerns, reactive and strategic, may also help
explain how the standard interpretation of Hardwick became so
standardized. Some undoubtedly-and earnestly-read Hardwick as
though it were as firm a repudiation of Michael Hardwick's
constitutional claims as the Court could muster. Keying into Justice
White's use of the word "facetious" to describe the merits of
Hardwick's argument,33 for example, or Chief Justice Burger's
approval of the age-old, masculinist notion that sodomy was "an
offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the very
mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a crime not fit
to be named,' "I some observers understandably might have thought
that any but the most "conservative" reading of Hardwick could not
capture what, to them, looked and felt like a mean-spirited,
backhanded dismissal of an eminently colorable constitutional
position. Professor William Rubenstein's candid reflection about
Hardwick captures the sentiment that many lesbians and gay men
assuredly felt (and feel) when reading the case: " 'I don't think about
sex when I read Hardwick and I don't think about what sex acts are at
issue. I think how they hate me.' "
33. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194 (opinion of White, J.).
34. Id. at 196 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (footnote omitted). For commentary relevant
to the description of Burger's notion as masculinist or male supremacist, see Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Brief of Amici Curiae, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S.
75 (1998) (No. 96-568), reprinted in 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 20-22 (1997) (explaining
that the denial of sex and gender in the context of male-on-male sexual abuse services to
maintain male dominance); id'. at 32-34 (highlighting the relationship of harassment
because of homosexuality to harassment because of sex); Marc S. Spindelman & John
Stoltenberg, Oncale: Exposing "Manhood," 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 4-5 (1997)
(discussing ways male victims of same-sex sexual harassment, including gay men, confront
cultural norms of male supremacy).
35. Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 429, 435 (1997)
[hereinafter Halley, Romer v. Hardwick] (quoting a letter from William Rubenstein)
(footnote and internal quotation omitted). Rubenstein's remark likewise supports
Halley's interesting idea that lesbians and gay men, along with non-gay readers, may read
Hardwick through the lens of their social identities as persons with sexual orientations. As
Halley puts it: "If we are readers of Hardwick at all, we are sexually identified readers
.... Readers of Hardwick cannot, I think, negotiate the text without making some
reference, however fleeting, to these bodies, investments, and identifications." Id.
I think it makes (some) sense to suppose that one's social identity would have
some bearing on one's thinking and one's experience of reading a text, and that a text like
Justice White's (which is what Halley has in mind in the context of the passage just
quoted), does, indeed, seem to divide its "audience by personhood and only as such [does
it] invite [its audience] to contemplate acts taxonomized by personhoods: 'homosexuals'
were invited to read differently from 'heterosexuals.'" Id. at 434. If I understand her
work correctly, however, it would be a mistake to think that Halley is suggesting that there
"is" a "gay" or a "straight" reading of Hardwick, although that might seem to be one way
to interpret what she is saying. Such a reading of Halley would fundamentally conflict
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Other commentators for their part may have adopted the
standard reading of Hardwick as their own less because they thought
it was the "best" possible reading of the case than because it was the
"worst." Steeped in adversarial modes of legal argumentation,36 some
commentators may have chosen to emphasize a conservative reading
of Hardwick in order flesh out the best possible arguments on the
other side.37
Still others may have followed the standard interpretation of
Hardwick because they understood, and worried about, the threat
Hardwick potentially posed to their deepest held principles and
commitments.38 Reliance on the standard interpretation of Hardwick
may have made it easier for some academics to show how Hardwick
seemed to threaten the values they held dear. To those, for example,
who prized liberal notions of privacy, the Court's refusal to accept
Hardwick's privacy claim held out the possibility that the Court
would roll back the constitutional protection that it had, in earlier
cases, afforded heterosexual sexual activity.39 For those interested in
with her basic critical commitments, which may properly be described as among the most
challenging within the legal academic literature dealing with social identities based on
sexuality and sexual orientation. She spells out these commitments in greater detail
elsewhere in her work. See generally, eg., JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S
GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999) [hereinafter HALLEY, DON'T]
(offering post-identarian reading of military policy dealing with lesbians and gay men). I
mention all this to make it clear that I do not think one needs to "be" a "lesbian" or a "gay
man" in order to share Rubenstein's general sentiment ("I think how they hate me"),
although perhaps the "non-homosexual" reader of Hardwick might conceive of the
sentiment in somewhat different terms (e.g., "I think how we hate them," or "I think how
they hate him").
36. JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE,
LAW, AND POLITICS 125 (1994) ("Lawyers naturally work by disagreement, as they argue
for contrary results; but in doing this they work by agreement, as well, reaffirming the
terms in which their conversation can proceed at all. Everything that is not arguable is for
the moment affirmed.").
37. Some commentators might simply have thought this was the best reading of
Hardwick because they approved of the Court's conclusion in the case. See, e.g., Lino A.
Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the Constitution, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 409, 418 n.43 (1997) (citing Hardwick approvingly and observing that "Justice White
explicitly declared that homosexuals do not have a 'liberty interest' in freedom of sexual
conduct that can prevent states from declaring homosexual sex a crime"); see also
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 120-26 (1990) (discussing Hardwick
with approval).
38. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contraception, Abortion,
Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 299, 305 (2000) (suggesting
that "the political or jurisprudential commitments of... commentators, which could lead
[them] to distort their descriptions of extant case law to favor what they view as the
desirable approach," may help explain flaws in scholarly accounts of sexual freedom
cases).
39. See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, supra note 22, at 56 (arguing that White's Hardwick
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defending a robust notion of privacy, emphasis on the conventional
reading of Hardwick would thus help cast in stark relief the doctrinal
tension Hardwick could be understood to have produced and to
generate pressure on the Court to continue the temporarily stalled,
forward march of its constitutional privacy doctrine. Even feminist
critics of conventional, liberal notions of privacy could find something
in the popular understanding of Hardwick's holding: additional proof
of the sexism they saw latent in the purportedly gender-neutral
privacy ideal.' In a certain way, the principal reading of Hardwick,
with the sexual orientation- and sex-based divisions it implied,
readied the tools for attacking Hardwick that might have been less
accessible, if at all, on other readings of the case.
Perhaps, and for present purposes finally, the standard reading of
Hardwick recommended itself to some scholars because they
recognized, paradoxically, the salutary effects such a reading could
have for the lesbian and gay communities. Judicial decisions, as we
know from the effects of Roe v. Wade,41 for example, can galvanize
groups that perceive themselves (or their values) as having been
defeated in a case, especially when members of the groups regard the
defeat as momentous.4 2 The perception, perpetuated by the popular
opinion "could herald the overruling of the entire line of privacy decisions, going back to
the 1920s"); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 746-47 (Hardwick "may foretoken a
considerable narrowing of the privacy doctrine."); id, at 749 ("By identifying three
disparate applications ungrounded by any unifying principle, [Justice White's Hardwick
opinion] effectively severed the roots of the privacy doctrine, leaving only the branches,
which will presumably in short order dry up and wither away.").
40. For a classic statement of the view that privacy under prevailing conditions of
male supremacy is anything but gender neutral, see, for example, CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184, 190-91 (1989)
(maintaining that because men dominate women within the "private" sphere, the privacy
doctrine guarantees women "no more than ... what they can extract through their
intimate associations with men"). For critiques of privacy specifically within the context of
Hardwick from a decidedly feminist perspective, see, for example, RUTHANN ROBSON,
LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 63-70 (1992) (discussing
"sexual privacy" from a lesbian feminist perspective); and John Stoltenberg, You Can't
Fight Homophobia and Protect the Pornographers at the Same Time-An Analysis of What
Went Wrong in Hardwick, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND THE ATrACK ON FEMINISM
184 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990) (discussing privacy from a
radical feminist perspective). See also Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy:
Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 154-62 (1988) [hereinafter
Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy] (making feminist arguments against sodomy
laws as a form of sex discrimination).
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, The Burger Court and the Family, in THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 92, 108 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983)
("Roe has not ended controversy regarding abortion. It was indeed the impetus for new
forces of opposition to identity themselves and to mobilize political effort that has had
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understanding of Hardwick, that the Court had attacked the lesbian
gay communities in its decision, both could and did mobilize those
communities in ways that other interpretations of the case simply
might not have done.43
considerable legislative success."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 379 (1985) ("Roe v. Wade
* has occasioned searing criticism of the Court, over a decade of demonstrations, a
stream of vituperative mail addressed to Justice Blackmun[,] annual proposals for
overruling Roe by constitutional amendment, and a variety of measures in Congress and
state legislatures to contain or curtail the decision." (citations omitted)); id at 380 ("The
decision in Roe appeared to be a stunning victory for the plaintiffs."); id. at 381 ("The
sweep and detail of the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life moment and
an attendant reaction in Congress and state legislatures."). But see David Garrow, A
Look at ... Roe v. Wade v. Ginsburg: History Lesson for the Judge; What Clinton's
Supreme Court Nominee Doesn't Know About Roe, WASH. POST, June 20, 1993, at C3
("[B]y suggesting that the Roe decision 'stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life
movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state legislatures,' Ginsburg has
misconstrued the political context of the Court's landmark decision.").
43. For a summary report of the immediate responses to Hardwick by the lesbian and
gay communities, see DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD:
THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 538 (1999). To ask
what accounts for the widespread acceptance of the idea that Hardwick held that the Due
Process Clause does not protect a right to engage in homosexual sodomy might be thought
to risk revising history. To investigate how Hardwick has come to mean what it does
might seem to some to hint that those who protested Hardwick, either in the streets or
academic journals, were protesting a chimera. I myself would not draw or abide such a
conclusion. The standard reading of Hardwick has been used in various ways to justify a
broad range of unjust discriminations against lesbians and gay men that, indeed, warrant
protest. Hardwick and its material effects have not been chimerical.
There are, then, undoubtedly risks associated with studying the academic
commentary on Hardwick. But they are, in the end, only risks. A study of that
commentary could well proceed without ever endorsing the notion that the standard
reading, particularly in its early days, was "wrong." It could keep the goal of respect for
lesbians' and gay men's equal citizenship keenly in mind, and treat (even praise) the early
protest of the case as fully justified.
All the same, the history of the commentary on Hardwick remains unwritten.
What I have written in my text, so far, about that commentary is, from one perspective, an
invitation to imagine the outlines of that history. If and when it is finally written, such a
history may well turn out to show that there are reasons-maybe like the ones already
mentioned, maybe not-that commentators came to accept the standard reading of
Hardwick and that those reasons are more complex than the easy idea that the standard
reading of the case-and only that reading-ineluctably flows from the text of the
Hardwick opinions.
The history of the commentary on Hardwick, if (and when) written, may not only
illuminate some of the more subtle reasons that the standard reading of Hardwick became
so widely accepted, but also how more basic tendencies (or modes) of thinking about legal
doctrine may have helped preserve that reading even when it might have begun to yield to
alternative ones. Even assuming for argument's sake that the standard reading of
Hardwick was once "the best" reading of the Court's decision, over time one might have
imagined that other readings would have emerged to claim some prominence, particularly
in light of the significant improvements in the social status of lesbians and gay men in the
years since the Court decided the case. Alternative readings (such as they are), however,
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It goes nearly without saying: The common wisdom about
Hardwick's holding, which continues to reign supreme, is not only
interesting intellectually; it also has significant doctrinal, and hence
practical, implications. Should the conclusion of Hardwick be, as
many have said it is,4I that there is no substantive due process right to
engage in consensual, same-sex sexual activity in private, lower courts
are bound to follow it as the "law in the books."45  Now, some
commentators have argued that the Court's decision in Romer v.
Evans46-- striking down, on equal protection grounds, an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution that precluded the state from protecting
lesbians, gay men (and bisexuals) from sexual orientation
discrimination-implicitly overrules Hardwick.47  But there is an
important difference between a High Court decision implicitly and
explicitly overruling an earlier case. For doctrinal purposes, as we
know, only the latter technically counts.48 All the same, this
difference need not be cause for despair-particularly if we recall
Justice Holmes's insight that "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged," but "the skin of a living thought [which] may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
time in which it is used" 49 -and if we reconsider how we choose to
define Hardwick, which, after all, is only a word.50
remain overshadowed by the standard interpretation of the case.
44. See supra note 29.
45. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12,35 (1910); cf
Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 373, 385-86
(1997) (describing the limited sense in which Hardwick is "still good law").
46. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
47. Grey, supra note 45, at 385-86; cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism:
The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. Cr. REv. 67, 82-83.
48. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,484 (1989) ("If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
As Judge Politz explained in his dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in the Fifth
Circuit's earlier decision in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996): "'[A]bsent clear indications from the Supreme Court itself, lower
courts should not lightly assume that a prior decision has been overruled sub silentio
merely because its reasoning and result appear inconsistent with later cases.' " Id at 723
(Politz, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Williams v. Whitley,
994 F.2d 226,235 (5th Cir. 1993)).
49. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
50. Again, I do not mean to suggest that as a word, with a particular meaning,
Hardwick has had no effects. Words can-and do-cause harm. See generally, e.g.,
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) [hereinafter, MACKINNON, ONLY
WORDS] (exploring the relationship between speech and speech harms). I mean only that
since it is only a word, one can understand the project of offering another interpretation of
Hardwick as the re-definition of a word. And yet I do not think that one can define
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Let me illuminate generally what I have in mind by contrasting
the way commentators have gone about their discussions of Evans
and Hardwick with how they might have proceeded had they
modified one of their basic assumptions. A familiar approach within
the literature on the two cases is to posit that they have fixed and
discernible holdings, to compare those holdings, and then, finally, to
determine whether, by reason, the two can be reconciled. 51 The move
is notable to no small degree because Justice Kennedy's Evans
opinion, as anyone who has read it closely will know, thwarts a
confident declaration of a single, simple proposition for which it
stands. 2 Thus, I share Professor Janet Halley's concern with the
familiar move just described. As she cautions, it "may render a
Hardwick in any which way. Not any reading of Hardwick will do. In this sense, I will be
relying to a considerable degree, albeit implicitly, on Fish's rich theory of "interpretive
community." See FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 31, at 141, 580
n.3; STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 14-15 (1980) [hereinafter FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN TIS
CLASS?]. The attempt in this Article to offer an alternative reading of Hardwick proceeds
from a basic acceptance of, respect for, and deference to, one of the most basic legal
"rules" important to the continuity and plausibility of "the rule of law": that lower courts
are bound to follow the "law" laid down by the Supreme Court. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text. In some sense, though, the argument in this Article shows that Fish
must be right that "rules are texts. [Therefore,] [t]hey are in need of interpretation and
cannot themselves serve as constraints on interpretation." FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY, supra note 31, at 121.
51. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 141 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW] ("Because the [Colorado]
initiative [at issue in Romer v. Evans] was bizarrely drafted and the Court's opinion more
broadly reasoned than needed to decide the case, Evans raises more questions than it
answers. Can Hardwick stand?"); id at 143 ("Stripped of its antihomosexual rhetoric,
Hardwick can no longer be applied to deny other rights to gay people and should be
narrowed or overruled outright."); id at 151 ("Although Evans does not overrule-or
even mention-Hardwick, the two decisions do not rest easily together in the same logic
set."); see also, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 453-73 (2000) (arguing that Hardwick and Evans cannot be
reconciled); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 152-57 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]
(attempting to reconcile Hardwick and Evans); Grey, supra note 45, at 373 (asking "[h]ow
much constitutional authority does Bowers v. Hardwick still have after Romer v. Evans?"
(footnotes omitted)). Notice how the inquiry arises in the related context of the effects of
stare decisis on overruling Hardwick. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra, at 166 (discussing
the impact of stare decisis on the decision whether to "overrule" Hardwick).
52. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 361,364 (1997) ("[T]he Romer opinion is strikingly enigmatic in ways that make it
perilous to venture strong claims about what the case means."); Jeffrey Rosen, A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 32
(describing, as part of a larger point, that "Justice Anthony Kennedy's constitutional
theory [in Evans] ... was expressed a little obscurely").
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deceptively clear picture of [Evans], of Hardwick, and of the
relationship between the two cases."53
Halley is certainly not alone. But particularly in light of the
concern she expresses, it is significant that, at moments, she herself
falls back on the "rigid and determinate"54 standard reading of
Hardwick. In the same article in which Halley sounds her post-
modern, post-identity note of caution, for example, she writes:
Hardwick, after all, held that popular majorities were
entitled to express their disapproval of homosexuality by
criminalizing homosexual sodomy: when the [Evans]
majority says that the people of Colorado have manifested
constitutionally irrational animus, it cuts deeply through the
rational fabric of doctrine and logic and into the very body
of the Hardwick holding.55
Halley's lapse (if it is fair to call it that) testifies volumes to the
profound grip that the standard reading of Hardwick has and has had
on legal thinking and writing about the case. I think-certainly,
hope-it does not speak definitively, saying it is impossible to avoid
the trap that Halley has quite rightly warned us to avoid.
And so, for a moment let us imagine what the Evans and
Hardwick debate might have looked like if commentators regularly
followed Halley's exhortation "to read less cooperatively" as one way
to avoid the "deceptively clear picture of [Evans], of Hardwick, and
of the relationship between the two cases. '56 What would happen to
the conceptual structure of the debate, for example, if one were to
indulge the idea that the holdings of cases, including those of Evans
and Hardwick, are not fixed, but rather (like the Constitution) change
over time in light of background changes in law and society?57 Would
53. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, supra note 35, at 434.
54. Id. at 433.
55. Id. at 438.
56. Id. at 434.
57. A complete theoretical defense of this assumption will not be provided here.
Nevertheless, it raises a set of interesting questions about the interpretive project as it
relates to judicial opinions. For those of us, for example, who do not believe that the
meaning of the Constitution is fixed, but that it changes over time, a defense of the
assumption might well open up investigation into the relationship between our views
about proper methods of constitutional interpretation and our methods of interpreting the
Court's interpretations of the Constitution. The Court's sex equality cases could provide
occasion for an elaboration and critique of the assumption. There are various moments
within the Court's sex equality jurisprudence, for instance, in which the Court, in
developing the doctrine, might be thought of as "cheating," by knowingly
"misinterpreting" or "over-reading" an earlier decision. See, e.g., United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Of course,
whether one thinks it is or is not any of those things will depend, in part, on one's views of
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it not be possible to read Evans as reflecting changes in legal and
social norms that should prompt us to reconsider what the holding of
Hardwick "is"? That, on such a reading of Hardwick, it might not
need to be "overturned" in the way many commentators have been
assuming? That, on such a reading, Hardwick could be squared with
Evans because Evans itself reflects legal and social changes that
significantly affect Hardwick's holding as well? Might those social
changes, incidentally but not accidentally, be traceable to the very
same standard reading of Hardwick that they potentially modify?58
That the highest tribute to the success of the standard reading of
Hardwick might be paid by recognizing that it may have brought
about its own undoing-that it may no longer be (if it ever was) the
only "plausible" reading of what Hardwick "holds"?
Even without answers, these various questions, like Halley's call,
beckon us to engage in some creative, even uncooperative, thinking
about Hardwick. But, to put the question sharply, is there room in
Hardwick for such thinking? Will the text of the Hardwick opinions
support an alternative interpretation? I believe so. And in the next
Part, through a careful re-reading of Burger's, White's and Powell's
Hardwick opinions, I explain why.
II. REORIENTING HARDWICK
In the main, majority opinions are written to mediate
disagreement as best they can, to highlight points of convergence and
consensus, and not to beg unnecessary mapping of the terrain of
dissent.59 When a Justice joins a majority opinion but nevertheless
the proper methods of interpreting judicial opinions, and, also in part, on one's view about
"the law." To be sure, what "cheats" there are, are produced to a measurable degree by
judges' perceived need not to seem to be "making" law, and to guard themselves against
the potential charge that they are. Cf DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SitCLE 180 (1997) (explaining that judges "and their informed
audience, 'deny' in the psychological sense of the word, the influence of ideology" in
judicial decision making). For Kennedy's further elaboration of the point, see i at 180-
212.
58. Thanks to Martha Ertman for reminding me of this last question.
59. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 59 (1964) ("While it is
probably true that accommodation within the Court more often prevents a majority from
splintering into concurring factions, compromise can also serve to mute dissent."); id. at 60
("[A] minority Justice might reason that it would be more prudent to suppress his
disagreement if he can win concessions from the majority."); id. at 63-64 ("[T]here are
factors which push the majority Justices, especially the opinion writer, to accept
accommodation.... The majority may thus find it profitable to mute criticism from within
the Court by giving in on some issues."); id. at 67 (elaborating reasons why a Justice who
wished to write for or strengthen a majority might appeal to a fellow Justice "who had
expressed some uncertainty during or after conference or whose voting record indicated
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files a separate opinion to explain the "join," the explanation can
invite us to discern fractures in the views of the Justices in majority
that might otherwise remain hidden from sight.
Chief Justice Burger's and Justice Powell's separate opinions in
Hardwick, which begin by noting their respective author's official
agreement with Justice White's opinion, both issue this kind of
invitation. By writing separately to express their views, Burger and
Powell told us not only what they themselves thought about
Hardwick, but also, by implication, what they thought about White's
thinking in the case. Separately and together, their opinions raise a
basic question about whether White's "majority opinion" in
Hardwick was the "opinion of the Court" more in name than in fact.
Powell's separate opinion, in particular, helps lay the groundwork for
a transformative redefinition-a reorientation-of Hardwick.
A. Chief Justice Burger's Hardwick Opinion
Analytically, Chief Justice Burger's separate Hardwick opinion
really has nothing to offer aside from its reliance on history (including
age-old, anti-gay morality), defined at a very narrow (or low) level of
generality:
"[T]he proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient
roots.' "I
"Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in
Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.
61
"Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct
have been subject to state intervention throughout the
history of Western civilization."'62
"Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman
law., 6
3
"During the English Reformation when powers of the
ecclesiastical courts were transferred to the King's Courts,
the first English statute criminalizing sodomy was passed."
6
"Blackstone described 'the infamous crime against nature' as
an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the
ambiguous commitment to the side with which he had actually voted").
60. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (citing Hardwick, 478 U.S. at
192 (opinion of White, J.)).
61. Id (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
62. Id. (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
63. Id at 196 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 197 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (citation omitted).
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very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a
crime not fit to be named.' "65
"The common law of England, including its prohibition of
sodomy, became the received law of Georgia and the other
Colonies." 66
"In 1816 the Georgia Legislature passed the statute at issue
here, and that statute has been continuously in force in one
form or another since that time."67
"To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside
millennia of moral teaching."6
These observations, which Burger believed provided him an adequate
reason for repudiating Hardwick's constitutional claim, are,
practically speaking, the sum and substance of his opinion. If our goal
here were to search for a reply, Justice Holmes might give us all the
answer we could either want or need:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.
69
What is interesting about Burger's Hardwick opinion, however,
is neither so much its questionable (not to mention, thin) reasoning
nor how we could respond to it. Rather, it is how his opinion can
direct our attention to the possibility that Justice White's was not the
most flat-footed rejection of Michael Hardwick's claim the Court
could have mustered. As Burger took pains to explain: "I join the
Court's opinion, but write separately" in order to "underscore my
view that in constitutional terms there is no such thing as a
fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy.
70
65. Id. (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (citation omitted).
66. Id. (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (citation omitted).
67. Id (opinion of Burger, CJ.).
68. Id (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
69. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
(quoted in Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (opinion of Blackmun, J.)); see also TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 1427 n.50 ("Lest the deployment of
Holmesian rhetoric appear a bit hyperbolic, it should be noted that Chief Justice 
Burger
relied in his [separate] opinion on the first English statute criminalizing sodomy, which
was enacted during the reign of Henry VIII."); cf. Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in
Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 523, 523-90 (1995) (lamenting
contemporary legal scholars' often superficial use of history and recommending 
the
perspective of early Amercian constitutional thinkers to modem theorists).
70. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
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He called it "my view." But is the view Burger expressed not the
same view that we tend to ascribe to "them"-the Justices who joinedJustice White's Hardwick opinion-and not just to "him"? When we
say that Hardwick "held" that the Due Process Clause does notprotect a right to engage in consensual, same-sex sexual activity inprivate, do we not ordinarily mean that the Justices who joinedWhite's Hardwick opinion were expressing the "view that in
constitutional terms there is no such thing as a fundamental right to
commit homosexual sodomy"? 71
Possibly Burger meant nothing by his "my," believing that his
opinion was but a reiteration of the gist of White's opinion.72 Possibly
his "my" was a mistake. But if it was not, and one might well believeit was not, through his use of an otherwise insignificant possessive,
Burger may have effectively begun to tell us something very
significant-about his way of thinking about the case and White's, as
well.
Based on history, including a history of anti-homosexual
morality, Burger was seemingly prepared to hold, once and for all,
that there was no fundamental, constitutional right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. Had White's opinion, in the Chief Justice's
estimation, fully embraced this position, Burger would have had no
reason to write separately, and no reason to set off his view with that
"my." That Burger did both suggests that, in his mind at least,
White's opinion had not gone as far as he himself would have gone in
rejecting, more or less permanently, the merits of the claim Hardwick
raised. Burger was right to entertain such thoughts if he did. It is one
of the precious few virtues of White's largely infelicitous Hardwick
opinion that it neither methodologically nor substantively simply
followed the Chief Justice's lead.
B. Justice White's Hardwick Opinion
Not infrequently the differences between Chief Justice Burger's
and Justice White's opinions in Hardwick are glossed over in the
academic commentary on the case.73 By isolating some notion of
71. Id. (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
72. Burger did tell us he wrote separately "to underscore ... that in constitutionalterms there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy." Id.(opinion of Burger, C.J.). And he did lift his remark about "proscriptions against sodomyhav[ing] very 'ancient roots' " directly from Justice White's opinion. Id. (opinion ofBurger, CJ.) (citing Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (opinion of White, J.)). See infra note 84
and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for
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history as the defining pillar on which White built his Hardwick
opinion, students of the case commonly divert attention away from a
more basic element of the opinion's architectural design.
If history mattered in White's opinion, it was not because it was
history, as such. Rather, it was because it was living history embodied
in the then-prevailing social norms about homosexuals and
homosexuality. 74 Those norms, as their historical pedigree helped to
demonstrate, were not merely an episodic expression of majoritarian,
anti-gay sentiment sprung suddenly, full-blown from Zeus's head.
Widely shared and deeply felt at the time of Hardwick,'75 with deep
historical roots, social norms about homosexuals and homosexuality,
and not history standing alone, carried White a good distance
toward-if not all the way to-his constitutional conclusion.76
I will return to these points in a moment, elaborating and
demonstrating that they are supported by the text of White's opinion.
But for now they should suffice to explain why I respectfully disagree
with Professor William Eskridge and those he joins by saying that
"[t]he [Hardwick] Court's response, and ultimately [White's] entire
opinion, rested upon a principle of history: only activities
unregulated in 1868 could be considered liberties protected by the
due process clause. '77  This might be a fit description of Burger's
Hardwick opinion,78 but not of White's "opinion of the Court. 79
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 915 (1989) (treating the
opinions together to launch a broader theoretical discussion of identity and the law).
74. Some, along with Justice John Harlan, might call this "living tradition," see Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting), or with Professor Daniel Conide, "the
pattern of American moral development." Daniel 0. Conde, The Legitimacy of Judicial
Review in Individual Rights Cases: Michael Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69
MINN. L. REv. 587, 642 (1985). There are, undoubtedly, differences between the
conceptions, but the lines conjoining and separating them will not be specified here.
75. Contempt for, or disgust with, male-male sex was nothing new, as Burger's
opinion shows. But the virulence of the emotional response to that kind of sex,
particularly in 1986 (when Hardwick was decided), assuredly drew power and form from
the conservative successes of the so-called Reagan Revolution and the close association
between gay sex and death spurred by the national, moral panic occasioned by the
emergence of AIDS in those years. As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes
345-73, one should not forget these factors when seeking to understand Hardwick. Cf
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 609, 677
(1990) (considering "socio-economic and political" factors in legal treatment of
homosexuality).
76. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("The Court concludes
that [Georgia's sodomy law] is valid essentially because 'the laws of... many States... still
make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.' " (citing Hardwick, 478
U.S. at 190 (opinion of White, J.) (emphasis added))).
77. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 156 (emphasis added); see id. at 151 ("The
Supreme Court in Hardwick sought to avoid the gay rights implications of this [anti-
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commandeering] principle by invoking the historical pedigree of laws against 'homosexual
sodomy' at the time of the framing of the fourteenth amendment (1868)."). But see id. at
166 (summarizing "Hardwick's reasoning [as] faulty in (1) characterizing the precedents,
(2) setting the terms of the inquiry, and (3) representing the history of state regulation of
oral sex").
78. I am not even sure if this is an apt description of Burger's position. Although
much of the historical evidence he invoked predated the enactment of the Bill of Rights,
he did, for instance, mention that "[i]n 1816 the Georgia Legislature passed the statute at
issue here, and that statute has been continuously in force in one form or another since
that time." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). The dating of the sources
in Burger's Hardwick opinion makes it somewhat difficult to say with much confidence
that either 1791 or 1868 was a date of any particular significance within the framework of
what he wrote.
79. History, it might be said, is one of "the essentially contested concepts" Gallie
taught us about. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
PROCEEDINGS 167 (1955-1956). In some sense, White's Hardwick opinion was, of course,
based on history. But mostly or only in the unexceptionable sense that the legal endeavor
is often conceptualized as inevitably relying on history, that one cannot know "the law"
without casting one's eye, in part, to the past. The legal force of precedents and statutes
reflect the force of history in judicial decision-making. There is, however, an important
way in which the legal endeavor is related to the future, as well, and cannot be said to be
"simply" or "merely" historical. The future is often implicitly posited in the reductio, of
which more anon, in which certain paths-future paths-are foreclosed in the present
because of the vestigial authority of historical norms. Nevertheless, I still think that what I
suggest in the text will make sense to most readers, especially in view of Eskridge's
specification of a particular history, linked to a particular moment in time past. I am not,
in other words, attempting to invoke any grand theory about "the nature" of "history," or
to score any philosophical point dealing with "the nature" of time.
This all, I think, suggests that there is not only a history to the commentary on
Hardwick, see supra note 43, but also a history of the use of history within the commentary
on Hardwick that is worth considering. Indeed, in reading Eskridge's remark about the
centrality of history within White's Hardwick opinion, I cannot help but detect a little
conscious overstatement. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. I would agree with
Eskridge, however, that if Hardwick had defined the scope of the Due Process Clause as
frozen in 1868, it would have been difficult on that score to square Hardwick with Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 156 ("In Roe, the
Court protected a woman's right to control her pregnancy through an abortion, even
though states prohibited women from obtaining abortions in the nineteenth century; in
1868 thirty-six states or territories made this a crime, twenty-one of which statutes were
still in effect in 1970." (footnote omitted)). And it also would have been difficult to square
Hardwick with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), neither of which, as Eskridge observes, "had considered nineteenth-
century regulation of contraception relevant." ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at
156. My own sense of it is that the identification of history as the touchstone of White's
Hardwick opinion underscores the significance of the endeavor Eskridge goes on to
undertake, challenging the "history of homosexual sodomy" found in White's opinion.
Efforts, like Eskridge's, to challenge White's understanding of history remain an
important endeavor even if one believes history played a more modest role, if any, as a
justification for White's ultimate judgment in the case, leaving to one side (for a moment)
what that "ultimate judgment" was. Thus, I find much more appealing (though still I do
not agree with), then Professor, now-Dean, Kathleen Sullivan's careful observation that
White and those Justices who substantively joined his Hardwick opinion "drew the line"
they did, "in large part, because they could not identify [homosexual sodomy] with the
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The argument that White's Hardwick opinion ultimately rests on
a principle of history, as with the standard statement of the
proposition for which Hardwick stands, seem likely driven by
something other than text alone. Nevertheless, it is not without
textual foundation. The most directly relevant passage for a historical
account of White's Hardwick opinion appears in his discussion of the
process of identifying unenumerated constitutional rights.80 After
laying out the familiar formulations from Palko v. Connecticut' and
Moore v. East Cleveland,82 White declared that "lt is obvious to us
that neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right
to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy."83 Sketching
the details, White told us that "[p]roscriptions against [consensual
sodomy] have ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal offense at
common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States
when they ratified the Bill of Rights," 8 adding significantly that, "[i]n
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37
States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws."' 5
Had this been White's only proffered justification for his
"obvious" conclusion (which is not at all "obvious" to many of us),
the notion that his opinion (like or unlike Burger's) turned on history
tradition of our country, the values underlying our people at the time of the framing of the
Bill of Rights." 3 NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG. 3099 (1987) [hereinafter BORK HEARINGS] (remarks of
Kathleen Sullivan (emphasis added)). White's case-by-case approach to constitutional
adjudication, see, e.g., Rhesa H. Barksdale, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107
HARV. L. REV. 3, 6 (1993) (noting that, jurisprudentially, White kept the issues "as
narrow as possible, so that there could be reasoned, and reasonable, predictability to the
law for the American people"); Charles Fried, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107
HARV. L. REV. 20, 22-23 (1993) (observing that "[d]octrinal consistency just did not weigh
very heavily with [White] if it led to a conclusion that did not make sense." (footnote
omitted)); id. at 22 n.35 (noting criticism of White's jurisprudence for this very reason),
may help explain the seeming inconsistency, to some, between his definition of the Due
Process Clause in Hardwick, and his positions in cases like Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 461
(White, J., concurring in the result); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (White, J.,
joining the unanimous opinion of the Court written by Warren, C.J.); and Griswold, 381
U.S. at 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
80. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191 (opinion of White, J.).
81. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (opinion of Cardozo, J.) (announcing that rights are
fundamental in the constitutionl sense which are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" or basic in our system of jurisprudence).
82. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) (treating as fundamental
those rights that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition").
83. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (opinion of White, J.).
84. Id. at 192 (opinion of White, J.) (internal citation omitted).
85. !L at 192-93 (opinion of White, J.) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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might have followed.86 But this was not all that White-or the text of
his Hardwick opinion-had to say.
1. Unenumerated Rights and Social Norms
Justice White introduced historical disapproval of the act of
sodomy in order to buttress what was, on a more basic level, an
argument from contemporaneous social norms. White wrote that
then-current prohibitions of consensual sodomy had "ancient roots,"
as he began to explain that those proscriptions did not violate any
fundamental right of "homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy."'  Two sentences on history, quoted above, followed:
"Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by
the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights.
In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of
the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws."' 8 Then, White
closed the circle at its source, with then-existing proscriptions against
consensual sodomy. "In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed
sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to
provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and
between consenting adults."9
86. I say "might" quite intentionally. That White was not relying exclusively on a
conception of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment (or more specifically, its Due
Process Clause) fixed in 1868 is suggested, albeit weakly, by his reference to the common
law and the "laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights." See
id at 192 (opinion of White, J.); cf BORK HEARINGS, supra note 79, at 3099 (remarks of
Professor Kathleen Sullivan). Perhaps, as David Cruz has thoughtfully suggested to me,
the references to the Bill of Rights can be explained in terms of the congruence between
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment notions of "due process." Either way, I will have
occasion shortly to provide much stronger evidence for the proposition that White's
opinion did not ultimately rest on a principle of history, whether or not fixed in 1868. See
infra Part II.B.1 (discussing unenumerated rights and social norms).
87. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (opinion of White, J.).
88. Id. at 192-93 (opinion of White, J.) (footnotes omitted).
89. Id. at 193-94 (opinion of White, J.) (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Although some have suggested that the evidence about homosexuality that the
Court considered was historically inaccurate, see, e.g., Michelman, supra note 20, at 1497 &
n.12, the considerable strides that had been made to achieve equality for lesbians and gay
men-to erase or modify social norms disapproving of homosexuality-were woefully
incomplete by 1986 (as they continue to be today). Part of the problem, of course, was the
use of sodomy laws, such as the one at issue in Hardwick, to perpetuate the subordination
of lesbians and gay men. See Nan D. Hunter, Banned in the U.S.A.: What the Hardwick
Ruling Will Mean, in LISA DUGGAN & NAN D. HUNTER, SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT
AND POLITICAL CULTURE 80, 80 (1995). As Professor Hunter explains: "Sodomy laws
have functioned as the linchpin for denial of employment, housing and custody or
visitation rights; even when... there was no nexus between homosexuality and job skills
or parenting ability, we have had the courts throw the 'habitual criminal' label at us as a
reason to deny relief." Id. at 80-81.
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Were the structure of White's reasoning not clear enough from
the structure of the passage just reviewed, one would need only look
back a few pages in his opinion-to his statement of the "issue
presented" in the case-to find the same rationale, prefiguring what
was to come, expressed more succinctly. "The issue presented,"
White announced, "is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence
invalidates the laws of many states that still make such conduct illegal
and have done so for a very long time."'  Prevailing social norms,
reflected in the glance White cast toward "the laws of the many States
that still make such conduct illegal," are primary; the history of such
laws, implicated by the subordinate conjunctive phrase "and have
done so for a very long time," functions to steel the main point.91 It
may be worth noting that Justice Blackmun, in his own Hardwick
opinion disagreeing, read White's opinion just this way. For
Blackmun, White's opinion had concluded that Georgia's sodomy law
was "[v]alid[,] essentially because 'the laws of... many States... still
ma[d]e such conduct illegal and ha[d] done so for a very long time.' ,92
So far, in a loose sense, we have largely stayed within the four
comers of Hardwick, reading White's opinion as relying in some basic
way on social norms disapproving of homosexuals and
homosexuality.93 But it will be helpful to lay White's Hardwick
opinion beside remarks Professor Laurence Tribe made in a brief he
filed with the Court on the eve of the decision in Hardwick, written
on Michael Hardwick's behalf. Comparing the texts should help
dispel any lingering doubt whether, in the passage under
consideration, White was or was not reasoning his way to his "obvious
conclusion" through a particular view of the social norms he thought
implicated by the case.94
90. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 (opinion of White, J.) (emphasis added).
91. Id. (opinion of White, J.).
92. Id at 199 (opinion of Blackmun, J.,) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
93. Cf. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 105-06 (John B.
Thompson ed., 1991) (explaining that text or language must be understood in socio-
historical context).
94. As Dean Terrance Sandalow has pointed out, Judge J. Skelly Wright was correct
to disagree with Justice Roberts's comment, see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936),
that "[a]nswers to constitutional questions" are to "be determined simply by laying 'the
article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged.' "
Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1038 (1981)
[hereinafter Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation] (footnote omitted) (quoting J. Skelly
Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 769, 784 (1971)). Still, there is often much to be learned about the interpretive
choices judges make in their texts by comparing them to alternative choices highlighted in
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Here is Tribe commenting on what he saw as the clear and
unmistakable trend toward tolerating, if not embracing, homosexual
sodomy, signified by a widespread trend to decriminalize the conduct:
"Our tradition of liberty under the Due Process Clause has never
'been reduced to any formula' nor 'determined by reference to any
code,' but rather has been a 'living thing,' that must grow and change
over time within careful limits sketched by 'solid recognition of the
basic values [of] our society.' "9 He continued:
It is for just this reason that Justice Harlan, in Poe [v.
Ullman] wrote that the "general public opinion ... of a
bygone day" condemning contraceptives could not justify
the criminalization of their use. Likewise, the general public
opinion of an earlier day that led Justice Harlan to take for
granted the condemnation of homosexual practices cannot
justify their criminalization of those practices today. In the
quarter-century that has passed since Justice Harlan wrote,
more than half the states in the Union have decriminalized
private homosexual acts between consenting adults, and our
nation's professional societies have taken the position that
such acts should not be condemned either by medicine or by
law.9
6
other texts, such as Tribe's brief in Hardwick.
95. Laurence H. Tribe, Brief for Respondent at 8, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (No. 85-140) [hereinafter Tribe, Hardwick Brief] (citations and footnote omitted).
96. Id. at 8-9 n.14 (citations omitted). Elsewhere in the brief, Tribe repeated this
theme. "Nor can consensual homosexual contact in private any longer be deemed so
transparently evil that a government need not explain its criminalization to any judicial
authority." Id. at 13 (footnotes omitted). Tribe then went on to cite Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 6 & n.5 (1967), for the proposition that "no activity may be deemed self-
evidently injurious in a nation where.., more than half the states have decriminalized it."
Tribe, Hardwick Brief, supra note 95, at 13. And in a footnote, Tribe drove the point
home:
The vast majority of the American population lives in the 26 states that have
decriminalized private, consensual, adult homosexual acts, either by legislative
... or judicial means. Petitioner claims that 25 states still outlaw oral and anal
sexual contacts, but its list of such jurisdictions erroneously includes the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which has long since held its sodomy law
unconstitutional as applied to the acts of consenting adults in private ....
Nor can the remaining division among the states on the issue be viewed
simply as a benign patchwork of legislative experiments. For a state's
prerogative to "serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic
experiments," New State Ice. Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting), in its public sphere entails no comparable perogative to conduct
"'experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality' of the individual."
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Id. at 13-14 n.23.
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Although White did not cite it in his discussion of the process of
identifying unenumerated constitutional rights, he was, in part,
responding there to Tribe's reliance on language from Harlan's
famous dissent in Poe. It seems clear that White and Tribe disagreed
on a good many things in Hardwick, but not on any grand theory of
constitutional interpretation. 97  Each articulated a method of
adducing unenumerated constitutional rights that was
commensurable with the other's. Each agreed that the pattern of
state laws, as evidence of "general public opinion" (what I have been
calling "social norms"), was relevant to the determination of whether
acceptance of homosexual sodomy should or should not already be
counted within the country's evolving social and constitutional
mores.
98
White and Tribe, however, disagreed with each other about what
to make of the evidence of public opinion to which Tribe, in his brief,
had pointed. Tribe saw the de-criminalization of homosexual
practices in more than half of the states as powerful evidence that
social norms about gays and gay sex had recently changed-so
powerful, in fact, he maintained that "the general public opinion of an
earlier day that led Justice Harlan to take for granted the
condemnation of homosexual practices [could not] justify
criminalization of those practices today."99  For his part, though,
White saw the other half of the glass: the laws of twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia that continued to criminalize
homosexual sodomy. White was unwilling to extrapolate from the
(seeming) trend to de-criminalize sodomy a constitutional warrant to
strike down the numerous remaining prohibitions, particularly in light
of their vitality and correspondence to the "the general public opinion
97. White's agreement with the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460 (1972)
(White, J., concurring in the result); Loving, 388 U.S. at 2 (White, J., joining the
unanimous opinion of the Court written by Warren, C.J.); and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment), may go some distance
toward illuminating the methodological similarities between the approach he and Tribe
took in Hardwick. See also Barksdale, supra note 79 (discussing White's interpretive
methodology); Fried, supra note 79 (same).
98. As Justice Scalia would explain several years later in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 370 (1989), "'[F]irst' among the '"objective indicia that reflect the public
attitude toward a given sanction"' are statutes passed by society's elected
representatives." Id (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976))). That the indicia are "objective" in any pure
sense is rather doubtful. Nevertheless, it might be agreed that they are less subjective in
some meaningful way than the Justices' own raw value preferences.
99. Tribe, Hardwick Brief, supra note 95, at 8 n.14 (citation omitted).
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... of... a bygone day."" ° For White, we might say, the day was not
entirely "bygone."
It is, of course, a prerogative of authority to reserve the last
word, and White took full advantage of that prerogative to belittle
Tribe's interpretation of public opinion. Against the background of
existing sodomy bans with their "ancient roots" and "the laws of the
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for
a very long time,"'' White snapped, "to claim that a right to engage
in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best,
facetious."'" White's damning description of Tribe's interpretation of
public opinion is equaled in its pitch perhaps only by the intensity of
the reactions it has precipitated. 3 But far from demonstrating simply
(or only) an inappropriate judicial expression of irrational dislike or
hatred of homosexuals, White's clever reductio of Tribe's argument to
100. Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 376 U.S. 497,546-47 & n.12. (1961)).
101. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 (opinion of White, J.).
102. Id. at 194 (opinion of White, J.).
103. Some critics of White's Hardwick opinion have been quite a good deal less
charitable towards his interpretation of the evidence of cultural opposition to homosexual
sodomy. As they see it, White's interpretation of the evidence, so different from Tribe's,
can be attributed to a defect in White's psyche that distorted his judgment in deciding
Hardwick. This, of course, is the familiar, sometimes whispered, sometimes published,
suggestion that White's "homophobia" rendered him incapable of viewing the evidence
(or the issues) before the Court in Hardwick "objectively," or that it improperly tilted him
against Tribe's otherwise powerful constitutional argument. See, e.g., supra note 17
(collecting sources sympathetic with this view).
White has often been the target of such charges, but he certainly was not the only
Justice in Hardwick whose personal relationship (or lack thereof) with homosexuals (or
homosexuality) shaped his view of the case. (Powell, who reported during deliberations
over Hardwick that he never knew a homosexual, comes to mind in this regard. JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521, 528-29 (1994).) Even if White was a
"homophobe" (I, myself, might hesitate before calling him that), that fact alone might not,
without more, explain why he decided the case as he did. Indeed, if hatred (or dislike) of
homosexuals were the determining factor in one's decision in a case like Hardwick, one
might have expected White's opinion to have attracted at least one other vote. According
to Professor David Garrow, Justice Stevens is reported to have confessed to at least one of
his colleagues during deliberations in Hardwick, "I hate homos." DAVID J. GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V.
WADE 659-60 (1994) ("John Stevens said that morality was not enough, and that while he
disliked homosexuals--'I hate homos,' one colleague quoted Stevens as saying-'we have
to live with it,' for it was a basic question of liberty."). And yet, Stevens, as we know, did
not join White's Hardwick opinion. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 218, 220 (opinion of Stevens,
J.).
If we are going to take account of White's psychology or biography, any theory of
defect must account for White's record of steady support for the Court's sex equality
jurisprudence and his experience on the Court as a clerk for Justice Vinson (giving White
some personal relationship both to the repudiation of Lochner and later as a Justice
involved in deciding Roe).
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an absurdity-a familiar judicial move 4 4-in an odd way may have
been a tacit acknowledgment of the seriousness and legitimacy of
what Tribe had claimed. For, if White had had a persuasive,
substantive justification for his rejection of the argument he declared
"facetious," he surely would not have failed to tell us what it was.
2. Precedent and Social Norms
The reductio plays an important role at vital junctures in Justice
White's Hardwick opinion, distracting the reader from the difficulties
of his positions and the reasons they are so unsatisfying.
Summarizing the relationship of the Court's privacy precedents to
Hardwick's due process claim, for example, White wrote:
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in
[the Court's earlier privacy] cases bears any resemblance to
the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals in acts of
sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated
105
While White neatly reconciled much of the Court's privacy
jurisprudence in the efficient rule that the Due Process Clause
protects "family, marriage, and procreation," he neglected to mention
the most obvious principle that, however roughly, might have
explained it. But it is there, in his opinion, in the passage we have
been examining. As that discussion suggests, White may have been
thinking that the Court's privacy precedents could be reconciled on
some principle of public opinion.10 6
104. See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693-94 (Mich. 1920); Queen v. Dudley &
Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 273-74 (1884). In both Roberts and Dudley & Stephens, the
courts passionately express their views about the reprehensibility of the conduct under
consideration. The tone of the respective opinions, however, can (well) be understood as
masking the real legal and moral dilemmas presented by each case. The same might be
said about White's Hardwick opinion. White's retreat to overstatement or reductio (not
necessarily in its formal meaning) may thus partake of a time-honored judicial tradition.
Whether one believes White's opinion was a reflection of his, or a, "homophobic
ideology," see Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason, supra note 17, at 1806, one might
nevertheless appreciate that there may be more to the opinion than that.
105. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (opinion of White, J.).
106. Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 18, at 1524 ("The only distinction
between the activity protected in the Court's previous privacy cases and the behavior
found unprotected in Hardwick is an unpersuasive one-a majoritarian consensus against
homosexual sodomy."); cf. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 923-24 (1973) (discussing consensus in the context of the
lawfulness of abortion and sodomy regulations).
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Naturally, had White attempted to elaborate such a principle, he
quickly would have discovered it lacking. At least two of the cases
White included within his rule-Loving v. Virginia 7 and Roe v.
Wadel' 8-were, to a greater or lesser degree, decided against a
background of social norms that frowned on the conduct that the
Court ultimately found in those cases to be constitutionally
guaranteed as of right.
We will come to Loving later on.109 For present purposes,
however, it will somewhat blunt the challenge Loving would have
presented White (if not completely meet it) to recall that by the time
that Hardwick was decided, there were no serious public calls to
revisit or reverse Loving. It might not have been outlandish for
White to have supposed that, at least by 1986, Loving could be read
to conform with the principle, which he did not specify, animating the
rule, which he did.
Roe, though, was a different matter. Neither at the time it was
decided nor at the time of Hardwick was Roe easily aligned with
social norms or public opinion. Under attack since its inception, Roe
had not been accepted by a vocal and powerful segment of the
American public. Moreover, at the time of Hardwick, the voice and
power of that segment of the public had been amplified through the
connections it had with the leaders of the so-called "Reagan
Revolution," not least among them Reagan Attorney General Edwin
Meese, who had repeatedly called for the Court to overturn Roe.110
It thus would have been exceedingly difficult for White to try to
account for Roe on a principle requiring correspondence between
constitutional rules and social norms. But, in a strange way, it may
partly have been the lessons Roe had taught the Court, and the Roe
Court's refusal to abide by social norms opposing abortion, that
inspired White's mean reading of the Court's privacy precedents."'
Professor Michael McConnell nicely makes the point I intend when
he reminds us that "[t]ouching a hot stove can [itself] be a kind of
precedent. 112
107. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
108. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. See infra Part III and Part IV.B; see also notes 158,222-23.
110. Hence, I can appreciate why Professor Nan Hunter would write that "Hardwick
was the case the Court picked to quiet its Meesian critics." Hunter, supra note 89, at 82.
111. White's discussion of the Court's institutional legitimacy demonstrated that he
had not forgotten the lessons of Roe. See infra Part U.B.3.
112. McConnell, supra note 22, at 701. At times, it is difficult to separate the attacks
on Hardwick from Hardwick itself. It may be that the Court's message in Hardwick was,
as Jed Rubenfeld has characterized it, "We in the majority barely understand why even
[Vol. 79
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White's reliance on the reductio reappears later in his opinion-
at precisely the place where it earlier left off. If the defining feature
of the right of privacy was that it protected those activities in the
sanctity of the home that were socially approved of outside it, what
could White possibly say about Stanley v. Georgia," which protected
in private what in public was-at least in theory114--socially
forbidden?
Stanley, one could say, threatened White's efficient rule about
the scope of the Due Process Clause." 5 His analysis of Stanley thus
began not a little defensively, almost as if responding to a critic who
had challenged his interpretation of the Court's privacy cases by
pointing out that Stanley had protected private possession of
obscenity despite its ostensibly widespread social disapproval:
"Stanley did protect conduct that would not have been protected
these three areas [marriage, procreation, and family relationships] are constitutionally
protected; we simply acknowledge them and note that they are not involved here."
Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 748. As suggested in the text, I am not sure that White had
"barely [any] understand[ing] why even [those] three areas [were] constitutionally
protected." Id. My own view is that he may well have understood why, but may still have
declined to elaborate that understanding because of the difficulties the elaboration would
have presented.
113. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
114. Specifically, I have in mind the theory of the Court's obscenity doctrine that ties
its regulation directly to community-as in social-standards. See, e.g., Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (rejecting obscenity as material utterly lacking "redeeming
social importance" and treating obscenity as appropriately community-defined). For the
view, however, that obscenity, or pornography, is more often condemned in principle than
in practice, see generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 127-205
(1987); MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 50, passim; id. at 87 (noting, not a little
ironically, that the Court's "obscenity test" in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973),
"is so effective that, under it, the pornography industry has quadrupled in size," and
asking parenthetically, "they're being hurt?"); Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Roar on the
Other Side of Silence, in IN HARM'S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS
HEARINGS 3 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997). For a fascinating,
if often overlooked, feminist discussion of pornography, see generally SUSANNE
KAPPELER, THE PORNOGRAPHY OF REPRESENTATION (1986). For more particularized
discussions of gay male pornography in a small, but growing legal academic literature, see
Christopher N. Kendall, Gay Male Pornography After Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium A Call for Gay Male Cooperation in the Struggle for Sex Equality, 12 WIS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 23 (1997) [hereinafter Kendall, Gay Male Cooperation] (arguing that
gay male pornography predicated on sexual hierarchy conflicts with sex equality
principles); Christopher N. Kendall, Real Dominant, Real Fun: Gay Male Pornography
and the Pursuit of Masculinity, 57 SASK. L. REv. 21, 22-23 (1993) (same). For a response
to Kendall's arguments, see CARL F. STYCHIN, LAW'S DESIRE: SEXUALrrY AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE 82-84 (1995); see also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social
Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REv. 661, 662 (1995) (praising gay male pornography
on various grounds), to whom Kendall, Gay Male Cooperation, supra, at 50-51, responds.
115. That it did may shed light on White's decision to treat Stanley independent of the
Court's privacy cases involving "family, marriage, and procreation."
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outside the home, and it partially prevented the enforcement of state
obscenity laws ... ". ,116
This, of course, was exactly the point of arguing Hardwick's case
from Stanley. Because Stanley had protected in private what was
unaccepted in public, even assuming for argument's sake that White
would take the position he did about social disapproval of
homosexuals and homosexuality, he would nevertheless have to
concede that Hardwick's conduct was protected-at least so long as it
took place behind closed, private doors." 7 After all, as White himself
noticed (and explained), "Stanley did protect conduct that would not
have been protected outside of the home." '
But, White continued, quickly deflating the power of such
reasoning by turning to different sets of social (and constitutional)
116. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195 (opinion of White, J.).
117. As Professor William Eskridge has recently argued, the Supreme Court should
"overrule Hardwick for it violates the central lessons of the Court's privacy jurisprudence:
the state has no business in the bedrooms of consenting adults, and in a Freudian culture
we are permitted to do disgusting things with other consenting adults behind closed doors
without incurring legal disabilities." ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 173. There is
here a bridge to be built between Eskridge's observation and Professor William Ian
Miller's fascinating (and stomach-turning) work on disgust. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER,
THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997). Professor Martha Nussbaum's review of Miller's
Anatomy of Disgust, Foul Play, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 1997, at 36 ("There is
certainly a lot to be said about the role played by appeals to disgust in the oppression of
homosexuality."), and another, more recent review she has written speak of the bridge.
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Experiments in Living, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 2000, at 31
(reviewing MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999)) ("Having a lot of shame about our own bodies-and
disgust, too .. -we seek to render our bodies less disturbing; ... frequently [we project]
our own emotions outward, onto vulnerable people and groups who come to embody a
shamefulness and a disgustingness that we then conveniently deny in our[selves]."). See
generally Martha C. Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of Vice:" Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW 19 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (analyzing the relationship
between disgust and male perceptions of homosexuality, especially the identification of
penetrability with a fear of mortality). Miller's Anatomy of Disgust, as Nussbaum's recent
work shows, offers ample material for someone who is interested in aspects of why many
undoubtedly do, as a descriptive matter, find homosexuality disgusting. See MILLER,
supra, at 19-20 ("Semen has the capacity to feminize and humiliate that which it touches.
And it just may be that the durability of misogyny owes much to male disgust for semen.");
103-04 (discussing semen); 101-05 (penises); 17 (Sambian fellatio practices); 126-27
(decay of orgasmic pleasure); 126-27 (orgasm as excessive) 99-101 (anuses); 209 (butt
cracks); 100-01 (dignity and control of the anus); 100 (contamination of anus); 15 (feces);
147-48 (defecation); 70, 101 (confusion of anus with vagina); 128-32 (sex and
degradation); 124-32 (sexual desire); 113-19 (desire's relation to disgust); 120
(prohibitions against desire); 34-36, 198-204 (shame and social/moral order); 114 (shame
and violating prohibitions); 199-200 (stigma); 179-86 (vice); see also Sigmund Freud, The
Most Prevalent Form of Degredation in Erotic Life, in COLLECTED PAPERS 203-16 (Joan
Riviere & J. Strachey eds., 1912) (cited and discussed in MILLER, supra, at 128-32).
118. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195 (opinion of White, J.) (emphasis added).
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norms, "the [Stanley] decision was firmly grounded in the First
Amendment."1 19 Stanley, he announced, jarring many who had
actually read Justice Marshall's opinion in the case,120 was not about
privacy after all.'' The proposition having thus been established by
its mere proclamation, White followed with reductio:
The right pressed upon us here has no similar support in the
text of the Constitution.... Its limits are also difficult to
discern. Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not
always immunized whenever it occurs in the home.
Victimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal
drugs, do not escape the law where they are committed at
home.... [I]f respondent's submission is limited to the
voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults, it
would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution
adultery, incest and other sexual crimes even though they
are committed in the home. We are unwilling to start down
that road.'2
Social norms disapproving of homosexuals and homosexuality, White
taught us (just in case we did not already know), did not stop at, but
pushed beyond the threshold of the bedroom door.
Drawing and defending lines can be tricky business. But so can
erasing them or deciding not to draw them."z If, as I have argued,
119. Ld. at 195 (opinion of White, J.). See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (joined by Brennan and White, JJ.) (treating Stanley as
presenting a Fourth Amendment problem); Al Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v.
Georgia, 1969 SUP. Cr. REV. 203, 215 ("The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart,
joined by Justices Brennan and White, characterized Stanley as a search and seizure
problem of the first aspect.").
120. For a fairly standard reading of Justice Marshall's opinion for the Stanley Court,
see Katz, supra note 119, at 215. See also TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 29, at 1426 ("Justice White's reading of Stanley ignores the Stanley opinion
itself ... and flies in the face of the Court's prior treatment of Stanley as having been
decided on substantive grounds derived largely from the Fourth Amendment." (footnote
omitted)).
121. Of course, if Stanley was not about privacy, but rather about the First
Amendment, it is hard to understand White's evident endorsement of Stanley's protection
of "conduct that would not have been protected outside the home." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at
195 (opinion of White, J.). If Stanley was "firmly grounded in the First Amendment," id,
and not the right to privacy (as well), why would Stanley be limited to the home? Why
would it not directly call into question the existence of the Court's obscenity doctrine?
Why would White's reading of Stanley not overturn that doctrine altogether? If White's
understanding of Stanley was correct, what is there to be said for the distinction between
public and private that the Court relied on in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
65 (1973), to distinguish Stanley?
122. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195-96 (opinion of White, J.).
123. See generally Louis Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 63-65
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White believed social norms provided a reason for distinguishing
between those activities that were protected by the right of privacy
and those that were not, surely he could not have been altogether
serious when he suggested it would have amounted to an exercise of
judicial fiat to place a line between homosexual sodomy and the other
practices (including drug possession and use, adultery, and incest) he
so blithely lumped together. Such a line, after all, was no different in
kind from the line between what constitutional privacy did and did
not entail-the very line that White himself drew even as he
purported to refuse to draw lines.124 Perhaps it is somewhat easier to
see as judgment a line (based on social norms) between social
approval and social disapproval. But how the same line becomes fiat
when placed between varying degrees of social disapproval, White
(1968) (discussing the practice and techniques of judicial line drawing); Yale Kamisar, The
"Right to Die:" On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 489 (1996) (same,
in the context of the "right to die").
124. Even on White's understanding of the evidence of social norms about homosexual
sexual activity, one might propose that disapproval of (some of) such activity was
significantly less severe than the corresponding social disapproval of the other activities he
mentioned. The "disapproval distinction," in other words, which White seemed to
recognize as a legitimate basis for distinguishing between what was and what was not
protected by the right to privacy, could have offered White a justification for recognizing
that private, consensual same-sex sexual activity was constitutionally protected without
necessarily holding that all the other activities (drug possession and use, adultery, incest,
and other sexual crimes committed in the home) were similarly protected. White's failure
to acknowledge the similarities between the line he drew between the Court's earlier
privacy cases, Stanley, and private, consensual sodomy, on the one hand, and the line he
refused to draw between private consensual sodomy and possession and drug use,
adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes in the home, on the other, is not without
consequence. As Professor Louis Henkin explained:
The lines and distinctions of doctrine tell why cases on either side should be
decided differently, and promise that future cases will be decided accordingly.
The line drawn, then, is the symbol of rationality in the judicial process. The line
also guides. It guides the Supreme Court itself, which will often apply it without
reconsideration. It guides the hundreds of courts that take care that the Court's
law is faithfully executed. It guides governmental agencies and citizens and their
lawyers. If the line which the Court draws is not rational, the law and the legal
process become less rational and lose the confidence of those they serve; if a line
is not rational it is less likely to survive; it fails to predict accurately what the
Court's law will be, thereby breeding uncertainty and undermining respect for
Court and law.
Henkin, supra note 123, at 64. One might respond to my suggestion about where White
might have drawn the privacy line, arguing that social disapproval of adultery, for instance,
was (and is) less virulent, perhaps by far, than social disapproval of sodomy or homosexual
sodomy. It may well be that, for men, generally, adultery is not physically punished and is
even sometimes socially prized. For women, however, adultery may be met with quite
different social consequences. But much more, however, would need to be said about
gender and sexual norms and their relationship to social disapproval of adultery to provide
an adequate answer to this objection than seems prudent to go into here.
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never explained."2 His silence here, on a matter so crucial to the
structural integrity of his reasoning, lends weight to the late Tom
Stoddard's blistering criticism of White's Hardwick opinion that it is
an ipse dixit defined. 6
3. Institutional Legitimacy, Caution, Morality and Social Norms
Without more, the argument I have already offered, at least,
strongly suggests that Justice White's Hardwick opinion chiefly relied
on social norms about homosexuals and homosexuality as its basis of
justification.127 But there are two final passages from that opinion
against which the thesis must be tested.
The first passage comes on the heels of White's discussion of the
appropriate method for elaborating unenumerated constitutional
rights and his conclusion that the Constitution extends no
"fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy."" In it, White spelled out his "judgment about the limits of
the Court's role in carrying out its constitutional mandate":12 9
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design
of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully
demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the
Court in the 1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of
much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed on
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. There should be, therefore, great resistance
to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses,
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary
necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the
country without express constitutional authority. The
claimed right pressed on us today falls far short of
overcoming this resistance.Y3 0
125. Perhaps there is a meaningful distinction to be drawn along the lines suggested by
Powell's Hardwick opinion, between "moribund" laws and "vital" ones. For discussion of
this aspect of Powell's opinion, see infra Part II.C.2.
126. See Stoddard, supra note 17, at 653 ("Ipse dixit can never suffice for a decision by
the Supreme Court of the United States and, at bottom, Bowers v. Hardwick is just that.").
127. Indeed, one might regard White's discussions of "homosexuals" and
"homosexuality" throughtout his opinion as further evidence of White's reliance on social
norms. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 187-96 (opinion of White, J.).
128. Id. at 192 (opinion of White, J.).
129. Id. at 190 (opinion of White, J.).
130. Id. at 194-95 (opinion of White, J.). White's biographer, his former clerk,
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White's expressed concern highlights in unequivocal terms his
deep-seated preoccupation with the potential repercussions for the
Court and its precious institutional legitimacy which might have
attended a decision in Hardwick disregarding or overriding
unfavorable social norms about homosexuals and homosexual
sodomy.'3 ' There will yet be time to assess White's reliance on such
pragmatic considerations in reaching his judgment on the merits of
the case.132 At present, I need only note that those considerations are
tightly bound up with White's focus on social norms as a basic
justificatory theme of his Hardwick opinion.
Much the same can be said of the final passage of that opinion.
In it, White observed that Georgia's sodomy law survived rational
basis review because it was supported by widespread moral judgment
disapproving of homosexual sodomy. White started out with "the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable," but dismissed the
Professor Dennis Hutchinson, calls this passage "the heart of the [Hardwick] opinion."
After quoting it, Hutchinson goes on to observe:
Unlike so many modem Supreme Court opinions, the words are absolutely
authentic to the author-down to the ice hockey metaphor awkwardly employed
to evoke the constitutional and political conflict between [President] Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the Supreme Court over the constitutionality of the New Deal in
1937. The diction should not distract from two points. First, the legitimacy of
judicial review-which White worried about in the abortion cases, the death
penalty cases, the campaign financing cases, the legislative veto case, and so on-
was central to the "claimed right," and no deft manipulation of precedent could
gloss over the fact. Second, White added without elaborating a point that some
political scientists and lawyers had argued for years: when the Supreme Court
tests the tensile strength of its legitimacy, it not only threatens principle but
jeopardizes its own political authority. A Court that weakens itself by
overreaching its power invites retaliation by Congress, not only by reversing
statutory decisions legislatively but by restricting the Court's power to hear issues
or cases. Even worse, the Court's capacity to persuade-its only real power, as
Paul Freund liked to emphasize-is likely to be diminished. The loss is likely to
be across the board, at both the center and periphery of its power. The point was
important, not expressly acknowledged before by any opinion for the Court, and
central to the growing debate over the role of the Court and proper basis for
construing the Constitution. White contented himself with making the point with
a single word--"vunerable."
DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT
OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 453-54 (1998).
131. See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 4-5 (1995) ("Whether the concern about legitimacy is valid or not, the
fact is that many members of the Court have regarded it as a fragile institution and have
adopted its preservation as a central part of their obligation.").
132. See infra note 300; Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 40, at 162-
64 (discussing "prudence"-or "pragmatic considerations"-in the context of White's
Hardwick opinion).
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claim that this "presumed belief" was reason enough to invalidate the
law (under rational basis review) by relying-will one be surprised?-
on reductio: "The law, however, is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very
busy indeed." 33 He then went on to invoke what he saw as the broad
moral disapproval of homosexual sodomy, concluding that Georgia's
law could stand: "[Hardwick] insists that majority sentiments about
the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do
not agree, and are unpersuaded that"-note the move--"the sodomy
laws of some 25 [sic] States should be invalidated on this basis.' 134
Q.E.D.
At the outset of this discussion, it might have seemed easy to
confuse White's and Chief Justice Burger's Hardwick opinions.
Perhaps now, the notion that White's opinion, like Burger's,
depended exclusively or primarily on history, including a history of
anti-homosexual morality, may be laid to rest. Quite unlike Burger's
opinion, White's depended on social norms as "the"-or "a"-
primary source of constitutional judgment. It was social norms-and
not history, much less history by itself-that provided the analytic
foundation for White's conclusion. And what was that conclusion?
To repeat, borrowing Sunstein's formulation: given existing social
norms, as evidenced in the pattern of state laws barring this practice,
which had lengthy historical roots, White's Hardwick opinion "held
that the due process clause does not protect the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy."'35
133. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (opinion of White, J.).
134. Id. (opinion of White, J.). It was not Georgia's majority's morality alone, White's
opinion can be read to say ("the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia
that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable," Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196
(opinion of White, J.)), that supported his decision to uphold the state's sodomy ban. But
see TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 1426 ("The only
justification offered to, or considered by, the Hardwick [Court] was that a majority of the
Georgia legislature had decreed that private acts of oral and anal sex offend public
morality. [White's Hardwick opinion] deemed this sufficient, since '[p]roscriptions against
that conduct have ancient roots.' "). That might have been the simple tautological
reasoning Tribe argued it was. Rather, it was "majority sentiment about the morality of
homosexuality," Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (opinion of White, J.), that supported White's
conclusion, and not just the majoritarian sentiment in Georgia, as the very next sentence
of White's opinion makes clear: "We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy
laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis." Id. (opinion of White, J.).
White's discussion of morality was thus tied into the same majoritarian norms-what I
have been calling social norms-that fueled the rest of his opinion.
135. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution, supra note 24, at 1161. One
could put White's holding differently, as Professor Donald Dripps has. See Dripps, supra
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
But wait. Have I not just effectively given up on the possibility
of creatively reinterpreting Hardwick? If White's opinion "held that
the due process clause does not protect the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy," and that opinion was, as it purported to be, the
"opinion of the Court," is the attempt to reinterpret Hardwick not
already at an end? No-far from it. Through a close reading of
Justice Powell's Hardwick opinion, I will show why.
C. Justice Powell's Fifth Vote: Deciding Not to Decide
Justice Powell provided Justice White with that crucial fifth vote
White needed to write formally in the Court's name. Like Chief
Justice Burger, Powell began his separate opinion by indicating his
agreement. "I join the opinion of the Court," Powell wrote,
continuing: "I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental
right-i.e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clause-such
as that claimed by respondent Hardwick, and found to exist by the
Court of Appeals.' 1 36
Perhaps it goes without saying. But not all joins are created
equal. Because Powell's initial remarks read like a basic endorsement
of White's reasoning, one can begin to appreciate why relatively so
few commentators have noticed that Powell's opinion can be read
another way.137
To understand, one must recall the nature of the right that
Hardwick claimed and that the court of appeals found. Professor
note 11, at 1440-41 ("If, as I have argued, all the Hardwick Court held is that an
unenforced, 'moribund' sodomy statute is constitutional, then the Court's decision leaves
utterly open the question of what civil law liabilities the Constitution allows the
government to impose on account of sexual orientation."). Indeed, Dripps goes so far as
to argue that had the Court been presented with something other than a "moribund" law,
as represented by an actual challenge to a conviction by a lesbian or gay man for engaging
in private, consensual sodomy, White might have voted differently. See id. at 1436-39. I
somehow doubt it. But to the extent that Dripps intimates that now-Chief Justice
Rehnquist might also have switched his vote in such a case, I doubt that even more. Still,
stranger things have happened. Compare the Rehnquist's position in Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (upholding Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966), as having
laid down a rule of constitutional law), with his position in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433 (1974) (describing Miranda's rule as prophylactic, not itself constitutionally
commanded). For commentary on Rehnquist's position on the Court's ruling in Miranda,
see Yale Kamisar, Reflections on Dickerson v. United States, Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the Oregon State Bar Association (Sept. 15, 2000) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
136. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (opinion of Powell, J.).
137. Some have simply overlooked Powell's Hardwick opinion, while others have
thought it enough to stop after remarking that he sounded his agreement with White's
privacy analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 89, at 83.
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Laurence Tribe (for Hardwick) advocated and the court of appeals
announced a fundamental right to engage in private, non-commercial
intimate association between consenting adults-a right that itself
would include a right to engage in private same-sex sexual activity.
138
This is the right that Powell, joining White, said was not protected as
fundamental under the Due Process Clause. His opening agreement
with White thus did not itself analytically preclude recognition of
either a narrower right to engage in same-sex sexual activity or an
alternative grounding for such a right. We will come back to this
point in a moment.
138. As Tribe remarked at oral arguments in Hardwick, on Hardwick's behalf: "I think
... it is misleading to say that we are championing a fundamental right to commit a
particular sexual act. We are saying that there is a fundamental right to restrict
government's intimate regulation of the privacies of association like [this] in the home."
Oral Argument for Respondents, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reprinted in
164 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 653-54 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1987)
[hereinafter Hardwick Oral Arguments]. Or, as Tribe explained in his Hardwick brief,
there is a fundamental right to engage in "wholly consensual, noncommercial sexual
relations between willing adults." Tribe, Hardwick Brief, supra note 95, at 4. Or, as he
put it a few pages later: "This case involves a claim of constitutional protection for the
associational intimacies of private life in the sanctuary of the home." I. at 7 (footnote
omitted). The omitted footnote specified that "[n]o claim of special protection is made
here for all activities that may be deemed 'intimate,' nor for all activities that may seek
shelter inside the four walls of a private home." Id. at n.8 (internal reference omitted).
The internal reference is to "Section II" of the Tribe brief, which he captioned, "CLOSE
SCRUTINY OF A LAW THAT CRIMINALIZES THE MOST PRIVATE OF
RELATIONSHIPS WILL IN NO WAY ENDANGER LAWS THAT REGULATE
THE PUBLIC SPHERE." Id. at 19. In that section of his brief, Tribe dealt not only with
the public/private distinction, but also explained that all private sexual relations, e.g.,
adultery or polygamy, were not immune from regulation under his theory of the case. Id.
at 23. As Tribe additionally went on to explain: "Marriage ... is a contract controlled by
the state .... Thus close scrutiny of state intrusion upon private, consensual,
noncommercial sexual acts ... does not suggest similar scrutiny of laws that would restrain
those who have entered marriage contracts from violating those agreements." Id.
(footnotes and citations omitted); see also TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 29, at 1427-29 (arguing that the Hardwick Court used the wrong level of
generality to conceptualize Michael Hardwick's consitutional claim); TRIBE & DORF,
supra note 22, at 73-76 (discussing what level of generality should be used to describe a
fundamental right). The court of appeals spoke of the broad right involved in Hardwick in
terms that lent weight to Tribe's point. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th
Cir. 1985) ("[T]he ... Court's analysis of the right to privacy ... leads us to conclude...
Georgia['s] sodomy statute implicates a fundamental right of Michael Hardwick. The
activity he hopes to engage in is quintessentially private and lies at the heart of an intimate
association beyond the proper reach of state regulation."); id. ("This is not a case
involving sexual activity with children or with persons who are coerced either through
physical force or commercial inducement. The absence of any such public ramifications in
this case plays a prominent part in our consideration of Hardwick's legal claim.").
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To be sure, White was not impervious to Hardwick's claim about
a generalized right to private sexual intimacies. He expressly
mentioned it in several places in his opinion in order, of course, to
dismiss it.139  Throughout the remainder of his opinion, however,
White demonstrated far, far greater interest in evaluating and
rejecting the basis for constitutionally recognizing the considerably
narrower "fundamental right [of] homosexuals to engage in
sodomy." 14 Had White not said so expressly, it would nevertheless
have followed logically from his rejection of a narrow right to engage
in homosexual sodomy that he did not believe there was a generalized
right of privacy or sexual privacy. No lesser, hence no greater.14
1
Powell, in contrast, began his opinion by speaking only of the
broad right of sexual privacy. In doing so, he left open the possibility
that the narrower right might yet be found to exist. What Professor
Yale Kamisar has written elsewhere seems equally applicable here:
139. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 189 (opinion of White, J.) (noting that the circuit court held
"that the Georgia statute violated respondent's fundamental rights because his
homosexual activity is a private and intimate association that is beyond the reach of state
regulation by reason of the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment," and then going on to state "[w]e agree with the petitioner that
the Court of Appeals erred, and hence reverse its judgment"); id. at 191 (opinion of
White, J.) ("[A]ny claim that [the Court's privacy cases] stand for the proposition that any
kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from
state proscription is unsupportable. Indeed, the Court's opinion in Carey [v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),] twice asserted that the privacy right.., did not
reach so far.") (citation omitted); id. at 195 (opinion of White, J.) ("[I]f respondent's
submission is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would
be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving
exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are
committed in the home.").
140. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 (opinion of White, J.) ("The issue presented is whether
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct
illegal and have done so for a very long time."); see also, e.g., id. at 190-91 (opinion of
White, J.) ("[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears
any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy that is asserted in this case."); id. at 191 (opinion of White, J.) ("Precedent aside,
however, respondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals did, a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy."); id. at 192 (opinion of White, J.) ("[N]either of
these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of
consensual sodomy."); id. at 195 (opinion of White, J.) ("Respondent, however, asserts
that the result should be different where the homosexual conduct occurs in the privacy of
the home.").
141. But see Cruz, supra note 38, at 326 ("The Constitution might include a more
broadly formulated right while not including a more narrowly formulated one if the
abstract specification names a constitutionaly protected value while the more concrete
specification does not.").
142. Perhaps Justice Powell's opinion can be read to have left open the possibility that
the broader right might yet be found to exist. See infra Part II.C.2.
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Powell's focus on the broad right may well have been a result of his
"reluctance to rule out the possibility of a right to [engage in private,
consensual gay sex between adults] in every set of circumstances and
a desire to 'proceed with special caution' in this area."'43 Perhaps the
best evidence that this is so is found in that language of Powell's
opinion, in which he proposed that a successful challenge under the
Eighth Amendment might lie for an adult who had been punished by
prosecution, conviction, and sentence for engaging in consensual and
non-commercial private sodomy with another adult of the same sex
(what, for the sake of ease, I will call either "private same-sex sex" or
"private gay sex").
I will continue explaining how Powell's opinion can be read to
have left the door open for a future challenge to a law banning
homosexual sodomy. But before I do, let me flag one sentence from
his opinion, in which he appeared to be embracing a much larger
portion of White's reasoning than I have and will suggest. "But the
constitutional validity of the Georgia statute was put in issue by
respondents," Powell wrote, "and for the reasons stated by the Court, I
cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now
become a fundamental right."" I will return to this remark once its
surrounding context has been illuminated. For the time being let me
simply say that, properly set in context, the meaning of this
sentence-with its significant but much missed "now"-is different
than what, taken in isolation, it might appear to be.
143. Kamisar, supra note 26, at 915. In the passage from which I quote, Professor
Kamisar is dealing with the meaning of Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in the Court's
recent assisted suicide cases, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
Be that as it may, by focusing on the broad-as opposed to the narrow-right
involved in Hardwick, Powell may have shown that his concern with what Dean John C.
Jeffries, Jr. has called the "'human dimensions' of laws against homosexuals." JEFFRIES,
supra note 103, at 527. Certainly, the emphasis is some indication of the "gulf that
separated [Powell] from Burger and White." Id As Jeffries has explained more fully:
[Powell's opinion] said merely that imprisonment for consensual sodomy would
create a serious Eighth Amendment issue, which he would not get into as it had
not been raised below. The point seemed almost an aside. It did not convey the
strength of Powell's commitment to the Eighth Amendment theory or suggest
how far he was prepared to go. It did not reveal the gulf that separated him from
Burger and White. It said nothing about the doubts and concerns that had led
Powell first to vote against the Georgia sodomy statute and only later to change
his mind. It gave no hint that anyone in the Court's majority was the least
concerned about the "human dimensions" of laws against homosexuals.
Id.
144. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
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1. Powell's Eighth Amendment Theory
After telling us he joined Justice White's opinion, Justice Powell
went on to elaborate an Eighth Amendment theory of the case,
presumed by many commentators to be a major motivation for
writing separately:
This is not to suggest, however, that [Hardwick] may not be
protected by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.
The Georgia statute at issue in this case authorizes a court to
imprison a person for up to 20 years for a single private,
consensual act of sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for
such conduct-certainly a sentence of long duration-would
create a serious Eighth Amendment issue. Under the
Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, even in the private
setting of a home, is a felony comparable in terms of the
possible sentence imposed [for] serious felonies such as
aggravated battery, first-degree arson, and robbery .... 145
Professor Kendall Thomas has offered one interpretation of this
aspect of Powell's opinion. According to Thomas:
The implication is clear enough. Justice Powell in effect
proposes what might be called a constitutional "systems
analysis," whose task would be to compare the sanctions
provided for under Georgia's sodomy law with those
criminal statutes that carry similar punishments. If this
comparative inquiry shows that the substantive conduct
criminalized under [those] other statutes is more "serious"
than the consensual sexual acts proscribed by the sodomy
law, then the sanction provided under the sodomy statute
may be deemed disproportionately excessive, thus rendering
the law itself constitutionally suspect"' 6
145. Id. at 197-98 (opinion of Powell, J.) (footnote and citations omitted). As Powell
then concluded, "In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much less convicted
and sentenced. Moreover, respondent has not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below.
For these reasons this constitutional argument is not before us." Id. at 198 (opinion of
Powell, J.) (footnote omitted).
146. Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, supra note 14, at 1471. Expanding on his
interpretation, Thomas observed:
[I]n a strict sense, the disproportionality argument by no means logically
forecloses retention of "sodomy" statutes as part of the substantive criminal law.
For example, one cannot tell from Justice Powell's opinion whether, and if so
why, a statute imposing ten months in prison would pass constitutional muster
and one imposing ten years would not. At this level, Powell's position arguably
relies more on intuition than objective analysis.
Id. at 1471 n.152. To foreshadow, one way of understanding Powell's Eighth Amendment
theory is to read it as suggesting that any criminal punishment for homosexual sodomy
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Thomas's reading is certainly plausible. After all, Powell did
note that the Georgia law under consideration in Hardwick
authorized a prison sentence for as long as twenty years for engaging
in a single act of consensual sodomy.14 7 And he did observe that
"[u]nder the Georgia statute[,] a single act of sodomy, even in the
private setting of a home, is a felony comparable in terms of the
possible sentence imposed [for] serious felonies such as aggravated
battery, first-degree arson, and robbery."' 48 And so, it may well
sound as if Powell had in mind precisely the kind of "systems
analysis" Thomas has described.
One plausible reading alone, however, does not define a text. In
the case of Powell's opinion, an equally-if not more-plausible
reading than Thomas's calls out for attention. Powell, it should be
remembered, did not ultimately take aim at "a [prison] sentence of
long duration" for private same-sex sex. Rather, it was any prison
sentence for such conduct, Powell said, that would face a serious
constitutional obstacle. In the Justice's own words, "In my view, a
prison sentence for such conduct-certainly a sentence of long
duration-would create a serious Eighth Amendment issue."' 49
One need not agree entirely with Thomas's reading of Powell's
opinion (and I do not) in order to share his view that "Powell's
argument regarding an Eighth Amendment-based challenge to anti-
would be unconstitutional. That reading and Thomas's raise different sets of questions.
Thomas's reading, on the one hand, might lead one to wonder: Why would "a statute
imposing ten months in prison ... pass constitutional muster and one imposing ten years
... not[?]" li On the other hand, the reading I am presently proposing might lead one to
ask: Should a criminal sanction for private gay sex be treated differently, for
constitutional purposes, than a non-criminal one? If so, why? I myself think it doubtful
that the Court would have long maintained, had it ever accepted, a distinction between
criminal and non-criminal sanctions for private gay sex. Still, had it wished to maintain
such a distinction, the Court would have had ample doctrinal resources at its disposal.
Thus, on reading reading of it, Powell's Eighth Amendment theory does not decide the
case in which a criminal conviction under state law for private, gay sex carried only a
punishment of a fine; it might or might not be unconstitutional. An interesting theory that
one might fruitfully develop is that a civil sanction for consensual gay sex could be treated
as an unconstitutional "taking" under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. (No puns
intended.) Finally, I am inclined to think-for reasons I explain later, see infra Part
II.C.2-that Powell was not really so particularly interested in a distinction between
criminal and non-criminal sanctions as his Eighth Amendment theory might, at first
glance, seem to imply.
147. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197-98 (opinion of Powell, J.) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 197-98 (opinion of Powell, J.) (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 197 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added); see also JEFFRIES, supra note
103, at 527 ("Powell was prepared to rule that a lengthy prison sentence-indeed, any
prison sentence-would be grossly excessive for private sexual activity between consenting
adults." (emphasis added)).
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sodomy statutes clearly rests on a view that the meaning of the
amendment is an evolving one.""15 As Powell undoubtedly knew, the
Court had expressly tied the meaning of the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to the notion of "evolving
standards of decency" in cases pre-dating Hardwick.15 1
So what did those "evolving standards of decency" as they
pertained to criminal punishment for engaging in private gay sex look
like at the time of the decision in Hardwick? One finds an answer at
that moment in Powell's opinion when he turned a spotlight on the
representation made to the Court during oral arguments by Georgia's
150. Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, supra note 14, at 1471 n.150.
151. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (Powell, J., for the Court). All
nine Justices (even the Justices in dissent) agreed on one point in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972): the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is an evolving
one. The Court had also used the expression "contemporary standards of decency."
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 343. As Donald Dripps has observed, "Powell played a leading role in
moving the Court to scrutinize prison terms, as well as death sentences, under the Eighth
Amendment's 'cruel and unusual punishments' language." Dripps, supra note 11, at 1434.
The "evolving standards of decency" test that Thomas identified within Powell's opinion is
a reflection of Powell's reliance on social norms in reaching his conclusion. But more must
be said before I elaborate my thoughts about that conclusion.
The two readings of Powell's opinion-the one offered here and the one Thomas
has proposed-can thus be expressed in terms of which the Court's Eighth Amendment
precedents most closely correspond to Powell's Eighth Amendment theory. Thomas's
reading would (and did) rely on the Court's decision in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-
92 (1983), whereas the reading in the text might draw on Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); or Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
See Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, supra note 14, at 1470-72, 1471 n.151
For additional discussions of the merits of relying on Robinson to understand the
reasoning of Powell's Hardwick opinion, see GARROW, supra note 103, at 659 (noting that
Powell relied on Robinson at the Conference discussion of Hardwick); JEFFRIES, supra
note 103, at 520 ("The [Powell] clerks ... invoked a different aspect of Eight Amendment
law, the 1962 decision in Robinson v. California.... [T]he clerks felt that the act of
sodomy was so closely linked to the status of homosexuality that perhaps Robinson could
be stretched to protect both from criminal prosecution."); id. at 520 (noting that Powell
accepted the clerk's recommendation of the Robinson theory). But see GARROW, supra
note 103, at 660 (quoting memorandum from Powell to the Conference backing away from
his reliance on Robinson but reserving decision on whether he would "join an opinion
finding no substantive due process right or simply join the judgment"); JEFFRIES, supra
note 103, at 526 (observing that after the Conference discussion of Hardwick, Powell
"abandoned" the Robinson approach to the case in favor of a "disproportionality" theory
of the case); id. at 527 ("Powell was prepared to rule that a lengthy prison sentence-
indeed any prison sentence-would be grossly excessive for private sexual activity
between consenting adults.... [T]his reasoning allowed Powell ... to forbid criminal
punishment for homosexual sodomy without getting into the more difficult issues ... he
did not want to face."). One could think of Robinson as a kind of "disproportionality"
case in that any prison sentence, given the nature of the offense, was out of proportion to
any reasonable governmental end. But this is a different and broader conception of
"disproportionality" than that at issue in a case like Solem, or in the kind of constitutional
"systems analysis" Thomas has described.
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Attorney General, that private same-sex sex was not ordinarily (and
had not, for years, been) an offense that led to criminal prosecution,
conviction, or sentence. 52 Extrapolating from the state of affairs in
Georgia, Powell can be read to have expressed the "evolving
standard" quite capaciously (and in a way that White's opinion,
evidently, disregarded): "The history of nonenforcement [in Georgia]
suggests the moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type
of private, consensual conduct."'53 As if to reinforce the point, there
152. Hardwick Oral Arguments, supra note 138, at 634. As Powell explained:
It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against respondent
Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving prosecution for private
homosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades. Moreover, the State
has declined to present the criminal charge against Hardwick to a grand jury, and
this is a suit for declaratory judgment brought by respondents challenging the
validity of the statute. The history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund
character today of laws criminalizing this type of private consensual conduct.
Some 26 States have repealed similar statutes. But the constitutional validity of
the Georgia statute was put in issue by respondents, and for the reasons stated by
the Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now
become a fundamental right."
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (opinion of Powell, J.) (citation omitted). Hereafter, when I
speak about "sentencing" or "punishment" in the context of Powell's opinion, I will
generally do so with prosecution, conviction, and sentence in mind, unless otherwise
specified or clear from context.
153. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.). The standard reply to a suggestion like Powell's, that
sodomy laws go unenforced, at least insofar as private gay sex is concerned, is that it is
simply not true. Tribe, for instance, assails the argument from desuetude at its source:
Michael Hardwick actually spent that day in jail following his arrest by the
Atlanta police. [See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 667 ("Even one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a
common cold.").] He was incarcerated despite the fact that a bondsman was
present at the processing desk almost immediately upon his arrival at the jail....
To defer resolution of the eighth amendment issue until ... a [formal] jail
sentence-something that may never occur hereafter-is to give state officials a
license to inflict cruelty without legal accountability, since the laws criminalizing
consensual adult intimacies are most typically used "only" to stigmatize, to justify
discriminatory treatment, and to victimize individuals in the very way Michael
Hardwick was victimized-without trial or sentence. Thus jailers and
prosecutors could forever insulate statutes such as Georgia's from judicial review
by the simple expedient of arresting and temporarily jailing offenders but
declining to complete prosecution. In a strange inversion of the civil contempt
context, where prisoners hold the keys to their own jail cells, jailers in Atlanta
and elsewhere would hold the keys to the federal courthouse.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 1425 n.32 (citation omitted).
"Cruelty without accountability" is strong language, as is the language in the
remainder of Tribe's argument. I concur in Tribe's observation that sodomy laws, even
though they go unenforced, are used to "punish" gays in a number of direct and indirect
ways. But the observation may, for some, be no answer to Powell's point that sodomy
laws are not used to "punish" gays for private, consensual sodomy in the ordinary sense of
what "criminal punishment" means (under the Eighth Amendment). One could say that if
Tribe does give us an answer, it is because he has changed the question to one about what
4092001]
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is Powell's additional remark that "[s]ome 26 States ha[d] repealed
similar statutes.' 1 54 One might say that, from aught Powell surveyed,
"evolving standards of decency" seemed harmoniously aligned: 5 s
punishment, certainly criminal sentence, for engaging in private gay
sex was beyond the constitutional pale.
Still, Powell may be thought to have reasoned, there had been no
deviation from the straight and narrow of those "decent" standards in
Hardwick. "In this case," Powell wrote, ending his short opinion,
"respondent has not been tried, much less convicted and sentenced.
Moreover, respondent has not raised the Eighth Amendment issue
below. For these reasons this constitutional argument is not before
US"1 5 6
As Hardwick's counsel before the Court, Tribe did not forget-
nor did he fail to mention-that his client had been subject to the
processes of the criminal law. In order to keep the Court from
veering away from a judgment on the merits, Tribe repeatedly went
out of his way to emphasize that Hardwick had been arrested and,
under the relevant statute of limitations, "remain[ed] subject to
prosecution for the charged offenses.' 1 57 Perhaps as a strategy for
(un)constitutional "punishment" is or should be. For the argument that, however
harrowing and humiliating Hardwick's day in jail, id. ("While putting him behind bars ...
jail officers made it clear to the other inmates that Hardwick was gay and had been
charged with sodomy, saying, 'Wait until we put [him] into the bullpen. Well, fags
shouldn't mind-after all, that's why they are here.' "), it was not the same thing as serving
a prison sentence after being convicted of a felony, see Dripps, supra note 11, at 1424 n.27
("Note how artfully Tribe equivocates between Hardwick's particular injury-the arrest,
of which Hardwick did not complain-and the common grievance against official insult, of
which he did complain.").
154. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (opinion of Powell, J.).
155. Cf WHIm, supra note 36, at 170 ("It is a deep part of our understanding of the law
that the results in particular cases should not only be legal but just, and this naturally leads
judges and lawyers alike to see harmony in the various sources of authority that bear on a
case.").
156. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 (opinion of Powell, J.) (footnote omitted).
157. Tribe, Hardwick Brief, supra note 95, at 2 (citation and footnote omitted). During
the oral arguments in Hardwick, Tribe explained that:
I want to make some comment about the suggestion implicit in some of the
questions, that the absence of frequent prosecution in cases like this, apart from
how strongly it suggests the State of Georgia hardly has a compelling or
important interest in vindicating this law, might also provide an avenue for
avoiding a decision much as the Court found one in Poe versus Ullman.
It does not seem to me that that avenue is a plausible one here for several
reasons. After all, Mr. Hardwick was arrested. Under this very arrest, he could
still be prosecuted. Under this arrest, he is subject to considerable restraint.
And, the state's undisputed resolve to enforce this law, at least in some instances,
according to their own catalogue of where they think it is appropriate to enforce
it if evidence comes to their attention. That resolve is undiminished, especially
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keeping the Court on course towards a judgment on the merits,
Tribe's maneuver worked (although, as I will presently explain, I have
my doubts). But all the same, by highlighting 'for the Court that
Hardwick had not been subject to actual prosecution, conviction, or
sentence, Tribe reminded Powell that he had all the wiggle room he
might have wanted or needed to avoid handing Hardwick the relief he
sought, even under an Eighth Amendment theory.
58
As I have suggested, one can read Powell to say, perhaps a little
coldly, 59 that Hardwick had to bear the risk of punishment, including
sentence, for private same-sex sex (tiny though the risk appeared),
discounted by the likely success of a subsequent Eighth Amendment
challenge. If one were to read Powell's opinion this way, one would
probably understand Powell's talk about the history of non-
prosecution for private gay sex in Georgia and the inference it helped
raise about the "moribund character ... of laws criminalizing"
private, consensual sodomy' 60 as nothing much more or less than a set
since this is a facial attack on the law.
It seems to us that the nature of the harm that Mr. Hardwick suffers from
having been arrested and being told he is a criminal and might be arrested again
makes it very difficult to avoid decisions.
Hardwick Oral Arguments, supra note 138, at 650. Thanks to my colleague Joan Larsen
for helping me see the point clearly.
158. It is interesting to note that Loving involved a formal conviction for Virginia's
prohibition against miscegenation. The Lovings were convicted and sentenced for
miscegenating, but their one-year prison sentence was suspended on the condition that
they leave Virginia for a period of years. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967). (The
facts of Loving thus look remarkably like the facts of a sodomy case that, as I will explain,
Powell may have been awaiting.) One might think that prosecution and punishment for
violating state law was a significant difference between Loving and Hardwick. It is hard to
say, however, whether that difference makes Loving an easier case or a harder case than
Hardwick. From one perspective, Loving (which involved both formal prosecution and
punishment) may seem an easier case than Hardwick (which did not). But from another
perspective, the fact that the Lovings were criminally punished might be regarded as
evidence that the cultural norms disapproving miscegenation were still electric at the time
Loving was decided in a way cultural norms disapproving homosexual sodomy at the time
of Hardwick were not. Cf. Note, Constitutionality of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes, 58 YALE
L.J. 472,479 & n.41 (1949) (discussing several prosecutions under miscegenation state laws
from the late 1940s). Accordingly, Loving may be a harder case than Hardwick, or it may
be more accurate to say, Loving is both easier and harder than Hardwick (and vice versa).
Either way, laws against miscegenation were not always only used to punish individuals for
miscegenating. In Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350
U.S. 891 (1955), affd, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S.
985 (1956) (per curiam), they were, for example, used as the basis for annulling a
marriage. For additional discussion of Naim, see infra Part IV.A.
159. See JEFFRIES, supra note 103, at 527 (proposing that Powell's opinion "gave no
hint that anyone in the Court's majority was the least concerned about the 'human
dimensions' of laws against homosexuals").
160. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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of "talking points" for an Eighth Amendment opinion Powell might
have written (or joined) in some future sodomy case. But before
stopping with this reading, we should sharpen our interpretive tools
and dig more deeply into Powell's Hardwick opinion to see what else
it can be interpreted to say.
2. Powell's Opinion (Re-)Defined
We often speak of a text's "plain meaning," but as a general, if
not categorical, rule, meaning is not found on the surface of a text.161
Justice Powell's Hardwick opinion is no exception, and it is a mistake
to treat it as if it were. Reading Powell's opinion as simply having set
forth an Eighth Amendment proscription against sodomy laws does
not explain the entirety of this very short text. Nor, for that matter,
does such a reading capture the notable gap in Powell's reasoning,
nor yet, as we will see, the text's notable internal conflict. Although
Powell himself did not put it this way, his reference to an Eighth
Amendment theory of the case, along with his refusal to pass
judgment on it, can be understood as a stand-in for a refusal to decide
Hardwick's due process claim. 62
161. See FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 31, at 87 ("Just as there
are those in the legal community who have insisted on construing statutes and decisions
'strictly,' ... so there are those in the literary community who have insisted that
interpretation is, or should be, constrained by what is 'in the text.' "). See generally FISH,
Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?, supra note 50 (articulating assumptions that can
underlie the interpretation of written text). My argument here may be in part an appeal to
the text. But as should become clear, it is at most only in part an appeal to the text. See id.
at 340 ("One cannot appeal to the text, because the text has become an extension of the
interpretive disagreement that divides[;] and, in fact, the text as it is variously
characterized is a consequence of the interpretation for which it is supposedly evidence.").
The reading of Powell's opinion and the redefinition of Hardwick I am trying to enable
will be preferable to the standard interpretation of Hardwick, or not, for reasons other
than what Powell's text "plainly says." Social context, for example, is one source of
judgment that may provide an additional reason for reading Powell's text the way I am
about to do. See infra Part IV.C. The specification of that context and the relevant facts
within it are not, I recognize, simply interpretive causes, but interpretive consequences, as
well. See FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 31, at 108. ("But while it is
certainly true that context constrains interpretation, it is also true ... that context is a
product of interpretation and as such is itself variable as a constraint.").
162. Of course, it is not self-evident that the argument from desuetude need be an
argument for judicial hand staying. To the contrary, should laws banning sodomy go
unenforced, one might reasonably argue that the Court should have stepped in to
pronounce last rites on a dead law. See SUNSTEiN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 51, at
108-15 (discussing the argument from desuetude generally and in the particular context of
laws banning physician-assisted suicide); id. at 110 (proposing that White's opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment),
"can be understood to point to concerns" of desuetude). One version of an argument
from desuetude calls for courts to strike down laws that show no continued signs of
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Let us begin by considering the striking parallels between
Powell's Eighth Amendment reasoning and the legal theory Justice
Felix Frankfurter utilized to avoid a judgment on the merits in Poe v.
Ullman.163  Impressed by the history of nonenforcement of
Connecticut's anti-contraceptive law, Frankfurter maintained that
"[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy-or
not carrying it out-are often tougher and truer law than the dead
words of the written text."'164 From this, it was but a small step for
Frankfurter to conclude that Poe did not present the Court with the
kind of real controversy that warranted judgment on the merits of the
substantive constitutional issue ostensibly implicated by the case:
It is clear that the mere existence of a state penal statute
would constitute insufficient grounds to support a federal
court's adjudication of its constitutionality in proceedings
brought against the State's prosecuting officials if real threat
of enforcement is wanting. If the prosecutor expressly
agrees not to prosecute, a suit against him for declaratory
and injunctive relief is not such an adversary case as will be
reviewed here. Eighty years of Connecticut history
demonstrate a similar, albeit tacit agreement. The fact that
Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this
statute deprives these controversies of the immediacy which
is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication.
This Court cannot be umpire to debates concerning
harmless, empty shadows. To find it necessary to pass on
these statutes now, in order to protect appellants from the
hazards of prosecution, would be to close our eyes to
reality.1 65
vitality, but leaves room for legislatures to resuscitate them. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716, 731-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (applying such an argument from
desuetude to strike down a state law banning physician-assisted suicide). For other
commentary on the arguments from desuetude, see, for example, Corey Chivers,
Desuetude, Due Process, and the Scarlet Letter Revisited, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 449, 489-90.
For recent commentary on desuetude in the realm of substantive due process, see Cruz,
supra note 38, at 333-39.
163. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (plurality opinion). Powell was reminded of Frankfurter's Poe
theory during oral arguments in Hardwick. See supra note 157 (setting forth remarks by
Tribe in the oral arguments in Hardwick about Frankfurter's decision in Poe).
164. Poe, 367 U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
165. Id at 507-08 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Frankfurter's views seem to
have dripped from Judge Learned Hand's pen when he wrote that since the power of
judicial review "is not a logical deduction from the structure of the Constitution but only a
practical condition upon its successful operation, it need not be exercised whenever a
court sees or thinks that it sees, an invasion of the Constitution. It is always a preliminary
question how importunately the occasion demands an answer." LEARNED HAND, THE BILL
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There are unmistakable echoes of Frankfurter's reasoning in
Powell's elaboration of his Eighth Amendment rationale in
Hardwick. The "concession" at oral argument "that, prior to the
complaint against respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported
decision involving prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under
this statute for several decades,"'66 and the state's choice not "to
present the criminal charge against Hardwick to a grand jury"'167 were
strong indications of what "the law" of sodomy in Georgia (and
elsewhere) was at the time Hardwick was decided. As Frankfurter
expressed the idea: "[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of carrying
out state policy-or not carrying it out-are often tougher and truer
law than the dead words of the written act.' 1 68 Powell captured the
gestalt of Frankfurter's Poe plurality with his own remark that "[t]he
OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 15 (1958). It is no coincidence
that Hand's famous Holmes Lecture (later published as The Bill of Rights) should sound
so much like Frankfurter. Frankfurter's influence on Hand in putting the lectures together
has been well documented by Hand's biographer and former clerk, Professor Gerald
Gunther. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND, THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 664-72
(1994) (noting the influence of Frankfurter in the development of Hand's Holmes
Lectures). Gently casting doubt on Hand's views in The Bill of Rights, Professor Herbert
Wechsler explained in his well-known article on "neutral principles":
If [Hand's view] means that a court, in a case properly before it, is free-or
should be free on any fresh view of its duty-either to adjudicate a constitutional
objection to an otherwise determinative action of the legislature or executive,
national or state, or to decline to do so, depending on "how importunately" it
considers the occasion to demand an answer, could anything have more
enormous import for the theory and the practice of review? What showing
would be needed to elicit a decision? Would anything suffice short of a
demonstration that judicial intervention is essential to prevent the government
from foundering-the reason, you recall, for the interpolation of the power to
decide? For me, as for anyone who finds the judicial power anchored in the
Constitution, there is no such escape from the judicial obligation; the duty cannot
be attenuated in this way.
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
6 (1959). Even the great devotee and proponent of the "passive virtues" of judicial review
(and the former Frankfurter clerk) Professor Alexander Bickel thought that Hand had
gone too far and called Hand's argument "a radical doctrine of judicial restraint." See
Alexander M. Bickel, Judicial Restraint and the Bill of Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, May 12,
1958, at 16 (quoted in GUNTHER, supra, at 782 n.104). To some, like Gunther, Bickel's
advocacy of the passive virtues in his book, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d. ed. 1986) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH], teetered on the edge of radicalness themselves. See
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1964) [hereinafter Gunther,
Subtle Vices].
166. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 (opinion of Powell, J.) (citation omitted).
167. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.).
168. Poe, 367 U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
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history of nonenforcement [of Georgia's sodomy ban] suggests the
moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of private
consensual conduct"-particularly given that "[s]ome 26 States ha[d]
repealed similar statutes.' 169
This was all Powell needed to say in order to establish the
predicate for his Eighth Amendment theory. He had adequately set
forth what the "evolving standards of decency" were and pointed out
that nothing indecent in the relevant constitutional sense had
happened to Hardwick. Was Powell, then, simply embellishing the
point a little too gaudily when he went out of his way to mention that
Hardwick was "a suit for declaratory judgment brought by
respondents challenging the validity of the statute,''170 and when, just
a few short sentences later, he wrote to similar effect that "the
constitutional validity of the Georgia statute was put in issue by
respondents,'' and again at the end of his opinion, that "respondent
has not been tried, much less convicted and sentenced"?" Perhaps
SO.
Powell's additional remarks make a good deal more sense,
however, and may well have been worth making, if his Eighth
Amendment rationale served as a stand-in for a non-justiciability
ruling on the substantive due process claim at issue in Hardwick.
Unlike Frankfurther, Powell may not himself have gone on expressly
to mold the argument from desuetude that he was suggesting into
such a ruling (or should I say, "non-ruling"). But it equally would
169. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (opinion of Powell, J.).
170. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.).
171. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.).
172. Id. at 198 (opinion of Powell, J.) (footnote omitted).
173. On my reading of Powell's opinion, one might ask: What kind of non-justiciability
ruling is reflected in Powell's opinion? Based on the analogy to Poe, one might fairly say
(in response) that it is a ruling that Hardwick's case was not "ripe." See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 122-23 (2d ed. 1994) (calling Poe "a classic
example of a case dismissed for lack of ripeness"). Alternatively, one might say it is a
ruling on "standing" grounds. See Dripps, supra note 11, at 1422-34 (arguing that
Hardwick lacked standing because he could not establish "injury in fact"). Indeed, some
commentators regard Poe as a "standing" and not a "ripeness" case. Id. at 1433 ("[lIt
seems clear from Poe v. Ullman that the injury-in-fact hurdle is not lowered in sexual
privacy cases"). Although the court of appeals had ruled that Hardwick had standing to
challenge Georgia's law, see Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204-07 (11th Cir. 1985),
the State did not appeal that aspect of the lower court's decision. Thus, Tribe may not
have been strictly obligated at the time of Hardwick to articulate any theory why a ruling
on justiciability grounds was inapposite in the case. He did, however, argue the point
during oral arguments, see supra note 157, and obviously, write about it later. See TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 1425 n.32. Finally, one might even
say that Poe was a case that involved the general warrant against issuing advisory
opinions. See id. at 74-75 (discussing Poe as an example of a "[n]onjusticiable declaratory
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have suited what, based on the structure of Powell's decision, appears
to have been his intention and, perhaps more importantly, its
consequence: to leave room in a future case for a decision announcing
that the state lacks constitutional authority to punish consensual,
private same-sex sexual activity. The significance of these
intentionalist and consequentialist equations will become clear (or
clearer) shortly.7 4
One potential ambiguity already calls out for attention. Which of
the constitutional rights involved in Hardwick can we understand
Powell to have deferred adjudicating? Is it the narrow substantive
due process right to engage in private gay sex or the broad due
process right to engage in private, non-commercial intimate
associations? It would be relatively easier to maintain that Powell
(meant to) put off for a later date a ruling on the existence of the
narrower substantive due process right. For, as I have already
explained, the opening passage of Powell's opinion neither mentioned
nor disparaged the constitutional bona fides of that right.7 5 Although
it will pose an additional challenge and require further explanation,
the reading I am offering is relatively more comprehensive. What I
mean to propose is that one can treat Powell's opinion as having
judgment action" in the context of a discussion of the relationship between declaratory
actions and the prohibition against federal courts' issuance of advisory opinions); see also
CHEMBRINSKY, supra, at 47-53 (discussing advisory opinions). I do not seek to defend
the inchoate theory of justiciability in Powell's text or to classify it in any one of the ways
in which it could arguably be classified. As some commentators have observed, there is
considerable overlap, or redundancy, between and among the concepts of ripeness, injury
and advisory opinion doctrines; accordingly, one need not choose one categorization. Cf.,
e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 47-53 (noting multiple ways to articulate non-justiciability
rulings). My point, then, is that such a ruling, however defined, can be found in, or can
legitimately be read into, Powell's opinion. See infra notes 174-205 and accompanying
text. Doing so may help give life to Professor Donald Dripps's general observation that:
"If the Court had dismissed, for want of [a justiciable claim], the claim Hardwick actually
brought, cases of ... discrimination against gays would still be litigated, but without the
complications posed by a homophobic precedent." Dripps, supra note 11, at 1444.
174. To some, these intentionalist and consequentialist equations will seem
unpersuasive. But if so, it cannot be because such equations are unfamiliar to those of us
in the law. I do not mean to embrace these forms of reasoning across the board; indeed, at
times, I find them deeply problematic and unpersuasive. The distinction between acts and
omissions, or feasance and nonfeasance, springs most quickly to mind. Still, it would seem
to me that if those forms of reasoning ever have any validity, it is here, in an interpretation
of Powell's Hardwick opinion. Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 751 & n.89 (1989) (asking,
"How else can one explain the Court's astonishing introduction of its pivotal holding in
Eisenstadt v. Baird with the phrase, 'If the right to privacy means anything, it means ...'
(footnotes omitted)).
175. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. Moreover, Powell's Eighth
Amendment theory itself seemed to suggest that, consistent with the Constitution, private
same-sex sexual activity could not be criminally punished.
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avoided an adjudication of the merits of both the narrow and the
broad substantive due process rights Hardwick involved.
This reading of Powell's opinion quickly runs up against a
significant (but not, in the end, insurmountable) obstacle. Powell told
us he shared White's view that a broad substantive due process right
did not exist. It would thus seem that he passed on the merits of that
right. As Powell wrote: "I agree with the Court that there is no
fundamental right-i.e., no substantive right under the Due Process
Clause-such as that claimed by respondent Hardwick, and found to
exist by the Court of Appeals." '176 Nevertheless, I think we might
properly resist the urge to read this remark "with the literalness of a
country parson interpreting the first chapter of Genesis."177
Powell, as we know, was deeply conflicted during the
deliberations over Hardwick,'178 and after the Court handed down its
decision in the case, he publicly revealed that he believed the
Hardwick "dissenters" had the better argument. He even went so far
at one point as to say that he had "probably made a mistake" in the
case. 79 The prevailing academic (or should I just say, "popular"?)
176. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (opinion of Powell, J.).
177. ALBERT R. BEISEL, JR., CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 32 (1955), cited in Yale Kamisar, The
Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So
Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE
COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). Without agreeing with
it, one can read the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as standing for the
proposition that, at least with some consitutional texts, "plain language" does not preclude
an interpretation that such texts might seem plainly to preclude. For recent Supreme
Court decisions embracing such a reading of the Eleventh Amendment, see Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); and
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). If the Eleventh Amendment, which
provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State," U.S. CONST.
amend. XI, can be read to stand for the proposition that a citizen of a state cannot bring
suit against that state, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890), surely language in
Powell's Hardwick opinion, which might appear to block a reading of it as a justiciability
decision, is not necessarily dispositive of what the "proper" reading of the opinion "is."
178. For a general discussion of Hardwick and Powell's deliberations in the case, see
JEFFRIES, supra note 103, at 513-30. See id. at 514 ("From the beginning, Powell found
the case deeply troubling."); id. at 522-24 (detailing Powell's vote-reversal before
Hardwick was handed down); see also supra note 151 (discussing, inter alia, Powell's
vacillation in his reliance on Robinson).
179. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 43, at 539 ("Four years later, Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., told a group of New York University. students, 'I think I probably
made a mistake' voting with the majority."). David Garrow and John Jeffries tell similar
stories. GARROW, supra note 103, at 667; JEFFRIES, supra note 103, at 530; see also infra
note 182 (relating Powell's considered opinion that the Court should not have granted
certiorari in Hardwick.).
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account of Powell's "confession" would have him wishing he had
joined with the Hardwick "dissenters," associating his "mistake" in
the case with not doing so.' ° Crediting this account, one could say
that Powell actually, or ultimately, believed the exact opposite of
what his opinion is often understood to have said. Reading Powell's
Hardwick opinion with his subsequent remarks in mind, one might
argue (though I would not) that Hardwick was not a five-four
decision against Hardwick, but yes, startling though it may sound, a
five-four decision in his favor.18
1
I wish it were otherwise, but I believe Powell may have had a
different "mistake" in mind: the "mistake" of signaling his opposition
to a broad right of privacy, or having said or written anything in the
case at all. So much, I think, may fairly be gathered from the
considered position Powell finally reached after having had years to
soul-search about the case. In a letter for posterity to Tribe,"s which
180. See David Cole, Playing By Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual
Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 163 n.200 (1994) ("Indeed, Justice Powell, one of the
five Justices in the [Hardwick] majority, essentially changed his vote after stepping down
from the Court."); Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the Police Are in our
Bedrooms, Should the Courts go in After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against
"Sodomy" Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997, 1000 (1994) ("Although Former Justice
Lewis F. Powell has since repudiated his 'mistake[n]' 'swing vote' that made up the five-to-
four majority, Hardwick casts a looming shadow, an excuse for judges who do not wish to
protect gay people against official discrimination.").
181. Is it legitimate to interpret Powell's Hardwick opinion in light of his subsequent
remarks about the case? If not, why not? What is the source of, and justification for, an
interpretive rule many will posit, suggesting the illegitimacy of the move? Where else, if
anywhere, has it been applied? Is it a special rule for Powell? For Hardwick, given its
subject matter? How often do we ordinarily use an author's subsequent remarks in
interpreting or understanding prior statements? How often do judges do so in the project
of interpreting precedent? Cf. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 803 n.16
(9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (majority opinion written by Reinhardt, J.) (citing media reports
indicating Powell said publicly he felt he made a mistake in Hardwick)]"), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). But see Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1449 (1996) (Trott, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (rejecting as "irrelevant [Judge Reinhardt's] observation that a retired
Justice Powell said he probably made a mistake in Bowers v. Hardwick"). What might we
say "fidelity" to Hardwick means? What are its conditions? Does Hardwick (on the
standard reading of the case, or the one I am proposing here) deserve fidelity? Cf.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Freedom from Unreal Loyalties". On Fidelity in Constitutional
Interpretation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1773, 1773-75 (1997) (questioning why those who
are excluded from full and equal protection of the Constituiton owe it fidelity). For an
insightful discussion of some of these matters, see Louis Michael Seidman & Mark
Tushnet, When Judges Tell Us What They Mean, GRAVEN IMAGES (forthcoming 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
182. According to Powell's biographer, John Jeffries, after Powell made his remarks to
those New York University students, see supra note 179, Tribe "wrote Powell a personal
letter recalling his oral argument ... and praising Powell's 'courage and candor' in
acknowledging error." JEFFRIES, supra note 103, at 530. As part of Powell's reply, came
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does not often enough make its way into the stories about Powell's
change of heart, Powell flatly declared, "The Court should not have
granted certiorari" in Hardwick.18
Powell's qualification may suggest that a relatively more modest
construction (or re-construction) of his Hardwick opinion is in order.
If Powell was willing to countenance the court of appeals's judgment
recognizing a broad right to sexual privacy (as his note to Tribe
suggests he was), 184 he could hardly have placed much stock in his
own earlier words rejecting such a right. Thus, in contrast to thinking
about Hardwick as either a five-four decision for or against
Hardwick, one might view the decision (as I am inclined to do) as
something more akin to "a vote of four and a half to four and a half,"
or a vote of four to four, with Powell, on behalf of the Court,
reserving judgment on the question that, at first glance, he may have
seemed to resolve.Ies Precisely how one describes Hardwick in terms
this: "The Court should not have granted certiorari" in Hardwick. Id.
183. Id. Recall that had that been the course the Court had followed, the right the
court of appeals found would have been left in place, in that circuit, to stand. It is scarcely
a circumstance that would recommend itself to a Justice who believed the circuit court's
ruling was wrong as a matter of constitutional principle.
184. Powell's willingness to countenance the court of appeals's judgment did not
suddenly arise only after the Court ruled in Hardwick. Powell was not one of the Justices
who had earlier voted to grant certiorari in Hardwick. See JEFFRIES, supra note 103, at
514 ("On October 11, 1985, [Powell] joined the majority of his colleagues (White and
Rehnquist dissenting) in refusing to grant review" in Hardwick.). Compare id. ("[T]he
decisive votes came from Brennan and Marshall, who joined White and Rehnquist in
granting review .... "), with GARROW, supra note 103, at 656-57 (explaining that
Brennan, who had at one point voted to grant certiorari in Hardwick, changed his mind,
withdrawing his vote, leaving White, Rehnquist, and Marshall voting to grant review in the
case, with whom Burger eventually joined, making up the required four).
185. Commenting on Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), Justice Potter Stewart
pointed out that, while purporting to join the opinion of the Branzburg Court, Powell
wrote a separate opinion in the case that was half way between the majority and the
dissents. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975) (describing
Branzburg as "perhaps a vote of four and a half to four and a half"). Interestingly, in a
gay rights case that came to the Court the year before Hardwick, National Gay Task Force
v. Board of Education, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per curiam), the Court agreed to review a
decision by the Tenth Circuit striking down, on First Amendment grounds, an Oklahoma
law "which gave public schools broad authority to fire homosexual teachers, and even
their supporters." CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 43, at 533. "On appeal, the
Supreme Court split 4-4, with Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. abstaining," thus affirming the
lower court decision. Id; see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights:
A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1607 n.309 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision to grant certiorari in Hardwick and the Court's action in National Gay Task
Force). Compare Nat'l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. at 903, with Stewart, supra, at 635, and
Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 631 (1949)
(Fuller sets forth the fictional "Justice Tatting's" opinion, which concluded that: "Since I
have been wholly unable to resolve the doubts that beset me about the law of this case, I
am with regret announcing a step that is, I believe, unprecedented in the history of this
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that bring us to nine matters less than does a basic interpretive point
about Powell's opinion in the case. Powell having (later) indicated he
would not have abided by the (earlier) "plain" words he wrote in
Hardwick, it is anything but self-evident that-or why-we now
should."6
In any event, we need not rely on Powell's conscientious choice
to distance himself from his Hardwick opinion, such as it was, in order
to read that opinion as I am proposing we can, as something other
than a categorical rejection of Hardwick's due process claim,
including a broad right to sexual privacy. To appreciate why, imagine
that Hardwick had been convicted and sentenced and that Powell's
Eighth Amendment theory had carried the day: Powell, J., delivering
the opinion of the Court, holding that a state cannot constitutionally
punish a person for having engaged in private same-sex sex. Had the
Court concluded that a state lacked the authority to punish
consensual same-sex sodomy in private-which is the conclusion to
which Powell's Eighth Amendment theory might have led him had he
followed it-it would, perforce, have given Hardwick the relief he had
asked for through his Fourteenth Amendment rationale.Y7 To put
the point somewhat differently, had Hardwick been convicted and
sentenced for private, consensual sodomy, the "existing doctrine[] ...
tribunal. I declare my withdrawal from the decision of this case.").
186. One might say that my interpretation of Hardwick is incompatible with (or as
some have less delicately put it, "flies in the face of") the doctrine of stare decisis. I fail to
see how this argument works. Among other things, it begs all the interpretive questions it
(confidently) purports already to have answered: What does fidelity to a judicial text or
precedent mean when there are interpretive choices available on many, if not most or all,
judicial texts? How can one say whether one is following or violating the norms
underlying stare decisis without making strong claims, which may or may not be
supportable, about (for example) what a judicial text that is to be treated as binding
precedent "means" or what legitimate modes (or rules) of legal interpretation "are"?
Indeed, it is tempting to suggest that my reading of Hardwick fully accords with, or more,
that it promotes, the principles of stare decisis. After all, unlike the standard
interpretation of Hardwick, which typically forms the basis for calls to "overturn" the case,
see, e.g., ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 166 (calling for Hardwick to be
overruled), the alternative reading I have offered eases the pressure on courts to make a
sharp (or clean) break with the decisional past. Which, in turn, I believe, shows that
"overruling" an earlier decision may sometimes be more important normatively and
symbolically than it is required as any matter of strict interpretive necessity.
187. For that matter, the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), is
as much a due process (or equal protection) case as a cruel and unusual punishments case.
See Daniel Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment, 1972 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 25 ("Why
[Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, in Furman] should have [used "the Eighth
Amendment as a tool for testing whether the penalty of death is evenhandedly applied"] is
obscure in view of the fact that existing doctrines of equal protection... or due process of
law should have furnished more than adequate ground for striking down the death
penalty, once the factual premises which these three Justice proffer... are accepted.").
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of due process of law should have furnished more than adequate
ground for striking down" the state's sodomy law as a punishment
that violated Hardwick's liberty.188 Resort to the Eighth Amendment
in such a case would have been unnecessary, even redundant. A
criminal law that cannot punish, whether under the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment, is (so far as I can tell) no law at all. 89
If I am correct, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment theories
in play in Powell's Hardwick opinion converge there to become
interchangeable with one another. It could not have been otherwise:
any "punishment," including (but not limited to) sentence and
imprisonment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment is itself a
violation of the Due Process Clause. 90 Accordingly, we can
188. Polsby, supra note 187, at 25.
189. Severity of sentence is not the only basis for declaring a law in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983), with
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962). Given the language of Powell's
Hardwick opinion, one cannot entirely discount the possibility of interpreting it as
suggesting that any punishment for private, consensual same-sex sexual activity would be
unconstitutional. But cf. Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964)
(upholding a twenty to thirty year sentence for fellatio as well within the statutory limit of
punishment) (cited in WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 179
& n.106 (2d ed., 1986). This, even though it is not a reading I ultimately embrace. That
said, let me go on to mention another reason the reading may recommend itself. If
Powell's Hardwick opinion is to be interpreted against the backdrop of doctrine as it
presently stands, such a reading may be preferable to one (like Professor Kendall
Thomas's) that is grounded in a notion of (Solem-like) Eighth Amendment
disproportionality. Solem, after all, has been all but completely erased from the doctrinal
backdrop against which Powell's opinion can be read. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
965 (1991). The same cannot be said about Robinson, which, at least technically, remains
(even today) "good law." To be sure, Harmelin did not do away with proportionality
review in every set of circumstances. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that the Eighth Amendment "does not require
strict proportionality between crime and sentence," but protects against only punishments
that are "grossly disproportionate"); id. ("successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences are exceedingly rare" (citation omitted)). But proportionality review
(as doctrine now stands) will generally not bear fruit, except perhaps in a somewhat
limited range of cases. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1977). So long
as a law prohibiting sodomy does not make the act an offense punishable by death, it will
likely fall outside of that limited range. Thanks especially to Terry Sandalow and Nancy
King for helpful thoughts on this aspect of my argument.
190. Professor Laurence Tribe might not strongly (or very strongly) disagree with the
point I am making about convergence between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
in Powell's Hardwick opinion. For, as Tribe has written, Powell's "consideration of
whether criminalizing homosexual conduct constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
cannot [properly] be thought to require actual imprisonment." TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 1424 n.32. "[I]t is the very criminalization of an
involuntary condition, not the terms of any specific sentence imposed, that violates the
Constitution." d. Then, citing the Court's decisions in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
667 (1977), and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962), as well as Justice
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justifiably talk about Powell's decision to delay ruling for Hardwick
on Eighth Amendment grounds as the equivalent of a decision to
postpone adjudication of Hardwick's due process claim.
To be sure, Powell may have attempted to foreclose the
equivalence between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, or
believed he did, by alluding to a distinction between these
constitutional provisions. Indeed, it may be tempting to urge as an
objection to the equivalence between the amendments, that I have
failed to give due regard to the relevant doctrinal differences between
the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses. One
could, for instance, consistently maintain that, while Hardwick had no
due process right to engage in private gay sex, he nevertheless may
have had an Eighth Amendment right not to serve time in prison if he
did. One could likewise contend that there are similar doctrinal
distinctions between a broad due process right, such as the one for
which Hardwick argued, and the kind of Eighth Amendment right
Powell's opinion seemed to envision.
However valid these (or other) distinctions may be (and I do not
wish to disparage them in the abstract), I must say that I think it is
Powell's opinion that does not give them their "due regard." Powell's
opinion no more than alludes to those distinctions-and at best that
implicitly-in the context of an opinion that in its way appeared
sharply to draw them into question. 191 At the risk of repetition,
White's opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968) (White, J., concurring in the
result), Tribe continued: "The eighth amendment 'imposes substantive limits on what can
be made criminal.'... [E]ven a day in jail for engaging in sexual intimacies inherent in a
homosexual orientation might violate the eighth and fourteen amendments." Id. (quoting
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962) (emphasis added)). Tribe went on to hint
that governmental harassment of lesbians and gay men or, under certain circumstances,
governmental indifference to such harassment, may likewise violate the Eighth
Amendment. ld. at 1425 n.32. For a similar argument that would call into question, under
the Eighth Amendment, laws, such as sodomy bans, that legitimize violence against
lesbians and gay men, see generally Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, supra note 14
(treating the relationship between the Eighth Amendment and anti-gay violence). For
questions about the tenability of arguing against the convergence of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in Powell's opinion, see infra note 191; see also LAFAVE &
SCOTT, supra note 189, at 182 (noting that "Robinson supports the proposition that crimes
of status and personal condition are unconstitutional-a result which has been reached in
other cases as a matter of substantive due process"). This, of course, is not to propose
that, as a general matter, constitutional protections against "cruel and unusual
punishments" are always coextensive with denials of due process, either substantive or
procedural.
191. Before arguing that these distinctions are really valid, one might want to answer
questions like these: If Powell's opinion stopped short of speaking of the narrow right to
engage in private gay sex, because he supposed there might be some other constitutional
foundation for such a right, what does his opinion indicate that that foundation is (or
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whatever else there is to be said of the line between the Eighth and
the Fourteenth Amendments toward which Powell's opinion seemed
to gesture, the opinion does not elaborate, much less use, available
distinctions between the two amendments to explain or to defend that
line. To count as publicly accessible, hence to warrant our respect, I
should have thought,192 judicial reasons must be given and not merely
hinted at or implied. 93
might be)? If the answer is the Eighth Amendment, might Powell's opinion not be
interpreted as having relied on some notion that sodomy bans impose punishment for
what amounts to a kind of "status crime"? If so, could Powell have held the line between
the "cruel and unusual punishments" and "due process"--so that, for example, he could
justifiably recognize a narrow right to engage in homosexual sodomy, but not a right to
serve in the military, see JEFFRIES, supra note 103, at 527 ("Nevertheless, this [Eighth
Amendment] reasoning allowed Powell-at least in his own mind-to forbid criminal
punishment for homosexual sodomy without getting into the more difficult issues (such as
... gays in the military) that he did not want to face." (emphasis added)), which at the
time of Hardwick was "explicitly status-based"? HALLEY, DON'T, supra note 35, at 27. If
Powell's opinion suggests sodomy laws imposed unconstitutional punishment for
"homosexual status" under the Eighth Amendment, what might Powell have said about
the current "compromise" ban on gays in the military, which turns on a distinction
between "homosexual status" and "homosexual sodomy'"-and which purportedly
excludes gays from the armed services not for who they are, but what they do? Id. at 27;
see also icL at 5 (noting that the 1993 revisions to the military's gay policy "are based on...
Hardwick"). On as broad an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as Powell's opinion
may have contemplated, could Powell have maintained a distinction between "criminal"
and "civil" punishment for homosexual sexual activity? Would a law denying lesbians or
gay men full citizenship status--or a fine-after conviction for engaging in consensusal,
private same-sex sex not be a constitutionally untenable punishment? See LAFAVE &
ScoTT, supra note 189, at 177 ("[E]ven a punishment which inflicts no physical hardship
or pain [could we safely add imprisonment or a prison sentence?] may be found to be cruel
and unusual [punishment], as with a deprivation of citizenship which results in the 'total
destruction of the individual's status in organized society.' " (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958))). On such an interpretation, does not the Eighth Amendment begin
to blend into a notion of "due process"? Could it be otherwise? Does the notion of
"incorporation" not itself effectively blur categorical distinctions between unconstitutional
punishment and constitutionally-required process? Are there really always so clearly "two
different kinds of substantive due process arguments, one involving the clause's function
as the vehicle for incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights and the other involving
what usually is referred to as 'substantive due process' or 'unenumerated rights' "? Letter
from Terrance Sandalow to Marc S. Spindelman (Mar. 6,2000) (on file with the author).
192. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 95-
127 (1996) (discussing the value of publicity); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 786 (1997) ("Public reason aims for public justification
[which] .. is not simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others."). It is not
clear to me whether judicial reasons such as those being imagined here would (or would
not) count within a regime of deliberative democracy. Rawls, supra, at 772 n.21
("Deliberative democracy limits the reasons citizens may give in supporting political
opinions to reasons consistent with their seeing other citizens as equals." (citation
omitted)); cf JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54, 430-31 (1993) (discussing
notion of "public reason").
193. Powell's opinion does, I must concede, state that "respondent [Hardwick] has not
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We could, of course, fill in the missing gaps in the text of Powell's
opinion. We could tell stories not only about the relevant differences
between the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments, but also about
why Powell's opinion contains no discussion of them.94 We ought to
be perfectly clear, however, that it is we who must do that work. It is
we who must choose whether or not to tell those stories. And we
ought likewise to be clear that because Powell's opinion itself fails to
convey such stories, we can read that opinion as tantamount to a
judgment that Hardwick's due process claim was not justiciable. If we
ourselves need to provide reasons for reading Powell's opinion this
way, they are available to us in the form of those intentionalist or
consequentialist equations I mentioned before.9 5
This still leaves us to contend directly with what we might now, at
last, see as a stark internal tension in Powell's text: the tension
between Powell's disparaging remark about the broad due process
right that Hardwick asserted and what I have argued can be read as
his opinion's deferral of judgment on that right. While there are
various ways to resolve that tension, one, indisputably, is to read
Powell's statement regarding that broad due process right as nothing
more than an "ink blot" on an arguably prudent but unmistakably
prudential text.'96 (Indeed, if one thinks it legitimate to consider,
raised the Eighth Amendment issue below," Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 (opinion of Powell,
J.), and that for that, and other reasons, "this constitutional argument [was] not before"
the Court. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.). One could, I suppose, propose that this amounts to
a reason for not giving reasons for drawing the line Powell alluded to in his opinion. But
as a reason, it might properly be thought of as insufficient, as Justice Blackmun's
Hardwick opinion can be read to show. Id. at 201 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). Given that
Powell himself raised the Eighth Amendment theory, and implied distinctions between it
and the due process argument Hardwick made, the burden was on Powell to justify his
theory even if he was not prepared, for reasons he gave, to base his ruling in Hardwick on
it. Considerations of substantive equality require no less.
194. Cf. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, supra note 35, at 432-33 (discussing the kind of
assumptions and interpretive choices involved in filling in missing gaps in judicial
opinions).
195. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. Although I am arguing for this
reading of Powell's opinion, and thus of Hardwick itself, I am not (as I have already said)
arguing that this is the result Powell or the Court should have reached. For the argument
that the Court should have decided Hardwick on standing grounds, but did not, see
generally Dripps, supra note 11.
196. BORK, supra note 37, at 166 (1990) (calling the Ninth Amendment an "ink blot"
on the Constitution). I, myself, however, would not have thought of the Ninth
Amendment as an "ink blot" on the text of the Constitution. Of the various arguments I
have heard on the provision's meaning, I presently find Tribe and Dorf's the most
appealing. See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 22, at 54-56 (proposing that the Ninth
Amendment should be understood as a "rule of interpretation"). Whatever else may be
said of Powell's opinion (hence Hardwick), if my interpretation of it is credited, it is not
that Powell's non-decision, effectively on behalf of the Court, is strictly in derogation of
[Vol. 79
REORIENTING BOWERS V. HARDWICK
Powell's comment to Tribe about how Hardwick should have been
handled could furnish us with a justification for saying, perhaps
boldly, that this is how the internal tension in Powell's opinion should
be resolved.197 But one need not, strictly speaking, rely on that
comment to provide the foundation for the move.) 198
In the last analysis, I cannot say that Powell decided Hardwick in
Hardwick's favor. But I do think his opinion can legitimately be
interpreted as promising-or positioning the Court-to do so in a
future case. Narrowly, Powell's opinion can be viewed as an
indication that he was awaiting a case in which the state had put its
sodomy law into play by breaking the "tacit agreement" not to punish
by prosecuting individuals for engaging in private gay sex. In such a
case, unlike Hardwick, the controversy would have been "real, not...
hypothetical" beyond any reasonable doubt. 99 And, in such a case, as
the Ninth Amendment, or the rule of interpretation Tribe (and Tribe and Dorf)
understand that Amendment to entail.
197. Cf. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 803 n.16 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (questioning the vitality of Hardwick, in part, on the grounds that Powell
"subsequently announced on several occasions that he regretted [his] vote [in the case]"),
rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
198. Another reason for resolving the tension this way, which some might find more
persuasive than reading Powell's opinion as if it did not reject the broad due process right
to privacy (or sexual privacy), would begin by noting that Powell did not declare that
Hardwick did not have a narrow substantive due process right to engage in homosexual
sodomy, see supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text, and then go on to note that
Powell "rejected" only the broader right to sexual privacy. Of course, Powell did not have
to reach the question of the existence of the broader right. After all, the Court had
rendered its earlier privacy decisions without ever endorsing a broad privacy right of the
sort Powell mentioned. See Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 751 & n.89 (discussing the
Court's technique for avoiding the announcement of a broad right like the one argued for
in Hardwick). Indeed, it is worth observing that Justice Blackmun used this very
technique at one point in his Hardwick opinion. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199-200
(opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("If that right [to privacy] means anything, it means that, before
Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices about the most intimate aspects of
their lives, it must do more than assert that the choice... is an 'abominable crime not fit to
be named among Christians.' ") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
id at 209 n.4 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (proposing "simple, analytically sound distinctions
between certain private, consensual sexual conduct, on the one hand, and adultery and
incest ... on the other" and thus avoiding recognition of a truly broad right to sexual
intimacy in the privacy of the home); Cruz, supra note 38, at 325 n.139 ("[A]t least in
Eisenstadt [v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 & n.7 (1972)] and Carey [v. Population Services
International, Ina, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1972)], the Court represented that the question
of the extent to which the Constitution protects decisions to engage in sexual activities was
largely open."). Given all this, one could say Powell's "rejection" of a broad right to
sexual privacy was (as his later remarks confirmed) merely a kind of dictum, not integral
to his reasoning, hence justifiably overlooked or ignored.
199. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 507 (1961) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). For one such case, see Garner v. Texas, No. 14-99-00111-CR,
2000 Tex App. LEXIS 3760 (Tex. Crim. App. June 8,2000).
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I think Powell may have sensed, social disapproval of punishment for
gay sex could be used as a constitutional device to trump social
disapproval of gay sex itself.2°° With Donald Dripps, I would say that,
"[i]n such a case, ... we can be confident [Powell] would have voted
to reverse a criminal conviction."2 "1 With admittedly somewhat less
confidence, I believe one might also say that in a future case, Powell
would have voted to strike down some other form of legal
punishment a state had finally decided to impose on individuals for
engaging in consensual, private same-sex sex.
As a result, if we read Powell's opinion, with its Eighth
Amendment rationale, as incorporating the view that Hardwick's due
process claim was non-justiciable at the time of decision in the case
and promising or positioning the Court to provide someone in
Hardwick's shoes with relief at some point in the future, we may at
last come to some understanding of what kind of thinking may have
prompted Powell to make White's opinion technically the "opinion of
the Court."
Powell may have been concerned about a premature ruling for
Hardwick. In part, he may have believed such a ruling was
unnecessary since Hardwick faced no immediate threat of criminal
prosecution for his conduct. And, in part, Powell may also have
believed that a ruling for Hardwick would have been unwise. In
order to vindicate Hardwick's claim, the Court would have had to
disregard the existing social disapproval of homosexual sodomy (such
as it was) and spend some of its limited institutional capital for the
sake of what he seemed to regard as a "symbolic" victory for gays.
Powell, I am inclined to say, may have been reluctant to shoulder the
ultimate responsibility for committing the Court to such a course of
action.2°2
200. Powell did not, I think, truly regard Hardwick's constitutional claim as
"facetious;" nor his claim as falling "far short" of overcoming the Court's expressed
resistance to announce new fundamental rights. Powell's Hardwick opinion belies both
those views. See supra note 143 (discussing Jeffries's comment that there was a "gulf"
separating Powell from White and Burger).
201. Dripps, supra note 11, at 1435.
202. There may be something to Donald Dripps's proposal that "[d]efenders and
detractors agree that the essential significance of sodomy laws is symbolic." Id. at 1442
(footnote omitted). Certainly, Powell seemed to view Hardwick's claim that way. See
infra note 300 (reading a media report to suggest that Powell thought Hardwick was
largely if not entirely symbolic or as he himself put it, "not very important," but brought
"just to see what the court would do"). That Powell may have viewed matters this way
might help explain why, for example, he did not join Justice Stevens's separate Hardwick
opinion, although he might have done so. Stevens, recall, charted a somewhat different
middle course than Powell between White's and Blackmun's opinions. See Hardwick, 478
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It is in this light that one can read Powell's remark in that
sentence bracketed above,20 3 that "the constitutional validity of the
Georgia statute was put in issue by respondents, and for the reasons
stated by the Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for
hundreds of years has now become a fundamental right."2 ' 4 What is
key (for reasons already explained) is not that Powell may have
agreed with White about the force and implications of the social
norms that guided White's decision (what Powell called "the reasons
stated by the Court"). Rather, it is that at that point in time-in that
"now"-rather than at some point down the road, Powell may have
been reluctant to announce both a new broad and a new narrow
fundamental right to privacy. Instead of interpreting Powell's opinion
to have decided the matter once and for all, we can regard it as an
effort to split the difference between the Justices who were and those
who were not prepared to recognize Hardwick's due process right to
engage in consensual, private same-sex sexual activity,2 5 an effort that
took the form of Powell staying his hand for another day.
D. Looking Back-and Ahead
In sum, Justice White can be understood to have written an
opinion holding that the Due Process Clause does not protect a broad
right to sexual privacy that would itself include a right to engage in
private gay sex, only solidly for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Distinguished (and
U.S. at 214 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But Stevens's opinion, which is close in many respects
to Powell's, may have gone too far for Powell when it reached the merits of the case in its
"bottom line holding." Stevens's reasoning might have been appropriate, and I could
imagine Powell agreeing with it, in the future case I think Powell can be read to have had
in mind.
203. See supra text accompanying note 144.
204. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
205. As John Jeffries helpfully explains:
From the beginning, Powell found the case deeply troubling. As the arguments
mounted and the Justices took sides, Powell felt forced to an unwelcome choice
between extremes. As he saw it, neither side was entirely right. While others
vehemently asserted one position or the other, Powell shied away from both,
instinctively searching for a middle course. But this time he did not find one.
Neither his colleagues, nor his clerks, nor the lawyers in the case helped him out
of the dilemma. Left to his own resources, Powell waited and waffled, accepting
finally what he thought to be the lesser of two evils. He never really came to rest
or resolved his inner conflict, which surfaced long after his retirement as
lingering vacillation and doubt about the vote he had cast. Most importantly,
Powell did not find the means to translate his moderate impulses into legal
doctrine. He failed to craft and publish a clear statement of his own views. In
this sense, Bowers v. Hardwick was Powell's greatest defeat.
JEFFRIES, supra note 103, at 514.
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distinguishable) from Burger's, White's Hardwick opinion relied
heavily throughout its analysis on a particular view of then-
contemporaneous social norms disapproving of homosexuals and
homosexuality. White's reliance on these norms thus ties the
meaning and precedential force of his opinion to the cultural status of
gay people and practices. As those norms warm (something I discuss
later on2°), the foundation of White's opinion-with its seemingly
emphatic rejection of Hardwick's due process claim-is
correspondingly diminished. The more lesbians' and gay men's social
standing improves, the more the holding of White's Hardwick opinion
looks like many now see it: a "derelict on the waters of the law. '20 7
But even those who believe White's opinion should be taken
substantively as the opinion of the Court might agree on a different
way of seeing things: as social mores change, growing increasingly
accepting (or tolerant) of lesbians and gay men and same-sex
sexuality, the more Hardwick is open to an alternative reading.
White's Hardwick opinion lends itself to such dynamic interpretive
possibilities (and others) in ways that Burger's opinion does not.
Either way, one cannot seriously deny the significance of Justice
Powell's separate opinion in Hardwick. As the expression of the
Justice who cast the crucial "swing vote" in the case, Powell's opinion
deserves special attention. A close reading of that opinion reveals
that it can be interpreted as having effectively declined to reach the
merits of the substantive due process argument under consideration
in the case. Accordingly, the text of Powell's observations presents us
with a choice-a basic choice-about how to interpret Hardwick.
One can say, as many have, that Hardwick rejected the due process
right Michael Hardwick claimed. But one can also (or instead) say
that the Hardwick Court did not ultimately pass judgment on the
existence of such a right, vel non.
Which of the two interpretations should we choose? The
question, no doubt, will strike some as terminally silly.08 For them,
the meaning of the relevant texts-the text of the Hardwick opinions
and the text of the Constitution-is anything but dynamic2 9 The
206. See infra Part IV.C.
207. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
208. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996) (Scalia J., dissenting) ("If merely stating
this alleged 'equal protection' violation does not suffice to refute it, our constitutional
jurisprudence has achieved terminal silliness.").
209. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTs AND THE LAW 37-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (discussing constitutional
interpretation).
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alternative reading will thus seem to them to be misconstruing (or
"perverting") the clear meaning of Hardwick; the standard reading, in
contrast, will seem to identify correctly what the Hardwick opinions
"say." Not coincidentally, for those who hold these views there will
likely be a neat correspondence between a certain "right" reading of
Hardwick and of the Constitution. To fail to challenge the question-
which reading of Hardwick to choose?-would, for these individuals,
be tantamount to giving up a decision and an interpretation that
affirm the validity of a particular constitutional and perhaps extra-
constitutional world-view. It would be foolish to ask for, or expect,
such a concession. When faith, seeking reason, finally finds it, it is
apostasy to let it go 10
Others may resist the question for quite different reasons.
Although they believe the meaning of the Constitution is an evolving
one, and therefore cannot persuasively appeal to the "fixed" text of
Hardwick as the reason for rejecting the alternative interpretation, to
recognize the validity of the question may seem to require them to
give up some of the morally-high (if constitutionally-low) ground the
standard reading undoubtedly provides. I am deeply sympathetic
with this concern. Nevertheless, I fail to see how it does, or could,
amount to an adequate justification for denying that there is a choice
to be made about how to read Hardwick.
For those readers who support lesbian and gay rights or could be
persuaded to support them, but who nevertheless find the interpretive
choice I have presented unnerving, it may provide some comfort to
reveal that, among other things, it aims to raise a series of strategic
questions.2 How should cases involving the rights of lesbians and
210. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J.
1297, 1309-20 (1990); Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil
Religion" Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAuL L. REV. 1047, 1071-81 (1990). See
generally SANFORD LEvINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS (1988) (discussing links
between religious views and judicial decisionmaking); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution
as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (same).
211. Perhaps it will also be of some comfort to remember that other cases, including
those in the privacy line, have changed meaning in the years since they were decided. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was originally thought to be a "due process" case, but in
recent years, commentators have with increasing frequency suggested it is better
understood as relying on "sex equality" principles. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS,
BELIEFS, ATITUDES, AND THE LAW 99-102 (1985); RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 339-40 (1992); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1185, 1199-1202 (1992); Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 382-86; Yale Kamisar, Against
Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 762 & nn.
124-27 (1995); Kenneth L. Karst, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 57-59 (1977); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1319-20 (1991); Francis
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gay men be argued? What types of doctrinal arguments might the
alternative reading of Hardwick enable advocates to make? What
arguments might it foreclose? Does it temporarily or permanently
preclude such arguments from being made? Limit them to certain
institutional fora? How might we use the uncooperative, alternative
reading of Hardwick I have proposed, cooperatively and
productively? In the next Part, I will give some initial answers to
these (and other) questions.
III. THE "MISCEGENATION ANALOGY" REVISITED
It is an open secret that courts, and especially the Supreme
Court, are not impervious to pragmatic considerations in their
pronouncement of constitutional principle. It is sometimes, as
Professor Alexander Bickel has written, "a disagreeable fact, [but] it
cannot be wished away. "212 To begin recalling why this is so, one may
only need to hear Bickel's famous summation of the problem:
"countermajoritarian difficulty. '213 Constitutional courts are in no
institutional position to turn prudence a completely blind eye.
It is against this perhaps inevitable backdrop that a number of
academic commentators have developed various theories urging
courts to recognize the equality and liberty claims of lesbians and gay
men. The great virtue of these theories lies in their devotion to
principle. But such virtue is not free. The virtuous pursuit of
principle is not infrequently paid at the expense of (among other
things) its achievement.
It is not, then, altogether surprising that in the lesbian and gay
rights literature, pragmatic considerations have, at times, been
marginalized, suppressed, or bracketed, to be treated separately, if at
all. The often unspoken intuition that pervades this literature seems
to be that pragmatic considerations are, by definition, unprincipled,
or at least inimical to a principled approach to lesbian and gay
rights.2 14
Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REv. 105, 117-26 (1989); Reva Siegal,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions
of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 350-80 (1992). For an instructive, related
discussion of shifts in the meaning of what have come to be known as the Court's early
"privacy" decisions, including Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), see Martha
Minow, We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families, 74 J. AM. HIST. 959,
961-67 (1987).
212. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 69.
213. Id. at 16 (discussing the "countermajoritarian difficulty").
214. Some commentators have seemed to regard pragmatic considerations as
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Something about this sort of thinking rings true. Pragmatic or
prudential considerations always potentially modulate a principle's
sweep. Not so very long ago, prudence may have practically stymied
implementation of principled constitutional projects affecting lesbians
and gay men.215 Nevertheless, as social and political contexts change,
incorporating pragmatism into relevant theories may well be the best
way-it is assuredly one way-to advance efforts to secure
constitutional protections for lesbians and gay men. 16
Let me elaborate by turning to what may be a particular
instantiation of a more general phenomenon, found in the academic
literature dealing with the so-called "miscegenation" or "Loving"'217
insurmountable obstacles to the judicial implementation of their ideas. At the end of the
introduction to his article on the Eighth Amendment as a basis for striking down sodomy
laws, which (even though I disagree with his reading of Powell's Hardwick opinion) raises
some thrilling prospects, Professor Kendall Thomas, for example, writes: "I harbor no
illusions that the theoretical argument elaborated in these pages will find doctrinal
expression in the constitutional jurisprudence of the current Supreme Court. Given the
ideological and institutional realities of our time, one would have to be impossibly naive to
entertain such a hope." Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, supra note 14, at 1436.
Thomas did well to clarify his aspirations. The social and political climate in which he
wrote was quite hostile to claims of right by lesbians and gay men. See infra Part IV.C.
That climate has warmed considerably, and as it does, it becomes less inconceivable that
his theory could find doctrinal expression. Consequently, it is less and less necessary to
bracket pragmatic considerations and perhaps more and more so not to do so. See also,
e.g., Marc A. Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed? A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 70 IND. L.J.
39, 39-40 (1994) [hereinafter Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed?] (resisting incorporation of
prudential considerations into principled constitutional projects advanced on behalf of
lesbians and gay men). For additional discussion of Fajer's argument, see infra notes 244-
49 and accompanying text.
215. One should not forget, too, that pragmatic considerations were pressed on the
Court as reasons for delaying racial desegregation efforts. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 12-15 (1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,299-301 (1955).
216. Whether one views the prospect as beginning or continuing to secure
constitutional protection for lesbians and gay men will depend, in part, on how one reads
the Court's decision in (among other cases) Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). There is
no need presently to quarrel over the imagery. For present purposes, I stipulate, see infra
note 250 and accompanying text, that the work of the miscegenation analogists has not
achieved a single major judicial success as a federal constitution project. Some potential
implications of incorporating prudence into the relevant theories will be considered in the
Conclusion.
217. David Orgon Coolidge, Playing The Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the
Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201, 201 (1998) ("Of all the legal arguments
offered in favor of legalizing 'same-sex marriage' the one with the greatest rhetorical
punch is the Loving analogy." (footnote omitted)); William N. Eskridge, A History of
Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1508 (1993) (observing that "the Loving analogy
has been accepted by the Hawaii Supreme Court"); Koppelman, The Miscegenation
Analogy, supra note 40, at 148 (discussing the "Loving analogy" and its relationship to
Hardwick); id at 162 (discussing the "Loving analogy").
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analogy, an analogy that has recently emerged to claim some notable
prominence.
A. The Analogy and its Critics
By way of background, it will be helpful to recall the theoretical
and doctrinal versions of the miscegenation analogy. Although the
two versions of the analogy are mutually constituting,218  and
distinguishing between them therefore risks a certain degree of
oversimplification, it will be useful for us to do so. Drawing the
distinction will ultimately help us to understand the relationship
between the theoretical and doctrinal objections to the miscegenation
analogy more fully.
The theoretical elaboration of the miscegenation analogy has
tended to focus on the ideological and material functions of
discrimination against lesbians and gay men within a system of sex
inequality. It has done so in large measure by drawing out the
parallels between prohibitions against interracial and same-sex sexual
expression.219  As prohibitions against miscegenation once flowed
from and reinforced an ideology of white supremacy which many
(once) believed justified unjust discriminations against people of
color, the argument runs, laws against same-sex sexuality reflect and
bolster an ideology of male (and heterosexual) supremacy that
provides the basis for unjust discriminations against lesbians and gay
men.20
Translated into legal doctrine, these theoretical insights have
typically taken the form of a sex equality argument for gay rights.
22
'
218. The theoretical and doctrinal aspects of the analogy seem likely to be mutually
constituting or reinforcing. They are, however, analytically distinct, and distinguishable.
One could have a complete theory about the relationship between sodomy and
miscegenation bans without ever effectuating it in-or through-law. But there is a
question, which I do not take up now, about whether one ever would have such a theory in
the absence of the doctrinal considerations that help make it possible to imagine the
theoretical insights being incorporated into law.
219. In terms which he takes great pains to elaborate, Koppelman has generally
observed: "In the same way that the prohibition of miscegenation preserved the polarities
of race on which white supremacy rested, the prohibition of homosexuality preserves the
polarities of gender on which rests the subordination of women." Koppelman, Why
Discrimination, supra note 18, at 202. See generally id. for further elaboration of the
analogy.
220. As Koppelman has explained: "[T]he taboo against homosexuality is not entirely
irrational, but serves a function, and that ... function is similar to the function served by
the taboo against miscegenation. Both taboos police the boundary that separates the
dominant from the dominated in a social hierarchy that rests on a condition of birth." Id.
at 202.
221. For commentary within the legal academic literature dealing, one way or another,
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Still, as did not escape Justices Blackmun or Stevens in Hardwick,2
for example, the miscegenation analogy can also be expressed
with the argument that discrimination against lesbians and gay men is a form of sex
discrimination, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 153-82 (1996) [hereinafter
ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 200-06 (1979); Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered
Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103,
114-18 (1994); Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 165,216 (1998); Jo Bennett, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 6 LAW & SEX. 1,
23-24 (1996); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE LJ. 1,
57-61 (1995); Amelia Craig, Musing About Discrimination Based on Sex and Sexual
Orientation as "Gender Role" Discrimination, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 105,
108-09 (1995); Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual Discrimination and Gender: Was Romer
v. Evans Really a Victory for Gay Rights?, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 271, 305-11 (1999);
Michael C. Doff, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword. The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22-23 (1998); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat
Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for
Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 633-49 (1992) [hereinafter Fajer, Can
Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?]; Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 731-40 (1997); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of
Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 563-581
(1991); Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 40, at 154-62; Koppelman,
Why Discrimination, supra note 18, at 215-19; Law, supra note 18, at 225-29; Samuel A.
Marcosson, Harrassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1 passim (1992); Marie Elena Peluso,
Tempering Title VI's Straight Arrow Approach: Recognizing and Protecting Gay Victims
of Employment Discrimination, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1533, 1538-42 (1993); Deborah L.
Rhode, Sex-Based Discrimination: Common Legacies and Common Challenges, 5 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 11, 12 (1995); David AJ. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 957, 984-85 (1979); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1774-89 (1998); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct,
47 AM. U. L. REV. 677 (1998); Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, supra note
18, 1-2, 11-13; Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and
Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 129-35 (1995); Alycia N. Broz, Note, Nabozny v. Podlesny: A
Teenager's Struggle to End Anti-Gay Violence in Public Schools, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 750,
761-77 (1992); I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1158, 1159-63 (1991); Roger Craig Green, Note, Equal Protection and the Status of
Stereotypes, 108 YALE L.J. 1885, 1890-92 (1999); Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra
note 18, at 1584; see also ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 218-31; id. at 219 (noting
that, in congressional testimony on the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, Professor
Paul Freund remarked that "if the law must be as undiscriminating toward sex as it is
toward race, it would follow that laws outlawing wedlock between members of the same
sex would be as invalid as law forbidding miscegenation") (citing 118 CONG. REC. 9096-97
(Mar. 20, 1972) (testimony of Paul Freund)).
222. As Justice Blackmun observed in his Hardwick opinion:
The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny... There, too, the
State relied on a religious justification for its law. There, too, defenders of the
challenged statute relied heavily on the fact that when the Fourteenth
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differently (though ordinarily it is not), as a claim about why
discrimination- against lesbians and gay men violates the Due Process
Clause. Even before there was much talk about what has come to be
known conventionally as the miscegenation analogy, many shared the
intuition that Loving cleared, the constitutional path that the
Hardwick Court should have taken,23 The miscegenation analogy,
now that we have it available and accessible in that form, can be
marshaled to thicken the explanation why.
As always, there are objections, two of which deserve to be
mentioned here. The first is that the ambitious account of the
miscegenation analogy is not ambitious enough on the level of theory;
the second is that it is too ambitious on the level of doctrine.2 4 The
seemingly divergent objections share a common theme. The
miscegenation analogy, to be either theoretically or doctrinally
satisfying, or both, requires attention to the history and context of
social identity movements.
Professor Janet Halley provides insights into troubles with the
theory underlying the miscegenation analogy.' Her 1998 Harvard
Amendment was ratified, most of the States had similar prohibitions. There, too,
at the time the case came before the Court, many of the States still had criminal
statutes concerning the conduct at issue. Yet the Court held, not only that the
invidious racism of Virginia's law violated the Equal Protection Clause, but also
that the law deprived the Lovings of due process by denying them the "freedom
of choice to marry" that had "long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 210-11 n.5 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (citations omitted). Justice
Stevens, as well, paused briefly to remark upon the relationship between Hardwick and
Loving in his own Hardwick opinion. Stevens wrote, "Our prior cases make [it]
abundantly clear.... [T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack." ld. at 216 (opinion of Stevens, J.). As support
for the proposition, Stevens cited Loving v. Virginia, and parenthetically added that
"[i]nterestingly, miscegenation was once treated as a crime similar to sodomy." Id. at 216
n.9 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (citations omitted).
223. Of course, as the earlier references to Loving, see supra note 109, 158, and 222,
should make clear, one could maintain that Hardwick should have been governed by the
constitutional method the Court followed in Loving without ever mentioning the Loving
analogy. That analogy, at a bare minimum, enriches the normative claims, in addition to
the simple precedential ones, that Hardwick's error lies, in part, in not abiding by the
constitutional approach followed by the Court in Loving. This holds true of White's
reliance on history (to the extent he can properly be said to have relied on history), as well
as his reliance on social norms in reaching the conclusion he did in Hardwick. See supra
Part II.B. For more discussion of the error of White's opinion, see infra note 300.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 225-32.
225. Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRrTIQUE 115 (David Kairys
ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation].
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Law School Biddle Lecture critiques basic structures of thought
within which it is possible to conceive of "sexual orientation and
sexual identity" in what she calls "like race" terms.? 6 One need not
subscribe to all of what Halley says in her provocative lecture (and I,
for one, do not) to be impressed by the ways her observations about
the "ethics of representation" add depth and perspective to "like
race" arguments. In particular, her remarks about the uniqueness of
"sexual orientation and sexual identity movements" and the
differences from the contours and development of racial identity
movements her claims imply, cannot properly be gainsaid1 7 Halley's
reservations about the use of certain race-based analogies and their
concomitant potential to create social identity itself are far-reaching
and ought properly to give pause.' They cast a long shadow over
thinking about identity through simile. Happily, though perhaps a
little inconsistently, Halley stops well short of making a bid to do
away with "like race" arguments altogether. She resigns herself to
the fact, even as she seems to lament, that " '[1]ike race' arguments
are so intrinsically woven into American discourses of equal justice
that they can never be entirely foregone."229
Other commentators, with more centrist and right-leaning
impulses, have criticized the analogy's doctrinal exposition." In their
view, the analogy underdetermines the doctrinal results for which it
stands as a call. Theirs is an emerging criticism within the literature
reviewing or responding to the work of miscegenation analogists that
the doctrinal analogy does not adequately account for the process of
constitutional change? 31 It is not that the Loving analogy literature
226. Id. at 120.
227. See id. at 116 ("Sexual orientation and sexuality movements are perhaps unique
among contemporary identity movements in harboring an unforgiving, corrosive critique
of identity itself, and they have launched significant activist and theoretical impulses in the
direction of a 'post-identity politics.' ").
228. I& at 120-21 ("The following pages suggest that only some 'like race' arguments
are unjustifiably coercive; others, even though inescapable, join sexual constituencies to
race constituencies in a shared exposure to danger that identity politics cannot even
apprehend .... ").
229. Id. at 120. Halley writes, for example, that: "Indeed, analogies are probably an
inescapable mode of human inquiry and are certainly so deeply ingrained in the logics of
American adjudication that any proposal to do without them altogether would be boldly
utopian, and beyond my aim here." Id.
230. See, e.g., Coolidge, supra note 217, at 217.
231. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1588, 1613
(1997) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL
EQUALrrY (1996)) ("Koppelman is uneasily aware of the need to cabin the scope of his
project without making it nugatory. But he has no well-defined, intellectually satisfactory
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contains no reflections that some constitutional process has been
unfolding, but rather that it has appeared, at times, to distill the
unshapely evolution of constitutional norms into neat syllogistic
reasoning-reasoning with admittedly "radical implications." 23
Distilled, the doctrinal account of the miscegenation analogy is, for
some, too ambitious.
Professor Andrew Koppelman, whose work is chiefly associated
with the miscegenation analogy and its doctrinal counterpart, has
sketched out its ambitions this way: not only does the Loving analogy
call for courts to strike down state sodomy bans, but if "taken
seriously, it follows that the Equal Protection Clause [or, I might add,
the Due Process Clause] forbids the denial of marriage licenses to gay
couples, or the use of homosexuality as a basis for denying custody of
a child. '' 233 In his earliest work, Koppelman predicted-quite rightly,
I should mention-that many would find "[tihe prospect of the Court
attempting to impose such results on a resistant society.., a daunting
one."23 Many, including those who might otherwise endorse the
project in the courts or who do endorse it outside of them, have found
it "daunting" indeed.
In all fairness, Koppelman took pains to observe in his early
work that "[m]iscegenation once presented a similar problem." 35 He
underscored his point by invoking Naim v. Naim,16 the case in which
the Court twice, on pragmatic grounds, refused to consider the merits
way of doing so.... [His] general invocations of an otherwise unexplained 'balancing' test
do not shed much light on ... his project." (internal citation omitted)); Andrew
Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 HARv. L. REV. 2035, 2054-55 (2000)
(reviewing ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51) [hereinafter, Koppelman, Why Gay
Legal History Matters] (discussing prudential arguments in the context of the use of the
miscegenation analogy to make the case for same-sex marriage); Richard A. Posner,
Should There be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1578, 1587 (1997) (reviewing ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE,
supra note 221) (It is "a significant weakness of Eskridge's book that it does not examine
the pragmatic objections to constitutionalizing the question of same-sex marriage.... The
country is not ready for Eskridge's proposal, [which] must give pause to any impulse
within an unelected judiciary to impose it on the country in [the Constitution's] name.");
Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1-12. For further
discussion of Sunstein's views, see infra text accompanying notes 241-43, 248-49. See also
infra note 239 (quoting from KOPPELMAN, supra, regarding the role of a prudential
calculation in judicial decision making).
232. Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 40, at 162.
233. lId (footnote omitted).
234. Id
235. Id.
236. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), affd, 90
S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). For further
discussion of Naim, see infra Part IV.A.
[Vol. 79436
REORIENTING BOWERS V. HARDWICK
of the Virginia miscegenation ban ultimately struck down in Loving v.
Virginia. 7 Nevertheless, Koppelman passed up the analogy between
Hardwick and Naim in favor of the analogy to Loving. Perhaps this
helps explain why he did not propose, or propose with any gusto, that
the miscegenation analogy he was developing should, or actually did,
incorporate a notion of prudence to limit its sweeping, radical
potential. In part, his reading of Hardwick (the standard reading, for
what it is worth) provided him the grounds of avoidance: "Prudence
does not.., adequately explain or justify what the [Hardwick] Court
did."z 8
That Koppelman did not mean to incorporate prudential
concerns within his affirmative program became even more apparent
in his illuminating later work on the analogy 9 I do not wish to
quibble: what is significant about Koppelman's choices are not the
undoubtedly good reasons he had for making them. Instead, it is that,
given the centrality of his writings within the literature promoting the
Loving analogy, his choices helped establish a pattern that others who
built on his thesis would-and did-follow.240
The notable exceptions to that pattern are relatively few.
Among those who have endorsed the Loving analogy as a
constitutional argument, Professor Cass Sunstein is one of the most
prominent to argue with serious dedication that prudence should be a
part of the analogy's doctrinal exposition. At least as long ago as the
published version of his 1994 Harris Lecture, Sunstein described (the
sex equality version of) the Loving analogy as "the most interesting
and powerful argument" in the "range of constitutional arguments
involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." 241
237. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
238. Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 40, at 163. As explained in
greater detail below, the alternative reading of Hardwick is not self-justifying, nor does it
immunize the case against criticism. See infra note 300.
239. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
(1996) (no similar discussion of Naim); id. at 103 ("It follows that the equal protection
clause obligates the state to act in furtherance of the [antidiscrimination] project to the
extent that it reasonably can. Such action, like policymaking in general, necessarily
involves a multitude of prudential and predictive judgments, of a kind for which courts are
not particularly well suited." (emphasis added)); see also Hills, supra note 231, at 634-38;
see generally Koppelman, Why Discrimination, supra note 18 (omitting Naim from
discussion).
240. See Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?, supra note 221 at 634-38.
Koppelman's recent work, Why Gay Legal History Matters, supra note 231, at 2054-55,
returns to, and reiterates, the theme of prudence found in his The Miscegenation Analogy,
supra note 40, at 162.
241. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1. Sunstein may
not endorse the alternative reading of Hardwick. In part, it frustrates the argument he has
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Nevertheless, immediately after saying so, Sunstein went on to stress
that "the judicial role is properly limited in this context, especially
because of a need to limit the clash between public judgments and
judicial judgments in so sensitive an area."'24 Accordingly, he:
argue[d] for the narrowest and most incremental of ...
judicial possibilities. In all likelihood, laws against
homosexual orientation and behavior will soon come to be
seen as products of unfounded prejudice and hostility, and
private prejudice and hostility will themselves recede.
Courts should play a limited if perhaps catalytic role in this
process.243
Demonstrating the tendency among some miscegenation
analogists to resist a pragmatic check on the reach of their efforts is
Professor Marc Fajer's barbed rebuke of Sunstein's proposal.2 "
Fajer, who a few years earlier had become one of the first
commentators self-consciously to build on Koppelman's work,245 took
a position that many within the lesbian and gay communities
undoubtedly did and would share. "To a gay activist," Fajer
commented, "what is most notable about [Sunstein's] discussion is his
repeated insistence that the federal courts act cautiously in deciding
cases that raise the theories he discusses. '' 24  Of these theories, the
example Fajer chose to focus on in an important footnote was
(perhaps not surprisingly) the sex equality argument for lesbian and
gay rights contained within the miscegenation analogy.247
It may be, as Fajer pointed out, that Sunstein expressed "a
concern for the long-term good of the gay rights movement."2' But,
made about the distinction between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution, supra note 24. As well, Sunstein might
disagree with the suggestion that White's Hardwick opinion was not primarily backwards-
looking, except insofar as the glance to the past added perspective to White's view of the
then-current, widespread social disapproval of homosexuals and homosexuality. For
criticism of Sunstein's distinction between due process and equal protection, see TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 22, at 115-16 (noting some troubles with Sunstein's theory).
242. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1-2.
243. Id. at 2.
244. See Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed?, supra 214, at 39.
245. See Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?, supra note 221, at 634-38.
246. Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed?, supra note 214, at 39. But see ESKRIDGE,
GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 230 ("For the foreseeable future, the Court should leave state
courts alone to develop the sex discrimination argument for same-sex marriage.").
247. Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed?, supra note 214, at 39 n.6. Fajer's choice to
focus on the sex equality argument for gay rights might have come as no surprise given
both his own and Sunstein's interest in the argument (and the miscegenation analogy).
See Fajer, Can Two Real Mean Eat Quiche Together?, supra note 221, at 634-38.
248. Id. at 39.
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as Fajer assuredly did not fail to recognize, that was not all Sunstein
was doing. More fundamentally, Sunstein was advocating a "limited
role of Courts under the Constitution and indicat[ing] how judicial
limitations might bear on the judicial role with respect to laws that
disadvantage homosexuals. '24 9 Sunstein did not himself put it in these
words, but without doing unpardonable damage to his argument, one
might read it as a solid vote for incorporating broader insights about
how courts do (and, in his view, should) function within our
constitutional system into the narrower, substantive doctrinal
exposition of (among other arguments for lesbian and gay rights) the
miscegenation analogy.
B. Answering Objections
Having laid out some objections to the miscegenation analogy,
perhaps we can turn to the alternative reading of Hardwick for
assistance in formulating a response. Before explaining how, it will be
useful to make a few stipulations about why those who wish to gain
judicial acceptance of the analogy (and I put myself in this camp) can
ill afford to ignore or marginalize the pragmatic objections to their (or
maybe I should say, "our") program. First, although the
miscegenation analogy has achieved a certain prominence in the
academic literature, drawing with it considerable attention to the
depth and pervasiveness of discrimination against lesbians and gay
men, it has not achieved a single major success as a federal
constitutional argument20 Indeed, its temporary success in Hawaii25'
(maybe Alaska, 2 as well) precipitated a flurry of antagonistic
legislative activity on both the state and federal level.253 This activity
makes the realization of the project's ultimate success-full and equal
citizenship status for lesbians and gay men, including a national
constitutional right to same-sex marriage-seem highly unlikely at
249. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, supra note 18, at 2. As it happens,
Fajer's objections can be read to address Sunstein's more general point, as well.
250. For present purposes, the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996),
will be included within the stipulation.
251. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration and clarification
granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). Baehr was declared moot without being
overturned six years later in Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
252. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). In November 1998, the voters of Alaska approved a
state constitutional amendment that effectively overturned the court's ruling in Brause.
ALASKA CONST. art 1, § 25 ("To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist
only between one man and one woman.").
253. For a recent survey of the pattern of state laws dealing with same-sex marriage,
see ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, app. B3 at 362-71.
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any time in the immediate or even the foreseeable future 4 Second,
to succeed, the project will require the cooperation and support of a
number of sympathetic individuals whose rights and freedoms are not
abridged because they identify themselves or they are identified as
lesbians and gay men. And third, in important ways, that cooperation
appears to have been conditioned on the incorporation of prudence
into the analogy's doctrinal exposition.
One last prefatory note is in order. What follows may require, as
Professor Fajer might wish it would not, that "individual litigants ...
sacrifice individual justice in the short-term for the possibility that
doing so might improve the chances for justice for all gay people in
the long-term."'  To say the least, it is discomfiting even to
contemplate such a sacrifice.156 As Fajer rightly observes, "[t]hese
litigants already risk status and security merely to pursue their
claims." 7 I may be missing something, but I somehow cannot see,
even on closer inspection, how would-be individual litigants are truly
being asked "to give up important tangible benefits for an amorphous
long-range hope."5 8 I think I can appreciate how the "hope" might
properly be described as "amorphous" and "long-range." But I
254. See Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, supra note 18, at 27 ("A
relatively radical attack on the prohibition of same-sex marriages might come many years
down the road, when the basic principle has been vindicated in many other less
controversial contexts.").
255. Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed?, supra note 214, at 40.
256. Much more must be said about the conditions of sacrifice, and its
conceptualization, within political struggles than is possible here. For now, there is this.
"Sacrifice" is as capable of being regarded as radically ennobling and empowering as it is a
form of demoralizing or corrupting collaboration. If asking for "sacrifice" from the
lesbian and gay communities is something better off avoided, it may be because those
within the gay community have a particular view of what that term means, including,
socially speaking, its gender, race, and class aspects. For some discussion of gender and
sacrifice, see Marc Spindelman, Some Initial Thoughts on Sexuality and Gay Men with
AIDS in Relation to Physician-Assisted Suicide, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). If gay men (or lesbians and gay men)
are unwilling to make such sacrifices, it may be in part because there is a sense that
sacrifice should be borne by those whose constitutional and political worldviews block
recognition and respect for lesbian and gay rights, including those who believe such
sacrifices to be of a spiritual dimension. No matter how "wrong" or "right" such views
may be to those of us who do not hold them, one cannot simply deny that they are
embraced by many within our constitutional community. It may, finally, be interesting to
think about the potential reasons why there seems to be no robust conception of sacrifice
(at least) in significant pockets of modern sexual orientation and sexual identity
movements. Its absence (if it is that) might be one way of discussing what separates those
movements from, and binds them to, earlier political movements, such as the civil rights
and sex equality movements.
257. Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed?, supra note 214, at 40.
258. Id.
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would have thought that, in the absence of sacrifice, the "important
tangible benefits" of litigating cases might well remain as hypothetical
as real. Without pragmatic concession, I am saddened to think,
individual litigants may simply not receive "individual justice [even]
in the short-term."'' 9
The pragmatic concession that I am about to propose, may be
thought of as a kind of constitutional compromise. At the outset, I
want to be clear: I am not sure I myself would unreservedly endorse
it. The compromise is an effort to help give tangible effect to the
short- and long-term hopes of the miscegenation analogists and
lesbian and gay rights advocates alike. It may also have implications
for other arguments explaining why lesbians and gay men should be
respected in our constitutional community as full and equal citizens.2 °
Despite the concerns it will probably raise, the concession is too
important not, at least, to consider, and too well known in its form for
anyone to suppose it will not divide, even as it aspires to conjoin.
Some of its possible minimal effects for agenda setting will be
considered more fully in the Conclusion.
The theoretical equation between sodomy and miscegenation
bans tells us nothing about how the two should be treated as a matter
of constitutional law. The force of the equation-and it is forceful-
stems, to an appreciable degree, from the moral and constitutional
status of laws that discriminate on the basis of race. Were the
subordination of people of color not so obviously odious, both
morally and constitutionally, the relationship between sodomy and
miscegenation bans might be nothing more than an interesting
thought of no legal moment. It is, however, precisely because there is
no serious question that the Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia
261
was right as a moral and legal judgment, that the Loving analogy
offers such persuasive reasons for declaring laws that discriminate
against lesbians and gay men to be inconsistent with Fourteenth
Amendment demands. But it should not be forgotten that the
theoretical similarities, such as they are, between discrimination
against people of color, on the one hand, and discrimination against
lesbians and gay men, on the other, do not of their own motion
compel analogy to Loving. That analogy, it must be said, is a
normative claim. It is a claim with which many may ultimately agree.
But it is normative just the same.
259. Id.
260. These broader implications are beyond the scope of this Article.
261. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Once stripped of, whatever descriptive mask might appear to be
hanging from it, the Loving analogy can be seen to be carrying much,
if not all, of the weight of the lesbian and gay rights project on the
doctrinal level. Likewise, it becomes possible to see the pragmatic
objections to the miscegenation analogy as objections to the radical
burden placed on Loving's shoulders. Perhaps such objections would
not have surfaced if Loving had more modestly been asked to bear an
analogy only to laws against sodomy. Under those circumstances,
those who have some sympathies with constitutional claims made on
behalf of lesbians and gay men might not have been made so uneasy.
But, in addition to sodomy laws, the Loving analogy has been relied
on simultaneously to carry much heavier freight, such as child custody
denial and same-sex marriage. Embracing these other issues,
although in a sense they are related to sodomy laws by principle, has
seemed to some (and a very important "some," at that) to be asking
for too much, too soon, not to mention from the wrong legal
institution.262
The various claims that fall under the auspices of the
miscegenation analogy can be distinguished from one another-if not
on the principle (or principles) that can bind them, then on prudential
grounds. A sensitive response to the pragmatic critique of the
analogy may counsel, or require, that such distinctions be made. In
concept, the effect is simple: queuing the discrimination claims and
relying on the miscegenation analogy, somewhat modified, to
transport them to the other side of constitutional protection, serially,
one case at a time.2 63 The alternative reading of Hardwick (though by
262. As my colleague Andrew Siegel has suggested to me, some may believe that these
views implicitly diminish discrimination against gays vis-A-vis discrimination against other
identity groups. In a sense, this is right. Nobody would, for example, suggest that a law
imposing separate but unequal educational facilities along the lines of race should not
properly be struck down as unconstitutional by the courts, and with speed. Nevertheless,
to the extent that the suggestion that centrist critiques are somehow unique in diminishing
discrimination against gays vis-a-vis discrimination against other groups, it seems
mistaken. Subjecting claims of discrimination against gays to a process of reasoned
argument might itself be thought to compromise the "obvious" immorality and
unlawfulness of such discrimination. Moreover, to the extent that the suggestion that
subjecting constitutional claims of lesbians and gay men to debate is to disparage such
claims carries weight, it seems to depend on a notion that has elsewhere been eschewed:
that the now-obvious moral and constitutional arguments regarding, for example, racism,
were not (and still are not) themselves subject to evolution or progression. In this respect,
the ideas debunking some of the popular misconceptions of the history of the Court's race
equality jurisprudence, reflected in the commentary referred to infra note 315, should not
be overlooked.
263. See generally SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 51, at 159-61 (arguing
for pragmatic incrementalism in the context of constitutional claims made on behalf of
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no means strictly necessary to the endeavor) offers a kind of
distinguishing principle that can enable the revised miscegenation
project-without abandoning the miscegenation analogy altogether.
Which brings us directly to one way the alternative reading of
Hardwick may help. That reading, recall, views the case as having
avoided a judgment on the substantive merits of Michael Hardwick's
constitutional argument. It thus suggests that Hardwick itself can be
read as a prudential decision. One can understand it to stand for the
proposition that courts should vindicate constitutional claims for
lesbians and gay men cautiously, perhaps only when individual claims
are no longer precluded by prudential considerations.&6 Until such a
time, it can be understood to suggest that courts, by and large, avoid a
substantive adjudication of the merits of lesbian and gay rights
cases.265 If so, instead of calling for Hardwick to be overturned, as a
good many have, lesbians and gay rights advocates might choose to
defend the decision (the alternative reading of it, of course).2 66
Indeed, those advocates might go so far as to urge courts that
Hardwick (again, the alternative interpretation) be left on the books
as a kind of pragmatic, interpretive rule.2 67 "No, Your Honor," one
can imagine counsel earnestly reporting to a court, "this case
challenging the State's law against sodomy does not require the court
to hold that the State's law prohibiting same-sex marriage is
unconstitutional. That law, as Hardwick teaches, is distinguishable
from this one. Some day that law, too, might be held
unconstitutional, but today is not that day. All that is now properly
before the court is the State's sodomy ban."2"
lesbians or gay men). For further discussion of the (potential) minimal commitments of
responding to the pragmatic critique, see infra Conclusion.
264. The "conditions of prudence" are the subject of Part IV, infra. One might think
that the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), already serves such
purposes. But see infra note 392 and accompanying text (discussing another way to
understand Evan's symbolic significance).
265. For the Court, this may mean using certiorari to deny jurisdiction, or in some
cases, using certiorari to grant jurisdiction and then to vacate a judgment on the merits.
See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 51, at 161 (suggesting "[a]t a minimum,
... that courts should generally use their discretion over their docket in order to limit the
timing of relevant intrusions into the political processes").
266. Notice, for what it is worth, that the alternative interpretation of Hardwick can be
squared nicely with the Court's more recent decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996). See supra text accompanying notes 51-58 (discussing Hardwick and Evans).
267. Cf TRIBE & DORF, supra note 22, at 54-55 (proposing that the Ninth
Amendment be understood as a rule of interpretation). Please note, again, that the
alternative reading of Hardwick is not strictly necessary as a predicate for the pragmatic
compromise, but may instead be used to symbolize it.
268. Accord Tribe, Hardwick Brief, supra note 95, at 23 ("Marriage, unlike other
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The idea that Hardwick might be inducted into the service of
lesbian and gay rights claims, defended by advocates of lesbians and
gay rights, like the idea that Hardwick might not be regarded as
inconsistent with a decision to strike down a state's sodomy law, may
strike quite a few as fanciful, at best. If it does, it may, in part, be
because of the time and effort so many have spent excoriating
Hardwick, based on the standard interpretation of the case. These
ideas may be a good deal less shocking, however, when one keeps
firmly in mind that the "Hardwick" they deal with is the alternative-
and not the standard-interpretation. To those who continue to find
the ideas implausible, it is tempting to ask, why should these (or
other) ideas should be dismissed out of hand simply because they
seem queer?269
Were advocates of gay rights to interpret Hardwick as I have
proposed it can be, the miscegenation analogy (revised in an
important way) could be invoked to inform a court's judgment about
whether (and when) pragmatic considerations would tend to
authorize a principled constitutional decision on the merits or instead
counsel judicial restraint. Rather than looking to Loving as the sole
(or primary) source of judgment, a court could look for guidance to
the process of constitutional change, as represented by some of the
social and legal changes that took place in the time between the
Court's decision in Loving and its earlier pragmatic non-decisions in
Naim v. Naim.z70
manifestations of intimate association, is a contract controlled by the state, and, like 'any
other institution,' it is 'subject to the control of the legislature.' " (citation and footnote
omitted)); id at n.44 ("Hardwick ... claims no right ... to have any homosexual
relationship recognized as a marriage." (citation omitted)); id at 24 ("There is thus no
cause for worry that affirmance of the decision below ... would cast doubt on any
administrative programs that states might fashion to encourage traditional heterosexual
unions.").
269. See generally ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCrION 1
(1996) ("Once the term 'queer' was, at best, slang for homosexual, at worst, a term of
homophobic abuse. In recent years, 'queer' has come to be used differently ....").
270. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam),
affd, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). See
ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 221, at 120-21 (discussing
the "United State's Supreme Court's temporizing between Naim and Loving" and
suggesting its parallels to same-sex marriage). One senses in Professor Eskridge's latest
book, ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, 228-31, some, perhaps qualified, support for
the federal constitutional compromise I have been and will be discussing. As Eskridge
argues, "[T]here are ways of negotiating the bind [the Supreme Court is in], what
Alexander Bickel called techniques of 'not doing,' devices for disposing of a case while
avoiding judgment on the constitutional issues it raises." Id at 230. Eskridge goes on to
comment that, "If a state appeals court were bold enough to rely on the U.S. Constitution
to strike down a state constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage, the Supreme
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C. Looking Back-And Ahead (Again)
The elemental structure of a possible compromise has been set in
place. It gives centrist and right-leaning doubters a response to their
concern that the doctrinal version of the miscegenation analogy has
not adequately incorporated pragmatic considerations into its
affirmative constitutional case for lesbian and gay rights. And it gives
proponents of the miscegenation analogy a way to forge the kind of
coalition that will be necessary to advance their constitutional project
in a meaningful way.
Miscegenation analogists, of course, along with others in the
lesbian and gay communities, may still object to the compromise for,
well, being a compromise.271 One must not take these objections
lightly. To repeat, it is understandably troublesome to contemplate
compromising justifiable claims of equality and liberty. That the
constitutional claims of lesbians and gay men are justifiable in that
sense, as the collective work of the miscegenation analogists and
others has shown, should be obvious within a community that
purports to prize equality and liberty so highly that they are
enshrined as constitutional values. Consequently, an initial gesture of
good will by those presently in or near the center may be required to
garner critical support for the compromise within the lesbian and gay
communities. The shape that that gesture might take will be
discussed shortly. 72 But before it is, I must fill in some details of the
outlined accord.
Court should avoid the case, either by denying review or finding the case prudentially or
constitutionally nonjusticiable, courses of action that would have saved the Court
embarrassment in Hardwick." IL at 230-31 (emphasis added). Eskridge does not say-at
least not in these pages-whether he would similarly endorse avoidance of the
constitutional question were a lower court to rule against same-sex marriage or other
constitutional claims on behalf of lesbians and gay men. Nevertheless, he does recognize
that "[flor pragmatic reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court might decline.., to require state or
federal antidiscrimination law to include sexual orientation. Such a move might be
considered a retreat from principle and the reasoning of precedent. But, as before, the
Court has available to it techniques for avoiding the constitutional issue." Id at 231.
Against the seemingly qualified support in his latest work, one must measure his previous
seemingly unqualified rejection of a pragmatic compromise. See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 221, at 121-22 (1996) ("Judge Posner's
pragmatism counsels not just delay but compromise .... The main thing that a Danish-
style compromise would sacrifice is formal equality. How important is that sacrifice? I
consider it critically important and would oppose a halfway house to marriage.").
271. See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 221, at 121.
272. See text accompanying infra note 415.
2001]
446 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79
IV. THE CONDITIONS OF PRUDENCE
I begin this Part by introducing Naim v. Naim more fully.
Following that introduction is a brief review of the legal academic
debate about the case. Then, picking up where Part III left off, I
consider the "conditions of prudence"-some of the changes on social
and legal fronts that took place in the years between Naim and
Loving v. Virginia273-that may have led the Court to finish in Loving
the principled business it pragmatically postponed in Naim. Finally,
building on the revised miscegenation analogy, I offer some
observations on the lessons the conditions of prudence may teach in
the specific case of sodomy bans. I ask, and provide thoughts on the
question: What action do the conditions of prudence today
recommend to a court faced with a constitutional challenge to a state
law against sodomy?
A. A Primer on Naim and the Academic Debate It Spawned
The time has come to turn to Naim v. Naim and some of the
academic commentary about the case. 4 Naim came to the Court on
273. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
274. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891
(1955) (per curiam), affd, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 350
U.S. 985 (1956). For a fine, concise discussion of the Court's deliberations in Naim, see
Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregatiown Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEo. L.J. 1, 62-67 (1979); see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE
AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA 106-07 (1993) ("Naim v. Naim has been the target of considerable criticism.
The Court's dismissal is understood to have been a concession to perceived majoritarian
pressure in the post-Brown era, when it had been asserted that school desegregation
would lead to 'mongrelization of the race.'" (footnotes omitted)); MARK V. TUSHNET,
MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936-1961 at 367 n.2 (1994); Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An
Interpretation, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1,
5 (Mark Tushnet ed. 1993) [hereinafter Tushnet, The Warren Court as History] ("The
justices knew they could not uphold the statute [involved in Naim] without undermining
Brown's moral force, yet they knew as well that they could not invalidate the statute,
which represented the heart of the white South's emotional commitment to segregation,
without exacerbating an already difficult situation ... ." (footnotes omitted)). For other
earlier sources dealing with the issues raised by Naim, see generally Jackson v. Alabama,
348 U.S. 888 (1954) (denying certiorari in a case in which the Alabama Supreme Court
had let the state's miscegenation statute stand against Fourteenth Amendment challenge);
Andrew D. Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes,
42 CORNELL. L.Q. 208, 212-14, 221 (1957) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause
governs the right to marry); Note, Racial Intermarriage-A Constitutional Problem, 11
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93, 96 (1959) (discussing Naim as an example of litigation arising
out of the idea that "the preservation of racial purity is a legitimate objective") (both this
student note and Weinberger, supra, are cited in Hutchinson, supra, at 62-63 n.526); Note,
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the heels of its decision in Brown v. Board of Education.275 Naim
squarely raised the question, among others, whether "a state [here,
Virginia,] consistent with the requirements of the equal protection
and due process clauses of the 14th Amendment, [may] annul the
marriage of a Caucasian and a now-Caucasian solely because of the
races of the parties?"2 76  The Supreme Court twice dodged that
question, leaving Virginia's law to stand for another dozen or so years
(until Loving).
The first time that Naim came before the Court, it vacated and
remanded an opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The
High Court issued a per curiam that stated:
The inadequacy of the record as to the relationship of the
parties to the Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the
marriage in North Carolina and upon their return to
Virginia, and the failure of the parties to bring here all
questions relevant to the disposition of the case, prevents
the constitutional issue of the validity of the Virginia statute
on miscegenation tendered here being considered "in clean-
cut and concrete form, unclouded" by such problems.277
On remand, the Virginia court affirmed its earlier judgment.278
When appeal was again taken to the Supreme Court, it evaded its
jurisdiction (even though jurisdiction was mandated by federal law), 279
and dismissed the appeal with an "opinion" which provided that:
The motion to recall the mandate and to set the case down
for oral argument upon the merits, or, in the alternative, to
The Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, 1 How. L.J. 87, 92-93 (1955) (discussing
why miscegenation statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
275. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
276. Appellant's Statement as to Jurisdiction at 3, Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955)
(No. 366) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Cf. Weinberger, supra note 274,
at 209 (proposing that Naim "squarely raised the question whether a state statute
proscribing the marriage of the Chinese appellant to a Caucasian woman was violative of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Although not cited in the
appellant's jurisdictional statement or the Brief in Opposition to Appellee's Motion to
Dismiss or Affirm, Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (No. 366) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review), the inaugural issue of the HOWARD LAW JOuRNAL elaborated the
due process argument for striking down state miscegenation laws. See Note, The
Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, supra note 274, at 92-93. For another pre-
Naim due process argument against miscegenation laws, see Note, Statutory Ban on
Interraical Marriage Invalidated by Fourteenth Amendment, 1 STAN. L. REv. 289, 293-97
(1949).
277. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
278. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849,850 (Va. 1956) (per curiam).
279. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1257 (1952) (cited in Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 165, at
12 n.77).
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recall and amend the mandate is denied. The decision of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia... in response to our
[earlier] order ... leaves the case devoid of a properly
presented federal question.?'
To understand the Court's inaction in Naim, which Professor
Herbert Wechsler, in a strong turn of phrase, later described as
"wholly without basis in the law,"21 one must look to the argument
that Justice Frankfurter-the "moving force" behind the Court's non-
decision in the case-had successfully made to the Conference:
Even if one regards the issue, as I do, of a seriousness
that cannot be rejected as frivolous, I candidly face the fact
that what I call moral considerations far outweigh the
technical considerations in noting jurisdiction. The moral
considerations are, of course, those raised by the bearing of
adjudicating this question to the Court's responsibility in not
thwarting or seriously handicapping the enforcement of its
decision in the segregation cases. I assume, of course,
serious division here on the merits. For I find it difficult to
believe that there is a single member of this Court who does
not think that to throw a decision of this Court other than
validating this legislation into the vortex of the present
disquietude would not seriously, I believe very seriously,
embarrass the carrying-out of the Court's decree of last
May.2
In his biography of Chief Justice Earl Warren, Professor Bernard
Schwartz has filled in some of the gaps of the Court's officially
unofficial prudential "rationale" for its inaction in Naim this way:
280. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (citations omitted). See also CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL, 16B FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE 253, § 14 (1992) (discussing
Naim); see also Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, supra note 274, at 5 ("On entirely
specious grounds the Court refused to consider the constitutional challenge. The Court
invoked technical grounds to explain its refusal, and only an insider could appreciate that
on the facts of Naim, those grounds were quite ridiculous.").
281. Wechsler, supra note 165, at 34.
282. As Hutchinson explains, "the moving force behind the Court's non-decision [in
Naim] was Mr. Justice Frankfurter." Hutchinson, supra note 274, at 64; see also
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 161 (1983) (referring to "the majority, led by Frankfurter").
Frankfurter himself fairly boasted of his role in persuading the Court to postpone a ruling
on the miscegenation question to his friend Learned Hand. See GUNTHER, supra note
165, at 664-72.
283. Hutchinson, supra note 274, at 95-96; see id. app. D. (reproducing the
Memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter on Naim v. Naim (November 4, 1955)). Justice
Frankfurter was, I think, implicitly referring to the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Countless students of constitutional law have puzzled
over the enigmatic Naim opinion. But the majority, led by
Frankfurter, was simply seeking a make-weight excuse to
avoid dealing with the miscegenation issue so soon after the
school segregation decisions. As a former Warren law clerk
put it, the reaction in the South would have been,
"Well, you know, first blacks in the school room, and
then the next thing they are going to be doing is
sleeping with your daughters and marrying your
daughters," and so on, the mongrelization of the races.
And so I think that the Court back in 1955 ... didn't
want to deal with it right away, it wanted to build up to
it.
A memo on the Naim case to Justice Burton by one of his
law clerks took the same position: "In view of the
difficulties engendered by the segregation cases it would be
wise judicial policy to duck this question for a time. '
Speculation can be an unstable component of a prudential
choice. Perhaps this helps explain why prudence is so often maligned
as a source of constitutional judgment by academic commentators. 285
But, without a doubt, it helps explain why so precious few
commentators defended the Court's action (or inaction, as the case
may be) in Naim.
One of the most eminent of those who did defend the Court was
former Frankfurter clerk Professor Alexander Bickel, who "praised
[the] dismissal [in Naim] as an example of the operation of
'techniques that allow leeway to expediency without abandoning
284. SCHWARTZ, supra note 282, at 161 (footnotes omitted). As another Warren
biographer has explained, "Naim v. Naim came at an awkward time. Still hoping the
South would rally behind the school desegregation decisions, the justices were reluctant to
provoke resistance by striking down miscegenation laws." ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 451 (1997); see also MURPHY, supra note 59, at 192-93
(discussing Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954), an even earlier post-Brown challenge
to Alabama's miscegenation statute, and noting that "racial intermarriage-
'mongrelization'-has been the great bte noire of white southern society and one of the
chief reasons behind the resistance to school integration," and then later commenting that
"[tihe Court's intricate maneuvering to avoid the miscegenation issue in another case,
Naim v. Naim, indicates the Justices' awareness of the volatile nature of the problem, as
does the remark which one Justice is supposed to have made after leaving the Naim v.
Naim conference: 'One bombshell at a time is enough' ").
285. Cf KOPPELMAN, supra note 239, at 103 ("It follows that the equal protection
clause obligates the state to act [to further the antidiscrimination] project to the extent
that it reasonably can. Such action ... necessarily involves a multitude of prudential and
predictive judgments, of a kind for which courts are not particularly well suited." (emphasis
added)); see also infra text accompanying note 298.
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principle[.]' ,2 As he himself wrote: "[T]he Court found no
insuperable difficulty in leaving open the question of the
constitutionality of antimiscegenation statutes, though it would surely
seem to [have been] governed by the principle of the Segregation
Cases" handed down but a short time earlier.8 Indeed, "a decision
on the validity of anti-miscegenation statutes was avoided through the
dismissal of an appeal, which is to be explained in terms of the
discretionary considerations that go to determine the lack of
ripeness."
Although Bickel trumpeted "discretionary adjudications" (what
he elsewhere called "the techniques and allied devices for staying the
Court's hand""9 ), he went to lengths to underscore that he did not
mean to "concede unchanneled, undirected, uncharted discretion"29
or "decision proceeding from impulse, hunch, sentiment, predilection,
inarticulable and unreasoned."291  According to Bickel, "[t]he
antithesis of principle in an institution that represents decency and
reason is not whim or even expediency, but prudence."2' For Bickel,
however, prudence in declining to rule on a case, which is what Naim
represented, was not the same as prudence in deciding the merits. He
thus did not consider it "the antithesis of principle" 293 for the Court to
stay its hand in Naim, at least (perhaps) so long as the Court (as he
put it) "was subject to scurrilous attack by men who predicted that
the integration of the schools would lead directly to 'mongrelization
of the race.' "294
Professor Gerald Gunther adamantly disagreed. He indignantly
maintained that Bickel's defense of Naim amounted to an extension
of the passive virtues "beyond the blithe disregard of principles
286. Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 165, at 11.
287. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 71.
288. Id at 126. In a narrowly limited context, "discretionary adjudications" may not be
terribly objectionable. But no sooner does one utter "discretion" than one may be
reminded of Judge Walter Schaefer's skepticism about its actual judicial use. "I have
come to believe," explained Judge Schaefer in a different context, "that if enforcement of
the rules of evidence were turned over on a broad scale to the discretion of trial judges,
the rule to be applied would depend on the personality of the individual judge." WALTER
V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES 34 (1967).
289. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 132.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 132-33.
292. Id
293. Id. at 133.
294. Id. at 174. For a more complete, albeit parenthetical, explanation why these
"attack[s]" were constitutionally and pragmatically significant beyond themselves, see
infra note 316.
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essential to jurisdictional doctrines" that "compromise[d] the very
principle-the impermissibility of racial classification-that [the
Court] purport[ed] to protect." 95
Disagreement, however, should not be overstated. There was a
narrow, but significant point of convergence between Bickel and
Gunther. As Bickel wrote, "[T]he techniques and allied devices for
staying the Court's hand... mark the point at which the Court gives
the electoral institutions their head ... and there is nothing
paradoxical in finding that here is where the Court is most a political
animal. 2 96 For their differences, I think, Gunther would have agreed
with Bickel about this much, at least: the Court was indeed a most
political animal when it avoided the merits of the constitutional claim
presented by Naim. For Gunther, one might say, that was precisely
the problem with the Court's actions in the case.
By acting as it did, the Naim Court may well have been "giving
the electoral institutions their head. ' '29  But many must have found
themselves agreeing with Gunther, that the Court erred when it
decided to make "conjecture about the complexities of political
reactions ... a primary ingredient of [its] deliberations. '298 For, even
a willowy precedent like Naim, once set, held out a real possibility of
infecting the constitutional principle that the segregation cases then
appeared to entail.299 Holding the line against the possibility that
Naim would undermine the principle of those cases was Bickel's goal.
Gunther, for his part, had grave doubts it could be done.3"
295. Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 165, at 24. It is difficult to imagine Gunther
disagreeing with Chief Justice Warren's view that "the failure to take the case was an
evasion of the Court's responsibility." CRAY, supra note 284, at 451.
296. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 132.
297. ld.
298. Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 165, at 7.
299. Gunther put it this way: "Expediency as to avoidance devices is contagious; the
effort to shield the integrity of adjudications on the merits from infection fails." Id. at 14.
300. Bickel and Gunther were not the first, nor the last, to debate the tension between
principle and prudence. And it is not difficult to imagine how one might use that debate
as the starting point for criticizing the alternative reading of Hardwick, or, for that matter,
White's opinion in the case.
Although Hardwick might have been one of those "discretionary adjudications"
of which Bickel would have approved, such techniques, as Gunther taught, are not free of
doubt. One might argue that if the Court supposed it was striking a balance between two
speculative harms, one to gays and one to itself, it was, quite simply, mistaken. Powell, at
least, seemed to think that the harm sodomy laws worked on gays was largely, if not
entirely, symbolic, but not (or so he said) "very important." See Ruth Marcus, Powell
Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3 (" 'That case was not a
major case, and one of the reasons I voted the way I did was the case was a frivolous case
.... So far as I'm concerned it's just a part of my past and not very important ....'"
(quoting Powell)). (For some evidence that Powell may have spent some more time
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thinking about the decision, at least later on, see JEFFRIES, supra note 103, at 530.) One
might well say that the only truly speculative harm in Hardwick was the Court's (or
Powell's) "conjecture about the complexities of political reactions," Gunther, Subtle Vices,
supra note 165, at 7, that might have resulted from a decision on the merits favorable to
Hardwick. Various amici in Hardwick valiantly attempted to explain to the Court that
sodomy laws, apart from direct enforcement, work material harm on lesbians and gay
men. See Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project, et al., in Support of
Respondents, at Part II, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140); Brief
Amicus Curiae for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al., in Support of
Respondents, at Part III, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
Hardwick, these amici rightly intimated, scarcely involved a "merely symbolic" claim.
Accordingly, and especially in light of the Court's earlier privacy decisions, one might
conclude that the only appropriate balance to have struck in weighing the competing
considerations in the case was for Hardwick. Failing to do so, Hardwick effectively
"compromised ... the very principle"-the impermissibility of regulating private,
consensual sexual activity between adults-that its prior cases seemed to protect. Indeed,
White's Hardwick opinion may further go to show just how contagious "expediency as to
avoidance devices is." Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 165, at 14.
A good deal more, of course, would need to be said in order for a critique
following these lines to be persuasive. Any argument that an outright judgment for
Hardwick was more appropriate than a non-decision would have to take great care to
draw a crisper line than any so far provided between the Court's prudential decision in
Hardwick and such decisions more generally. Unless, that is, one was prepared to defend
Gunther's line between "discretionary adjudications" and the "principles essential to
jurisdictional doctrines," id. at 24 (emphasis added), or to solve the seemingly intractable
riddle of the countermajoritarian difficulty.
One could well develop an adequate critique of Hardwick (as it is understood
here). But no more than the foregoing brief drawing will presently be attempted. Even
assuming error in Hardwick's reliance on prudence, its days are numbered. Prudence will
not forever impose itself between lesbians and gay men and the Constitution. As Sunstein
has explained, "In all likelihood, laws against homosexual orientation and behavior will
soon come to be seen as products of unfounded prejudice and hostility, and private
prejudice and hostility will themselves recede." Sunstein, Homosexuality and the
Constitution, supra note 18, at 2. Sunstein's predictions may be optimistic, though I hope
not too much.
Not everyone will be able to resist the urge to hasten Hardwick's death-even a
"reoriented" Hardwick. Those who cannot may be motivated, in part, by their substantive
views about the possible transitional compromise the alternative reading of the case sets
forth. One way to challenge the compromise, already mentioned, is to dispute the
plausibility of reading Hardwick to have effectively decided not to decide the case's
merits. Another, whose contours can now be discerned, is to accept the plausibility of the
alternative reading and then proclaim the error of the Court's decision to reach a
prudential judgment in the case.
Before moving on, I should add a few words about White's opinion in Hardwick.
Whereas Bickel adamantly maintained that "discretionary adjudications" should be
limited to the realm of the "passive virtues," one might say that White confidently, but far
too casually, pushed those adjudications into the very realm the Burkean Bickel studiously
avoided taking them. White happily let "discretionary adjudications" control his decision
on the merits in Hardwick. On them he pinned his denial of the existence of a
fundamental right to same-sex sexual activity in private, notwithstanding precedents fairly
indicating, to the contrary, the existence of constitutional protection for such activity.
Some, of course, might not be moved by such an argument, thinking that White's
opinion was an appropriate expression of constitutional realpolitik. In White's defense,
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B. Illuminating the Conditions of Prudence: What Happened
Between Naim and Loving?
Let me begin with a quick reminder of where we are. As I
suggested earlier, the alternative reading of Hardwick can be viewed
as offering a pragmatic interpretive rule for courts to follow in cases
involving constitutional disputes over laws that discriminate against
lesbians and gay men.301  In deciding whether, in such a case,
pragmatic considerations would permit a principled constitutional
decision on the merits or counsel judicial restraint, a court (I
proposed) might look for guidance to some of the social and legal
changes that took place in the time between Naim and Loving. These
changes embody what I generally call "the conditions of prudence."3"
they might say, the Court's decisions on the merits will-and ought to-be governed by
social norms, institutional legitimacy, or both. See, e.g., Sandalow, Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 94, at 1033-34. There is much to be said in response to such an
argument, but Bickel himself may have said it best: "'[I]f the estimate of reality on which
[this defense of White's opinion] feeds is in any degree correct, then the reality must be
changed to exactly that degree.'" Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 165, at 13 (quoting
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 84). For "'[I]f men are
told complacently enough that this is how things are, they will become accustomed to it
and accept it. And in the end this is how things will be.' " IL
301. How broad should the scope of Hardwick, understood as a pragmatic interpretive
rule, be? Should it be treated as a general rule of application? Should it apply differently
to due process or equal protection theories? Should it apply to First Amendment claims?
To some but not others? Should we recognize a distinction for pragmatic purposes
between, say, a case like Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that the exclusion of gays from St. Patrick's day
parade is protected by First Amendment rights of private parade organizers), and other
First Amendment claims on behalf of lesbians and gay men that have been developed in
the literature? See, e.g., David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr. From Hand-Holding to
Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319,325-30 (1994). How, if at all, would viewing the First Amendment,
as infused with an equality notion change the pragmatic calculation? See Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 23-
26 (1975). Would Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that a state
law requiring Boy Scouts not to exclude gays from organization violates the First
Amendment), have been decided differently if the Court had adopted Karst's (or similar)
theories? See generally THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH,
HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY passim (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado
eds., 1995) (collecting various essays discussing this point more or less explicitly). These
questions may be part of a future discussion of my present efforts.
302. Before turning directly to the discussion of the conditions of prudence a few words
about conceptualization are in order. I must acknowledge a basic conceptual limitation to
my present discussion. It is quite likely true that the conditions of prudence in
constitutional adjudication (whether, as here, in the specific context of the
constitutionality of miscegenation bans, or elsewhere) can never be entirely known.
Prudence is not readily susceptible of being defined by tidy calculation. That there may be
no grand theory of prudence to be articulated, however, does not mean it entails no
calculation or that the calculation lacks any conditions. Nor does it mean that an effort to
2001]
454 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79
It may be obvious, or if not, can readily be agreed, that the
conditions of prudence played a role in the Court's treatment of the
lawfulness of miscegenation bans in both Naim and Loving. Even so,
attempting to discern which social and legal changes may have altered
the Court's prudential calculations-so that it did in Loving what it
avoided doing in Naim-points to a substantial methodological
obstacle one encounters when attempting to talk about the conditions
of prudence. 3 One could, of course, look to any of the myriad
commonplace changes individual citizens brought about in their
own-and others'-daily lives in the span between Naim and Loving
as a starting point for the Court's prudential calculations. On this
level, however, the potential field of prudential vision seems too large
to contemplate efficiently and too "twitchy," except perhaps in
hindsight, to be counted chiefly among the prudential conditions that
slowly eroded Naim to channel a course toward, and for, Loving.3"
speak of the conditions of prudence cannot pay its way. Something may not be
everything, but it is not nothing either. Indeed, even these initial efforts suggest that there
may yet be a way to guard against idiosyncratic reliance on prudence, or its wild excess. It
may, as well, begin to provide a response to claims, mentioned elsewhere, that courts are
simply ill-suited to make prudential judgments. See, e.g., supra note 285 and text
accompanying note 298.
Moreover, the conditions of prudence identified in the analysis that follows may
yield insights applicable beyond the particular context-the constitutionality of
miscegenation bans-in which they are adduced. It is not necessary, though it would
surely be interesting, to explore the full extent of their capacity to be generalized and
applied in other arenas. The only claim that need, and will, presently be advanced is
decidedly more modest: the conditions of prudence as they operated in the Court's
constitutional treatment of laws against miscegenation are relevant, by analogy, to the
constitutional consideration of laws that discriminate against lesbians and gay men. So
much, I think, is suggested and may already have been justified by the theoretical work of
the miscegenation analogists. Elaboration of thoughts on these issues will wait for another
day.
303. It presents a number of theoretical challenges, in addition to those already
mentioned. In order to deal thoroughly with the conditions of prudence, one ought to ask
(and try to answer) questions like these: Should prudence have played any role in the
Court's deliberations on the miscegenation question? If so, why and what role? And if
not, why not? Should the Court have counted in its pragmatic calculation its own
decisions widening the scope of Fourteenth Amendment equality protections? To answer
these questions, one would have to say a good deal more about the idea of "prudence" as
a constitutional value. Among other things, it would require further observations on more
basic concepts like "law," "judicial review," and "democracy" (perhaps "federalism," as
well). The full theoretical defense of the conditions of prudence is well beyond the scope
of this Article. All I will do here is gesture in the defense's vast directions. For a related
and more complete account of prudence as a constitutional value and the more basic
concepts it implies, see generally SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 51.
(discussing and defending prudence and incrementalism in constitutional adjudication).
304. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, supra note 31, at 1186 ("Just as every
'intuitive twitch' is not to be taken as expressing the values of an individual, not every
action of government is to be understood as expressing the values of the society." (citing
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It may well be that the highly individualized and local changes
(or foot-dragging) that took place between Naim and Loving played a
role in informing the Court's imagination of what prudence counseled
then and again on the miscegenation question. Nevertheless, one
might think it appropriate to be mindful of Dean Terrance
Sandalow's observation that "[a] consensus achieved through a
broadly representative political process is ... as close as we are likely
to get to the statement of a norm that can be said to reflect the values
of the society.""0 5 Likewise, one can perhaps understand why it may
be at that level-at the level of social norms, expressed through those
institutions and processes vested with cultural and legal authority-
that the Court might have found surer signals to guide it toward (in
Loving) or away (in Naim) from a principled decision on the merits of
what, for relevant constitutional purposes, was the very same case.°6
More about why as the narrative unfolds.
Thomas Grey, The First Virtue, 25 STAN. L. REv. 286,300 (1972))).
305. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, supra note 31, at 1187.
306. There is a related, but much more controversial argument than the one being
made here. One could say, though I do not, that the "correct"-or principled-
constitutional decision should be defined with reference to laws that "reflect and embody
consensus about the inappropriateness of using race to distinguish between people."
Telephone Interview with Terrance Sandalow, University of Michigan Law School (Dec.
21, 1999); see generally Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 94.
Congressional enactments, on this view, can (at least in some cases) be taken as reflecting
the relevant constitutional consensus. The Court seemed to accept this sort of thinking as
a principle of statutory interpretation in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 586 (1983). The kind of consensus-based argument that would justify extending Bob
Jones University to the constitutional context (as I argue Justice White did in Hardwick),
however, is not the one I am developing. My argument, rather, seeks to explain that the
enactments which some, including Dean Terrance Sandalow, believe should inform a
court's judgment about the meaning of a particular constitutional provision can also be
used to inform a court's judgment about when a principled decision of a particular sort
would be timely or feasible or "prudent."
Reading "social" or "cultural" norms, whether for purposes for which I am not
going to read them or for those for which I will, presses on that well-rehearsed "level of
abstraction" problem. Cf BORK, supra note 37, at 203-04; Frank H. Easterbrook,
Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 350 (1992). See generally Tribe &
Doff, supra note 29. Let me give rest to any idea that the problem's solution might be
found in these pages. It will not. For what it is worth, the approach to these matters in the
pages that follow is what strikes me as likely to be the way many-including some number
of judges-would intuitively tend to understand them, which means neither that they are
ungrounded in reason nor necessarily the most appealing theoretical approach one could
offer. But the approach has to recommend it that it is both serviceable and
understandable. See Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law,
in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85, 91 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1957) ("The
controlling considerations in the solution of these [constitutional] problems have been
considerations of common sense-none the less common sense because it may not have
been your common sense or my common sense .... ).
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Let us start with the signals from Congress. In the time between
Naim and Loving, Congress, over the strong objections of various
lawmakers who defended racial segregation against all comers,307
enacted some of those famous Civil Rights Acts, among them the
Civil Rights Acts of 1957,308 1960,3° and 1964,310 as well as the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.7 It is easy to get bogged down in the detailed
provisions of these various statutes and caught up in the thought that,
by their express terms, they neither attempted nor purported to put to
rest the lawfulness of miscegenation bans.312
But we should not forget that vetting statutory minutiae from
colon to colon is not the only way to read a law. Although the Civil
Rights Acts reflected the political compromise that is as part and
parcel of the legislative process, they were still susceptible of being
understood, pragmatically, as reflections of congressional respect for
the constitutional principle ensuring and requiring that people of
color be treated as full and equal citizens.313 They could (and can),
307. See Alvin Schuster, 96 in Congress Open Drive to Upset Integration Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1956, at Al (reporting on the so-called "Declaration of Constitutional
Principles," or what may more commonly be known as the "Congressional Manifesto").
308. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). In his 1957 State of the Union Address, President Eisenhower
proposed, among other things, what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1957; some,
however, gave credit and "congratulat[ions to] the then Democratic Senate Majority
Leader Lyndon B. Johnson for 'getting even this little bit from the Southerners.' "
HARRY GOLDEN, MR. KENNEDY AND THE NEGROES 111 (1964). As Judge Louis Pollak
has observed, "[T]he [1957] Act conceptually followed the extraordinary victories of
[William H.] Hastie and [Thurgood] Marshall in pre-Brown voting cases. The impetus for
the Act, however, was the decision in Brown itself." Louis H. Pollak, The Limitless
Horizons of Brown v. Board of Education, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 19,20 (1992) (emphasis
added).
309. Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 90 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 33,
42 U.S.C.).
310. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 1447 and
scattered in 42 U.S.C.).
311. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Other federal legislation in the period could, of course, be counted as statements
about Civil Rights. The federal school-aid and economic programs, for example, are
federal laws that Bickel might have counted within a prudential calculation. See BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 271 (citing 1 UNITED STATES
CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT 143-98 (1961)).
312. Cf Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed". Legislative Reaction and
Judicial Development 1956-1957,43 VA. L. REV. 1205 (1957).
313. In the years since Brown, commentators have recognized a number of theories of
race equality that could support the Court's judgment in that and other race
discrimination cases. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 31-36
(Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (discussing various ways of stating the principle of
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that is, be regarded as assent for the principle of the Court's
segregation decisions by a coordinate branch of government within
the "colloquy that can take place after the declaration of governing
principle by the Court,' 314 and I would add, before.315  The Civil
Rights Acts, we might say, contributed to the reconfiguration of the
prudential calculus that had once (or, more accurately, twice) led the
Court to stay its hand in Naim.
By 1967, the year of the Loving decision, the potential
implications of those "scurrilous attack[s] by men who predicted that
the integration of the schools would lead directly to the
'mongrelization of the race' ",316 had somewhat subsided. The Court
could thus balance significant support within congressional chambers
on the side of a principled ruling on the merits in a miscegenation
case. A conservative reading of the signals emanating from Civil
Rights Acts might have led the Justices to suppose they could, at a
bare minimum, count on enough active sympathy within Congress to
quash reactionary attempts to marshal that institution's constitutional
authority to undermine-or undo-a decision by the Court striking
Brown).
314. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 244.
315. The idea that the Court's race equality jurisprudence, and especially its decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), burst forth on the constitutional scene
largely or entirely without warning has, in recent years, been revealed as more mythic than
real. For commentary discussing these matters, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-169 (1991); Randall
Kennedy, Cast a Cautious Eye on the Supreme Court, 12 MEDIA STUDS. J., Winter 1998, at
112; Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?,
83 GEO. L.J. 433, 452-53 (1994) (reviewing MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994)); Michael
J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1,
7-8 (1996); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 2012-15 (1990);
Mark V. Tushnet, The Significance of Brown, 80 VA. L. REV. 173, 178-79 (1994)
(critiquing Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7 (1993)). For an earlier account of the slow evolution of the Court's race
equality jurisprudence leading up to and shortly following Brown, see Yale Kamisar, The
School Desegregation Cases in Retrospect: Some Reflections on Causes and Effects, in
ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA 1952-55 at xii (Leon Friedman ed., 1969).
316. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 174; see also id at
250 ("This is the unpalatable but undeniable fact that the principle of the integration of
the races ran counter to the views and strong emotions not merely the customary practice,
of a majority of the people to whose way of life it was chiefly to be applicable .... "); id at
251 ("The foreseeable opposition [to execution the segregation cases' principles] was
localized, indeed isolated; but, by the same token, it was entrenched in a cluster of states,
where it formed a majority. Thus concentrated, it could wield power disproportionate to
what its numbers would give it if distributed nationwide.").
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down laws against miscegenation.317 If "the cooperation of the
political branches might be needed in fostering the necessary
acceptance" of a decision constitutionally to protect miscegenation
from state prohibition, the Civil Rights Acts seemed to indicate, and
certainly could be read to indicate, that the Court had that
cooperation from Congress.318
But there was cooperation from the Executive Branch, too.
President Eisenhower's "tepid" support for desegregation efforts319
317. Such means might include efforts aimed at constitutional amendment, jurisdiction
stripping, or impeachment of the Justice, or Justices, who would join in such a ruling.
318. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 251. My account
is somewhat at odds with the one found in BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH,
supra note 165, at 244-72 (discussing the social and political context of the school
segregation cases); id. at 265 ("At best, the President [Eisenhower]-and, for its own
reasons, also the Congress-politely declined the Court's invitation to join with it in
ensuring the success of its now hazardous undertaking."); id. at 271 ("Here a federal
school-aid bill and programs for the development of what is now a sick one-crop economy
may be more important than principles declared by the Supreme Court or the Civil Rights
Acts of 1957 and 1960.").
Though not strictly necessary to defend my present argument, one might also have
read the Civil Rights Acts, with their various explicit and implicit jurisdictional provisions,
as amounting to a kind of legislative authorization-or invitation-for the courts to
elaborate and expand the principle of the school segregation cases-up to and including
laws against miscegenation. Indeed, the Justices were hardly impervious to various Civil
Rights Acts' grants of power to the courts. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306
(1964), where, in dissent, Justice Hugo Black wrote: "I think one of the chief purposes of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act was to take ... disputes out of the streets and restaurants and
into the courts, which Congress has granted power to provide an adequate and orderly
judicial remedy." Id. at 318-19 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 311-12 (1964) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
nondiscriminatory treatment in public accommodations and then observing that, in the
words of Professor Ira Michael Heyman, "[t]he Civil Rights Act created the substantive
rights that Mr. Justice Goldberg found within the Fourteenth Amendment," Ira Michael
Heyman, Civil Rights 1964 Term: Responses to Direct Action, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 159,
174). Perhaps some number of the Justices viewed the congressional invitation in the Civil
Rights Acts as a kind of roving constitutional warrant to "do justice" for people of color.
See, e.g., Hamm, 379 U.S. at 315 ("The great purpose of the civil rights legislation was to
obliterate the effect of a distressing chapter of our history.").
319. Golden's account of President Eisenhower's lack of enthusiasm for pre- and post-
Brown race desegregation efforts somewhat undermines the force of Bickel's boldish
suggestion that the "cooperation of the political branches [with such efforts] could well be
looked for, since the Solicitor General of the United States, responding to the Court's
request for an expression of views as amicus curiae, had appeared and supported the cause
of the Negro Plaintiffs." BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at
251. There was, as Golden points out, a significant distance separating Eisenhower's
enthusiasm for desegregation, on the one hand, from that of his Attorney General,
Herbert Brownell, and his Solicitor General, Simon Sobeloff, on the other. See GOLDEN,
supra note 308, at 104 ("Despite their chief's sentiments, they soon argued an advisory
brief with the Supreme Court regarding desegregation procedures which employed such
terms as 'promptly' and 'immediately.' The Brownell brief and the Sobeloff argument
clearly indicated that the 'moderate' President had an 'extremist' Attorney General and
2001] REORIENTING BOWERS V. HARDWICK 459
gave way to the promises Senator John F. Kennedy, Jr., made on the
presidential hustings to uphold and defend the Constitution as the
Court had been interpreting it (at least) since the segregation cases.320
Those promises-some sooner, some later, some not at a11321-turned
into President Kennedy's various civil rights programs, reflected in
Executive Orders 322 legislative proposals,323  administrative
regulations,2 4 and the campaign of the Justice Department under his
brother's stewardship, all aimed at making race equality a meaningful
reality throughout the country, particularly in the South, in the years
leading up to Loving.
The Kennedy Administration's institutional support for civil
rights, which many believed inadequate to the task at hand, became
more vigorous when Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the
responsibilities of the Oval Office and became, as he put it, "the
trustee and custodian of the Kennedy administration ....
an 'extremist' Solicitor General."). Bickel did, however, note Eisenhower's limited
support for the Court's desegregation efforts. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH, supra note 165, at 266.
320. See GOLDEN, supra note 308, at 130 (explaining that the "romance" between
then-Senator John Kennedy and white Southerners "was shattered once and for all" when,
on June 23, 1960, Kennedy "addressed the Liberal party of New York and said that he
hoped to win the Democratic nomination for President without a single Southern vote in
the convention"); see also id at 118 ("[I]t was two years before Mr. Kennedy issued an
Executive directive against discrimination in government housing. Political considerations
had stayed him. He had been a member of both the House and the Senate and he
appreciated the quid pro quo of politics."); id. (explaining some of the reasons why
Kennedy's "appreciation" for the "quid pro quo of politics" mattered).
321. Many, for example, "complained that President Kennedy had wasted two years
before he ended housing segregation in government-financed units; and that when the
President did end it by his celebrated promise of 'a stroke of the pen' it was not half as
strong as they hoped it would be." Id. at 135.
322. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963) (dealing with the non-
discriminatory employment practices of government contractors under the auspices of the
President's Equal Employment Opportunity Committee); Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3
C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. 1982 (1964) (creating equal
opportunity in housing); and Exec. Order No. 11,114,3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963) (extending
the authority of the President's Equal Employment Opportunity Committee). Following
President Kennedy's assassination, Executive Orders Number 10,925 and 11,114 were
both superseded by Executive Order Number 11,246.
323. See President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on Civil Rights, 1963 PUB.
PAPERS 82 app. at 221 (Feb. 28, 1963). Criticism of Kennedy's original Civil Rights bill, as
well as events in April and May of 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama, helped lead to the bill's
enhancement. IRWIN UNGER & DEBI UNGER, LBJ: A LIFE 267-68 (1999).
324. As Professor Gerald Rosenberg reports, it was not until late in May 1961 that
"Attorney General Robert Kennedy, supported by other cabinet members[,] petitioned
the [Interstate Commerce Commission] to adopt more stringent regulations. In
September 1961, the [Commission] issued new and stronger regulations." ROSENBERG,
supra note 315, at 64 (citation omitted).
325. UNGER & UNGER, supra note 323, at 291 (citing LYNDON JOHNSON, THE
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President Johnson, whose efforts as Senate Majority Leader had been
instrumental in the passage of, among other important pieces of civil
rights legislation, the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts,326 played a
catalytic role in the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964327 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.32 If by the time of Loving, then, the
Court could include congressional assent within its pragmatic
assessment whether to declare miscegenation prohibitions
unconstitutional, it could, by then, include Executive assent, as well.
What may be the most important of the conditions of prudence,
however, has not yet been mentioned. The oral arguments in Loving
appear to indicate something of the actual significance of what might
be thought of as "federalist assent" to the Court's prudential
reflections. Notice, for example, that the very first question from the
Bench in Loving went directly to the kind of opposition on the state
level that a decision declaring miscegenation bans unconstitutional
might have encountered: "How many states," asked one of the
Justices, "have laws like [Virginia's]?" 32 9  The answer returned-
sixteen33 -- stood in stark contrast to the one given in the literature
the same year that Naim first arrived at the Court-twenty-nine.331
VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1963-1969 at 19 (1971)).
326. See id. at 203-19 (discussing Johnson's role in the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L.
No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. &
42 U.S.C.)); id. at 232-35 (same for Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat.
86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 33, 42 U.S.C.)); id. at 306-11 (same for
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 24 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
1447 and scattered in 42 U.S.C.)); id. at 357-59 (same for Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)); see
also VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET, THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 95 (1983)
(same for Civil Rights Act of 1957); id. at 98-99 (same for Civil Rights Act of 1964).
327. Johnson, according to Unger and Unger, "publicly stayed in the background
during the fight over the [1964] Civil Rights Act, but he was everywhere behind the scenes
cajoling and threatening southern senators." UNGER & UNGER, supra note 323, at 309.
328. See id. at 357-59.
329. Oral Argument for Appellants, Loving v. Virginia, 399 U.S. 1 (1967), reprinted in
64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 961 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)
[hereinafter Loving Oral Arguments].
330. Id. ("There are 16 states, Your Honor, that have these [miscegenation bans]
presently. Maryland just repealed theirs.").
331. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 753 (Va. 1955) ("More than half of the States of the
Union have miscegenation statutes."), vacated by 350 U.S. 891 (1955); Note, The
Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, supra note 274, at 88 & n.12 (1955) (counting
twenty-nine states with laws against miscegenation). As late as 1957, one observer began
his "reappraisal of the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes" with the finding that:
"Today, twenty-five States of the Union by statute forbid marriages on racial grounds."
Weinberger, supra note 274, at 208 & n.1 (collecting statutes).
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The Court did not fail to comprehend that sheer numbers told
only part of the story. Picking up on the parallels between the pattern
of laws prohibiting miscegenation and the earlier pattern of school
segregation laws, one of the Justices commented: "I've just been
looking at the list [of the states that then prohibited miscegenation],
and I can't-I can't see a single one of these states that wasn't among
those that had the school segregation laws. You may find one, but I
think they're identical. '3 2 This last note was, of course, as important
to strike as its salience was, at least publicly, to dampen. And
dampened it was. "Well," one Justice (about the general line of
inquiry) eventually remarked, "it isn't a matter of any great
consequence.
'333
Officially, it may not have been a matter of "any great
consequence." But can there be any serious doubt that, at the very
least, subliminally, it really was more than an idle point of
information? The number and pattern of state laws barring
miscegenation had shifted considerably since Naim, a time when the
states that prohibited interracial marriages were scattered illiberally
throughout the South, East and West. As the transcripts of the oral
arguments in Loving suggest, that shift may well have bolstered the
Court's confidence that Loving was the occasion for finishing the
332. Loving Oral Arguments, supra note 329, at 1001. The list was not exactly
identical. The list of states, reproduced infra note 333, did not include Kansas, which, as
the Justice who made this observation could not have forgotten, was "among those [states]
that had the school segregation laws." See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486
(1954).
333. Loving Oral Arguments, supra note 329, at 1001. Although the Loving opinion
did mention the "fact" of the number of states that then prohibited miscegenation, it
seemed to avoid expressly attributing any significance to it. The Court simply stated:
"Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of
racial classifications." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967). In a footnote, the Court
added, "After the initiation of this litigation, Maryland repealed its prohibitions against
interracial marriage, Md. Laws 1967, c. 6, leaving Virginia and 15 other States with statutes
outlawing interracial marriage." IL at n.5 (listing the following state law sources:
"Alabama, Ala. Const., Art. 4, § 102, Ala. Code, Tit. 14, § 360 (1958); Arkansas, Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 55-104 (1947); Delaware, Del. Code Ann., Tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Florida, Fla.
Const., Art. 16, § 24, Fla. Stat. § 741.11 (1965); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961);
Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.020 (Supp. 1966); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. § 14:79
(1950); Mississippi, Miss. Const., Art. 14, § 263, Miss. Code Ann. § 459 (1956); Missouri,
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.020 (Supp. 1966); North Carolina, N.C. Const., Art. XIV, § 8, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-181 (1953); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat., Tit. 43, § 12 (Supp. 1965); South
Carolina, S.C. Const., Art. 3, § 33, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7 (1962); Tennessee, Tenn. Const.,
Art. 11, § 14, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-402 (1955); Texas, Tex. Pen. Code, Art. 492 (1952);
West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. § 4697 (1961)"). Into this silence about the significance
of these laws (and their pattern), I think, at least some measure of constitutional prudence
can justifiably be read.
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
business left unfinished by Naim. Based on more than a decade's
experience contending with Southern opponents of its race-equality
rulings, 34 experience significant in its own right, the Court may have
had a pretty good "feel" for how well it, standing alone, could handle
the resentment that might be engendered by concluding that
miscegenation laws did not square with the Constitution's demands.
The growing assent for the principle of race equality on the national
and state level could not but have reassured the Court that, in any
event, it would not have to-or no longer did-stand alone.
C. On Prudence and Sodomy
What lessons might these conditions of prudence hold for the
choices courts face when deciding whether to declare that the
Constitution forbids governmental discrimination against lesbians and
gay men? Again, without thinking of them as a perfectly neat
prudential calculation, might prudential considerations tend to lead
courts toward-or away-from the merits of such cases? The answer,
of course, will vary from law to law. Rather than analyzing the entire
spectrum, in this Subpart I will illustrate how a court might
operationalize Hardwick, understood as a pragmatic interpretive rule,
and translate the conditions of prudence from the miscegenation into
the lesbian and gay rights arena. As I mentioned earlier, the chosen
illustration will be a constitutional challenge to a state's sodomy ban.
In the years leading up to Hardwick, as well as in the years since,
"[t]here has not been a piece of watershed legislation [from Congress]
that has truly delivered practical benefit and safety to gay
Americans." '335 The absence of watershed legislation, however,
should not lead us to overlook the noteworthy ways Congress can be
seen to have expressed its interest in participating in that "vital
334. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 500 (1954).
335. Ballot Box Key to Getting Change for Gays in Military, Clinton Says, UNION-
TRIBUNE (San Diego), Dec. 17, 1999, at A9 (remarks of Elizabeth Birch, Executive
Director of the Human Rights Campaign). Congressional authorization for funds
dedicated to AIDS and AIDS-related research, treatment and prevention in the years
before and after Hardwick might be thought of as an earlier "breakthrough." Without
meaning to deny the import of such funding, my current discussion sets out to show how,
since Hardwick, Congress has spoken in ways a court might consider relevant to a
prudential calculation of whether to reach the merits of the constitutionality of a state's
sodomy prohibition. I cannot now say for certain, but the federal government's funding in
the AIDS arena may have helped forge a link between AIDS and sexual orientation in
ways that, as will be discussed shortly, did not much help lesbians and gay men in their
constitutional arguments. See infra text accompanying notes 345-73.
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national seminar 36 that the Hardwick Court indicated it preferred
not to lead.
As the Court's sometime student, Congress may have been
reticent to disagree with its sometime teacher's views l
Nevertheless, by 1990, just four years after Hardwick, Congress
started making its thoughts known. First came the notion, through
the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA),338 that discrimination
against lesbians and gay men was worthy of federal notice. One
commentator has recounted that Congress had been considering the
law "[f]or several years," but its "passage was blocked by legislators
unwilling to include sexual orientation as a category" within it?3  The
HCSA, enacted, was a modest thought, to be sure, but considered: in
principle, discrimination against lesbians and gay men might properly
be the subject of future congressional action.
Shortly thereafter, almost as if Congress had it in mind when
speaking through the HCSA and demonstrating that the HCSA was
more than an empty, abstract observation, Congress approved the
Immigration Reform Act of 1990 (IRA) ° which, as a technical
matter, repealed the categorical exclusion of lesbians and gay men
from immigration by "eliminat[ing] the statutory ground [in
previously-existing law] for exclusion based on 'sexual deviancy.' "31
336. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193,208 (1952).
337. Cf JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 31-32 (Alan Bass trans.,
1978) (discussing "the disciple's" relationship to "the master").
338. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); cf. Congress Bill on Hate and Violent Acts Gains, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 1988, at A18 (discussing Reagan Justice Department study concluding that gays
are more commonly victims of "hate crimes" than members of other minority identity
groups).
"The Act requires the Department of Justice to collect data on [hate crimes]. The
purposes of the Act are to (1) compile the empirical data necessary to develop effective
policies to fight the problem of hate-motivated violence; (2) raise public awareness; and
(3) provoke an official response." Aklilu Dunlap, The Bellows of Dying Elephants: Gay-,
Lesbian-, and Bisexual-Protective Hate Crime Statutes after R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 12 L.
& INEO. J. 205,210 (1993). For criticism of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, and its
qualified support for lesbian and gay rights, see id. at 206 n.6 (collecting authorities).
339. Capers, supra note 221, at 1164 n.25 (citing Moore, Hate Crimes, 21 NAT'LJ. 1604
(1989), and Robert W. Stewart, Dannemeyer Suggests White House Policy Encourages
Homosexuality, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1989, at 28). "Representative William Dannemeyer
... and Senator Jesse Helms ... led efforts to exclude sexual orientation from the
categories of biases, with [Helms] going so far as proposing to amend the bill by adding
antigay language urging the enforcement of sodomy statutes and depicting homosexuality
as a threat to families." Id.
340. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18,22,26,29,42 U.S.C.).
341. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1993). For discussions of
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In what can be understood as an arrow shot in the direction of Justice
White's Hardwick opinion, the IRA's legislative history described the
categorical exclusion as "being out of step with current notions of
privacy and personal dignity." 2  In sweeping language, Congress
added that the IRA's amendments show that "the United States does
not view personal decisions about sexual orientation as a danger to
other people in our society."' 3 The IRA's provisions themselves may
be unassuming, but the rationale for enacting them (which one could
read into the law anyway) was not. No mental acrobatics are needed
to see why a court might include the IRA within its pragmatic
assessment of the unlawfulness of a state's sodomy ban. If majorities
in both Houses of Congress supported the IRA, a court would not be
acting entirely on its own in concluding that a state's sodomy ban was
unconstitutional. Nor, unlike the Hardwick Court (or any other court
at the time of Hardwick), would it be acting without good reason to
believe it could square such a conclusion with a congressional
judgment about what "current notions of privacy and personal
dignity" 4 dictated.
Far more significant than the judgment expressed by Congress
through the IRA is the declaration one can find in the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 4S that undeniably "watershed"
civil rights legislation protecting disabled Americans against a broad
array of discriminations. The implications of the ADA for the kind of
pragmatic assessment presently under consideration might not be
apparent at first glance. The ADA, after all, does not protect lesbians
homosexuality and immigration, see Ellen Vagelos, The Social Group that Dare Not Speak
its Name: Should Homosexuals Constitute a Particular Social Group for Purposes of
Obtaining Refugee Status? Comment on Re: Inaudi, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 229, 231-32
(1993); see also Samuel M. Silvers, Note, The Exclusion and Expulsion of Homosexual
Aliens, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. Rnv. 295,295-96 (1984).
342. H.R. REP. No. 723(1), at pt. 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6736
(emphasis added) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.118: 101-723/pt.2).
343. Id. As further evidence for congressional views about what "current notions of
privacy and personal dignity" dictated, compare the attempt in the District of Columbia to
repeal its sodomy ban as part of the Sexual Assualt Reform Act of 1981, 28 D.C. Reg.
3409 (1981), which Congress rebuffed that same year, H.R. Res. 208, 97th Cong., 127
CONG. REc. 22,572-79 (1981), with a similar but successful effort to repeal the District's
sodomy ban in 1993. 1993 D.C. Stat. 10-14. In 1993, notably, Congress failed to take the
action necessary to negate the District's repeal of its sodomy ban. See Rene Sanchez, D.C.
Sodomy Law is Off the Books: Congress Allows Repeal, Ending 12-Year Battle by Gay-
Rights Advocates, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1993, at B3.
344. H.R. REP. No. 723(1), at pt. 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6736
(emphasis added) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/8: 101-723/pt.2).
345. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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and gay men as lesbians and gay men from discrimination.346  As
Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the ADA's chief architects and
strategic masterminds, has explained: "Congress specifically affirmed
that homosexuality and bisexuality are not physical or mental
impairments and hence not covered under the ADA." 7 However,
Feldblum continued:
[A]lthough sexual orientation is not a disability protected
under the ADA, a gay man, lesbian, or bisexual person who
has a disability covered under the law is protected from
discrimination on the basis of the covered disability. Thus,
for example, a homosexual or bisexual person who has HIV
disease, uses a wheelchair, or is blind is protected against
unjustified discrimination based on those covered
disabilities. Moreover, if a gay man, lesbian, or bisexual
person is discriminated against by an employer or business
owner because the person is regarded as having AIDS or
HIV infection, that person is protected under ... the
definition of disability.3
On what grounds, then, might one say the ADA's provisions can
properly be understood to have altered the prudential calculations
about the lawfulness of sodomy bans in the years since Hardwick was
decided--or, more ambitiously, that those provisions altered the
calculus in a fairly substantial way? To explain, one must bring to
mind a feature of the social background against which Hardwick was
handed down that is often, though by no means always,39 overlooked.
It is a feature about which little or nothing need be said by way of
"proof," for, as Professor Charles Black observed in a different
context, it is a matter "of common notoriety, [a] matter[] not so much
for judicial notice as for the background knowledge of educated
[women and] men who live in the world.""35
346. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
read the specific exclusion of lesbians and gay men from the Americans with Disabilities
Act as congressional "unresponsive[ness] to repeated attempts to extend homosexuals the
protections of federal civil rights laws." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). No mention of the Hate
Crimes Statistics Act or the Immigration Reform Act, or Congress's failure in 1993 to
override the repeal of the District of Columbia's sodomy ban is to be found in Scalia's
Evans opinion.
347. Chai R. Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirements of the ADA, in
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 35, 41 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer
eds., 1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (Supp. II 1990)).
348. Id. (emphasis added).
349. See, e.g., Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 18, at 1518-20 (discussing
sodomy, public health, and HIV/AIDS).
350. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
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It is what Black might have called a "plain fact""35 of American
history that Hardwick was decided in the midst, maybe even at the
height, of the national moral panic over AIDS.352 It was hardly a
coincidence, for example, that amici in Hardwick, chiefly among them
the American Public Health Association, sought to reassure the
Court that, neither as a matter of constitutional law, nor, significantly,
as a matter of public health policy, should prohibitions against same-
sex sexual activity in private be sustained.3  Nor was it a coincidence
that the then (at least) rhetorically potent arguments on the "other
side" were pressed on the Court with a certain urgency. As Professor
William Eskridge has recently reminded us, for example, there was
"an amicus brief in Hardwick [filed by a professor of law] arguing that
421, 426 (1960) (relying on quoted languge to describe the inequalities and well-known
social meaning of racial segregation).
351. Id. at 427 ("[I]t would be the most unneutral of principles, improvised ad hoc, to
require that a court faced with the present problem refuse to note a plain fact about the
society of the United States.").
352. For the classic articulation of the theory of "moral panic," see STANLEY COHEN,
FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 9-12 (Martin Robinson ed., 1980) (1972). For a later
elaboration of the theory, see ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL
PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE (1994). As Professor Cohen
explained:
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or
(more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or
deteriorates and becomes more visible.... Sometimes the panic passes over and
is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more
serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those
in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.
COHEN, supra, at 9. Thanks to my colleague Orit Kamir for introducing me to Cohen's
work and for helping me to begin to think through some of the ways it may have shaped
public discussion of the constitutionality of laws against sodomy at the time Hardwick was
decided. Kamir herself, at moments, relies on Cohens's work in her fascinating book on
stalking. See ORIT KAMIR, EVERY BREATH You TAKE: STALKING NARRATIVES AND
THE LAW (forthcoming 2001).
353. See Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Psychological Ass'n and American Pub. Health
Ass'n at 19-27, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (arguing that
prohibitions against sodomy do not prevent the spread of AIDS and may, indeed,
adversely affect public health). Perhaps it is worth noting that the term "HIV" was coined
in 1986. See STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS
OF KNOWLEDGE 77 (1996) ("In response to the confusing array of acronyms then in use-
HTVL-III, LAV, ARV, HTLV-III/LAV, and others-the Human Retrovirus
Subcommittee of the International Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses rebuffed
Gallo and agreed on a new, compromise, name in 1986: I-IV, human immunodeficiency
virus.").
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sodomy laws [were] justified as a way to prevent the spread of HIV,
the virus that causes AIDS."354 The State of Georgia, too, defended
its sodomy law, in part, on similar grounds.3 5 With Eskridge, then,
one might heave a sigh of relief that "[t]he Supreme Court correctly
ignored the argument 356 that sought to defend state sodomy bans on
354. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 171. For the brief Eskridge had in mind,
see Brief of Amicus Curiae David Robinson, Jr., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(No. 85-140).
355. See Brief of Petitioner Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia at 37,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
356. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 171. Eskridge elaborates reasons for
thinking that the Court ignored the AIDS-related argument elsewhere, where he has
written that "the AIDS epidemic is never mentioned by the various opinions in Bowers v.
Hardwick." William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and
Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 385 n.25 (1992) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Posner's Sex and Reason] (book review).
Nevertheless, it may be worth pointing out that a law review article Justice White
cited in his Hardwick opinion, see Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (opinion of White, J.) (citing
Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 525 (1986)), contains an interesting
proposal. As the article (though not the portion cited by White) explains:
Notwithstanding the possibility that the Supreme Court may find the Georgia
sodomy statute unconstitutional, the Court may provide the states with
guidelines for enacting AIDS legislation that would pass constitutional muster.
In this respect, the Court may use Hardwick in the same manner it used Roe.
Although the Court in Roe struck down the antiabortion statute, the Court
utilized available medical data so as to provide states with guidelines for enacting
constitutional antiabortion legislation.
Id at 631. Ordinarily, we may suppose a declaration striking down a state's sodomy law as
unconstitutional would not require on-going judicial supervision. In contrast to ordinary
supposition, however, was the proposal that the Court treat the occasion presented by
Hardwick as an opportunity to revisit and build on Roe by providing legislative
"guidelines for enacting AIDS legislation that would pass constitutional muster." lId
However sensible, such a proposal might have struck some one or more of the Justices as
yet another reason to avoid a ruling in Hardwick for Hardwick altogether-especially
given the on-going assualt, including by the Reagan Administration, on Roe. See supra
text accompanying note 110. For the kind of criticism that such a proposal, had it been
embraced by the Court, might have precipitated, even among those who might have been
sympathetic with some of its premises (e.g., that private gay sex is constitutionally
protected, minimally under some circumstances, as a fundamental right), see Ely, supra
note 106, at 943-44. Indeed, it is at just this point, the intersection between
homosexuality, disease, and death, that Ely's suggestion that, unlike homosexual sodomy,
"[a]bortion ends ... the life of a human being other than the one making the choice,"
begins to stumble without further elaboration. hd at 929. In any event, if White-or some
other of the Justices-had in mind a proposal that the Court should, following Roe, extend
a trimester-like framework to the regulation of sodomy, it would certainly have given
added dimension to that declaration White made "about the limits of the Court's role in
carrying out its constitutional mandate." Id; see also supra text accompanying notes 128-
32. Cf. Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL
ACrIvSM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988).
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public health grounds. I myself, however, would not rush too quickly
to sigh; such an expression, I think, may come too soon.
Consider the following colloquy between Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor and Professor Laurence Tribe at the very end of Tribe's
oral argument in Hardwick. 7 The colloquy offers us some reason to
think that the Court's failure to grapple with the AIDS defense of
Georgia's sodomy ban should not be confused with a court decision
actually rejecting that defense, or "ignoring" it:
QUESTION: Well, Mr. Tribe, under your analysis what sort
of explanation would be required? You suggested that if the
state were to assert its desire to promote traditional families
instead of homosexual relationships would not suffice in
your view and yet that is an articulate[d]-potentially
articulate[d] reason. Perhaps the state can say its desire to
deter the spread of a communicable disease or something of
that sort.
MR. TRIBE: Yes.
QUESTION: Now, what suffices here?
MR. TRIBE: As to the first, if the State of Georgia were
simply defending-Might. I finish the answer to this
question, Mr. Chief Justice?
If the State of Georgia were defending its refusal to
sanction homosexual marriage, there would be a close
connection between that and the first rationale. The
connection, however, would be so weak between this
sweeping law and the rationale of endorsing or helping
marriage that I doubt that would work.
As to avoiding the spread of communicable diseases,
the American Public Health Association ... think[s] that
this law and laws like it would be counter-productive to that
end, but you don't even reach that issue until you have some
kind of meaningful inquiry.
Surely, if a narrowly tailored law could be shown
necessary to protect the public health, that would be a
compelling justification, but Georgia offers no such
justification here.58
357. Though official transcripts generally do not identify which Justice asks which
questions during Supreme Court oral arguments, listening to the recording of the oral
arguments in Hardwick strongly suggests that it was Justice O'Connor who pressed the
line of inquiry that follows in the text. The recording of the oral arguments in Hardwick
can be found conveniently at http://oyez.nwu.edu.
358. Hardwick Oral Arguments, supra note 138, at 656.
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The exchange spawns questions. What was O'Connor really
asking? Did she (or did she not) have AIDS in mind when she
pressed Tribe the way she did? If she did, was she alone? Were other
Justices impervious to the considerations to which O'Connor seems to
have been giving voice?
Professor Janet Halley has helpfully explained that in Hardwick,
homosexual sodomy was a metonym for homosexuality.359 Others, in
a similar vein, have noted that, particularly around the time of
Hardwick,3'0 both homosexual sodomy and homosexuality were
synonymous with AIDS.361 Even if the Justices themselves did not
359. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy, supra note 15, at 1737 ("Sodomy in these
formulations is such an intrinsic characteristic of homosexuals, and so exclusive to us, that
it constitutes a rhetorical proxy for us. It is our metonym."); see also Feldblum, supra note
23, at 288 ("From the beginning of the opinion, in which Justice White first described the
question on which the Court granted certiorari, the conflation between 'engaging in
sodomy' and 'being a homosexual' is apparent.").
360. Not only at the time of Hardwick, of course. The thought still lingers. It may
even be found, for example, in the coyly odious but seemingly unmistakable invocation of
the equation between HIV/AIDS and gays found in Justice Scalia's opinion in Romer v.
Evans. See 517 U.S. 620, 638 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting Colorado's
Amendment 2, which the majority ruled unconstitutional, to mean that "homosexuals
could not be denied coverage, or charged a greater premium, with respect to auto collision
insurance; but neither the State nor any municipality could require that distinctive health
insurance risks associated with homosexuality (if there are any) be ignored." (emphasis
added)).
361. See STYCHIN, supra note 114, at 48 ("The 'promotion' of homosexuality, then, is
highly dangerous because of the contagiousness, not only of the disease of [AIDS], but
also of the disease of homosexuality. In fact, the two become virtually synonymous
(which, incidentally, further facilitates the erasure of lesbians from the discourse)."). Of
the 1987 congressional debate over the "Helms Amendment," which barred providing
federal funds to state governments or private groups that would use those funds to offer
"AIDS education, information, or prevention materials" or to engage in "activities that
promote or encourage, directly or indirectly, homosexual sexual activities," Stychin writes:
"[G]ay male sexuality became inextricably linked to the [AIDS] pandemic, such that the
gay male body is the vessel which contains and spreads HIV." Id. at 50. As Senator Jesse
Helms had said: "Every AIDS case can be traced back to a homosexual act." 133 CONG.
REC. 27747,27754 (1987) (statement of Sen. Helms). As Helms also proposed: "Many ...
experts, self-proclaimed, tell us that the source of the AIDS epidemic is the AIDS virus.
That is like saying that the source of a fire set by an arsonist was the match that the
arsonist used, rather than the arsonist who struck the match and set the fire." Id. I do not
make mention of the Helms Amendment in my general discussion of the conditions of
prudence, because although it passed the Congress in 1987, see STYCIN, supra note 114, at
50, it was "rejected the following year in the debate on the appropriations bill, and was
replaced by a more 'neutral' clause that focused on whether [AIDS] educational materials
were 'designed' to encourage sexual activity[.]" Id. at 51. For other commentators who
have noted the metonymic or synecdochical equation between gay male sexual activity,
sexual identity, and AIDS, see CATHERINE WALDBY, AIDS AND THE BODY POLITIC:
BIOMEDICINE AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 11 (1996) ("[G]ay masculinity has been so
intensely medicalised and so closely associated with the AIDS epidemic that gay men are
effectively treated by much public health discourse as if they themselves were the virus, the
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and would not have indulged such reductionist and integrationist (and
not a little hateful) equations,362 were there not others who did and
would have? Might these considerations not have given the Justices
pause?363 Were there not those ascendant on the national political
scene in 1986 who might have exploited the equations to criticize a
decision in the case favorable to Hardwick? 3 4  Who might have
fanned the already fulsome fears of the American public, claiming the
Court had endangered the public's health by "promoting"
homosexuality and homosexual sodomy? 365
On this level, should we fail to notice the parallels between
Hardwick and Naim? The claims of "mongrelization"? Of forced
commingling of blood, pure with impure?3 6 Of rending "the fabric of
origins of infection."); Judith Butler, Sexual Inversions, in DISCOURSES OF SEXUALITY:
FROM ARISTOTLE TO AIDS 344,357 (Dona C. Stanton ed., 1992) ("The pathologization of
homosexuality was to have a future that Foucault could not have foreseen in 1976. For if
homosexuality is pathological from the start, then any disease that homosexuals may
sometimes contract will be uneasily conflated with the disease that they already are."). Cf.
Thomas R. Mendicino, Note, Characterization and Diseases: Homosexuals and the Threat
of AIDS, 66 N.C. L. REV. 226 (1987).
362. The justices of the Missouri Supreme Court who decided State v. Walsh, 713
S.W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. 1986), holding that the state sodomy ban was rationally related to
the State's interest in protecting and preserving the public's health, cannot properly be
given this same benefit of the doubt. But see State v. Cogshell, 997 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a legislative revision of the state's sodomy law effectively
decriminalized consensual sodomy in the state); Litigation Notes, LESBIAN AND GAY LAW
NOTES, Oct. 1999, at 19, available at http://www.qrd.orgqrd/www/legallgln/10.99.html (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("[Missouri State] Attorney General Jay Nixon
urged the court to reconsider or clarify its opinion, but the court has refused to do so, and
Nixon, who has since told the local press that he believes consensual sodomy should not be
a crime, has announced he will not try to appeal the ruling further.").
363. Eskridge, Posner's Sex and Reason, supra note 356, at 338 n.25 (1992) ("Posner
notes that AIDS was discussed in the briefs ... and is widely believed to have had some
influence on the Justices who formed the majority." (emphasis added)).
364. See supra note 75; see also text accompanying note 110.
365. Cf STYCHIN, supra note 114, at 151. Stychin writes:
The predominant factor, however, which may have fuelled an anti-assimilationist
politics was the urgency, panic, frustration, and anger that was experienced
around the American government's gross inaction over the [AIDS] pandemic in
the 1980s. The message here was completely compatible with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Hardwick, namely that gay men were sodomites and that
sodomy led inexorably to death from [AIDS]. Gay men thus were the cause of
[AIDS], which was the logical result of engaging in sodomy. Within these
rhetorical tropes, gay men were constitutionally unprotected and, furthermore,
their lives were beyond protection from the relentless pursuit of the virus (no
matter what "protection" was adopted).
366. Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME ONE: AN
INTRODUCTION 149-50 (1990) (noting the relationship between racism, sexuality, blood,
and "blood myth").
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life"? Of violence and bloodshed?367 Did Hardwick, in its own way,
not rehearse and reconstitute the moral panic surrounding Naim? If
so, would it have been any more or less unprincipled, any more or less
pragmatic than the Court's decisions in Naim, for the Hardwick Court
(or one of more of the Justices, even in the quiet hush of sober
deliberations) to believe that the safer course to follow in the case
would be to wait for another day, when (and if) the political climate
had changed and the hysteria had died down to declare sodomy laws
unconstitutional? 368
Whatever else might be said by way of response to these
questions, in hindsight there is this: The Supreme Court missed an
opportunity in Hardwick to show the kind of (principled) moral
leadership that we so like, and may even need, to think the Court
ought to provide.3 69 Fortunately, there was teaching, eventually. Not
by the Court, however, but by Congress, through-to return to the
federal law we have been discussing-the ADA.370
In its fashion, the ADA taught the country, once again, that each
moral panic must some day (begin to) end, and that the time had
367. For a decrepit view of the importance of upholding miscegenation bans, see Lonas
v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287, 299-300 (Tenn. 1871) (defending a law criminalizing
miscegenation by arguing that it "prevent[ed] violence and bloodshed which would arise
from such cohabitation, distasteful to our people, and unfit to produce the human race in
any of the types in which it was created"). For further discussion of Lonas, and of the
miscegenation analogy in the context of same-sex marriage, see James Trosino, American
Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 103
(1993).
368. See WALDBY, supra note 361, at 3 ("[S]cientific knowledge has drained away the
potential for political conflict from the field of AIDS .... Science has prevented nature
from contaminating culture, and so stopped us reverting to a state of nature, the war of
each against each.").
369. Even the Hardwick opinions written by Justices Blackmun and Stevens provided
no moral leadership on this front. As Judge Richard Posner observed some year ago:
There is also a profound lack of empathy [in Hardwick] for the situation of the
male homosexual in America in the age of AIDS. (AIDS is not mentioned in
any of the opinions, although it was mentioned in several of the briefs.) In this
respect [Blackmun's and Stevens's] opinions, in their bland decorousness and
their formulaic generality, do not differ notably from [White's, Burger's and
Powell's] opinions, but in this they reflect faithfully the tone and emphasis of
Hardwick's brief.
POSNER, supra note 211, at 346.
370. Only in 1998 did the Supreme Court reach the AIDS question under the ADA,
holding that asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals can receive protection under the
statute. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998). Bragdon, however, and one thinks
it is no sheer coincidence, did not involve an HIV-infected gay or bisexual man, or even a
lesbian or bisexual woman, but a presumably straight woman. The Court's decision, years
before, in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1986), might have hinted that the Court
would ultimately take the direction it did in Bragdon.
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come, by law officially, to put the moral panic relating to AIDS to
rest.37 Although the ADA did not extend protections against
discrimination to gays as gays, it is a mistake to conclude that that
statutory exclusion makes the law irrelevant for a pragmatic
consideration of the constitutionality of a state's sodomy ban.
Counterintuitively perhaps, it is precisely because the ADA did not
protect gays as gays that the ADA, as a text, can be heard speaking
prudence. In distinguishing between gays as a class and those who
were (or were thought to be) suffering from AIDS,3 72 the text of the
ADA disrupted, even if it did not cleanly break, the link once so
virulent in the public's imagination between homosexuality and
disease.373  The statutory language of the ADA can thus be
interpreted as reflecting a shift, perhaps a marked one, in
congressional and cultural attitudes that have come about since
Hardwick. The statute speaks to the relationship between
homosexuality and disease, and in doing so, to the pragmatic reasons
that mediated the relationship between private gay sex and the
Constitution at the time Hardwick was handed down.
In one of her recent books, Professor Martha Minow has
elegantly shown how the ADA provides exciting points of departure
for thinking about, among other things, "community" and what she
calls the "paradox of identity"-the ways in which social identity
simultaneously both is and is not "real."3 74 These points of departure,
371. Whether the lesson has been learned, is of course, another question entirely. For
some reason to think that some judges have not fully (and correctly) appreciated the
implications of the ADA's provisions, see EEOC v. Prevo's Family Market, 135 F.3d 1089,
1090 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employer did not violate the ADA when it required a
supermarket employee suspected of having HIV to submit to a medical exam as a
condition of continued employment). For a powerful argument that the Prevo majority's
decision was in error, see id. at 1098 (Moore, J., dissenting). Thanks to Ruth Colker for
bringing the case to my attention.
372. Or, I might add, those who were (or were thought to be) HIV-infected.
373. On some level, the history of the ADA might appear to be in some tension with
this reading. Some legislators, for example, undoubtedly believed the express statutory
exclusion of gays as gays from the ADA's protections was necessary in order to make it
clear that by protecting individuals with certain disabilities-for example, those infected
with HIV or who had AIDS-the law did not aim to protect gays as gays. That is, some
legislators surely saw homosexuality (or some manifestations of it) as the equivalent of
AIDS (or HIV, or both). Nevertheless, the exclusion they, among others, called for can
still be interpreted as teaching through text the lesson I suggest it teaches. It deserves
mention that, at the time the ADA was being considered within Congress, there were
undoubtedly those who recognized the potential benefits of this statutory exclusion for
gays. Feldblum, as her gloss on the ADA, supra note 347, may be taken to suggest, may
have been among them.
374. MARTHA MINow, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS AND THE LAW
22-29 (1997) (discussing "community" and the "paradoxes of identity").
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as Minow herself points out, are available for reflecting on how we do
and do not live in peaceable community with lesbians and gay men
and what that might mean.3 75
All the same, at least for the near future, it may be a pragmatic
misstep for courts to read the ADA as a general warrant for creative
redefinition of our constitutional community. While it might, as just
explained, safely be read in the context of sodomy bans as reflecting
changes in congressional and social attitudes about private gay sex in
the days since Hardwick (and maybe elsewhere, as well), 37 6 Congress
has offered guidance about where it would, fairly clearly, object to
such judicial creativity.
Two laws, in particular, spell out those limits: the so-called
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy of 1993 (DADT)37 7 and the (equally
so-called) "Defense of Marriage Act" of 1996 (DOMA).378 Because
each of the laws has received a good deal of attention elsewhere, my
discussion of them here will be quite brief. The ultimate point about
each of these laws is that it might, like community and identity, be
understood not only in terms of what it is but also what it is not.
379
Neither DADT nor DOMA is a sweeping congressional judgment
rising to the level of a prudential bar to any and all principled judicial
decisions on the merits of laws that discriminate against those who do
(or might) identify themselves as lesbians or gay men. A challenge to
a state's sodomy ban in this sense is but one example of a case in
which DADT and DOMA may not block a court from taking
constitutional action.380
DADT, of course, established by legislative compromise that
there is some place within the military community for lesbians and
gay men. Without suggesting they do not matter (they do), let us put
to one side DADT's dramatic shortcomings and failures,381 along with
375. See id. at 63-64.
376. Williams v. Pryor, 229 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000); Louisiana v. Smith, 766 So. 2d
501 (La. 2000); Louisiana v. Brenan, 99-KA-2291, 2000 La. LEXIS 1271 (La. May 16,
2000).
377. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
378. 104 Pub. L. No. 199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(Supp. IV 1998)).
379. See infra Conclusion.
380. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-35 (1996) (holding that an amendment that
precluded state action designed to protect individuals against discrimination on grounds of
non-heterosexuality violated the Equal Protection Clause).
381. Janet Halley, for example, has boldly proposed that "[t]he new military policy is
much, much worse than its predecessor." HALLEY, DON'T, supra note 35, at 1 (emphasis
in original). The predecessor policy, Halley has explained, "required the separation of any
servicemember deemed to be 'homosexual' and defined the excludable servicemember as
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the repeated calls to re-consider or repeal it. For present purposes,
what needs to be noted is the distinction between homosexual
"status" and homosexual "conduct" on which the law purports to
rest.3" For that distinction, as should be easy to see, is the very
distinction often supposed implicated by sodomy bans. Thus, if
DADT were a law of general application (assuming for the sake of
discussion that Congress had the authority to enact such a law), one
might take it as a sign of congressional disapproval of a judgment that
sodomy bans are unconstitutional. But one must not forget that the
policy is not a law of general application. It is limited in its scope to
the military. And that difference, sometimes for good, sometimes for
bad, is one to which the Supreme Court has bowed on any number of
occasions. 383 Accordingly, there is reason to think a court would bow
needlessly and improvidently to a state law against sodomy based
exclusively on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."
Much the same can and should be said based on nothing more
than DOMA. Even if, as it unfortunately seems to do, DOMA
manifests congressional hostility toward same-sex marriage as part of
an effort to "protect" that cornerstone of community and identity-
marriage-the law's emanations should not be thought prudentially
'a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts.' "Id. at 27 (citation omitted). As Halley continued, mere statements by
a servicemember, under the old policy, "that he or she was gay," did not necessarily
require separation from the services, so long as there was "a further finding that the
member is not a homosexual or bisexual." HALLEY, DON'T, supra note 35, at 1.
382. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 170 (Eskridge notes that overruling
Hardwick may unsettle "the armed forces' exclusion of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
personnel. The exclusion is defended in part as a corollary to the military's criminal
prohibition of sodomy. Gay soldiers can be excluded either because they commit sodomy,
or because they have a 'propensity' to commit sodomy."); see also id. ("If Hardwick were
overruled, the consensual sodomy prohibition in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
[(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 5, art. 125 (1994); Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. 1998) (providing the
consequences of illegal sexual activity)] would be more vulnerable to constitutional
attack."). But see ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 170. ("Because the Supreme
Court often defers to military statutes and regulations that would be invalid if adopted in a
civilian context or by the states, this is not a foregone conclusion."). I agree with those
who believe that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is unconstitutional. Nevetheless, Hardwick-
understood as a pragmatic interpretive rule-would not necessarily call for it, or the
UCMJ's sodomy prohibition, immediately to be overturned. For an explanation why the
qualification in the text-"purports"-has been (and should be) added to the claim that
DADT rests on a distinction between homosexual "status" and homosexual "conduct,"
see generally HALLEY, DON'T, supra note 35.
383. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1981); see also Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding that the National Defense Authorization Act's prohibition of
homosexual conduct by service memebers is constitutional, in part, because of the
deference courts pay to Congress in military matters).
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to cover the entire field of lesbian and gay rights 3 4 The Hate Crimes
Statistics Act,385 the Immigration Reform Act,386 and the Americans
With Disability Act,317 all of which remain "good law," block those
emanations, just as DOMA, where marriage is concerned, blocks
theirs.
One could notice that an additional constraint on DOMA's
emanations is the ever-growing support in Congress for the sort of
watershed legislation that assuredly would amount to the kind of
congressional "green light" a court considering the constitutionality
of a state's sodomy laws might, ideally, like to know it had.388 But it is
not necessary (or necessarily advisable) for a court to incorporate
even increasing support for proposed legislation into its pragmatic
evaluation of the lawfulness of a state sodomy ban. Though such
support assuredly adds color and scope to the evaluation, it may not
amount to a "consensus achieved through a broadly representative
political process" and hence may not be a "statement of a norm that
can be said to reflect the values of the society. 38
9
The discussion presented so far has simply been an initial
attempt to sketch some of the most significant conditions of prudence
that might indicate congressional assent to a judicial decision on the
merits, striking down a state's sodomy ban on constitutional grounds.
There are surely other congressional signals that a court might detect.
The Senate confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork, for
example, might be considered a kind of senatorial referendum on the
constitutional right of privacy.39  Just so, although indications of
384. Perhaps one might say that DOMA is a strong red light on judicial invalidation of
sodomy bans because it implicates gay sex. It would be strange, of course, for Congress to
disapprove of marriage and approve of non-marital sex. But I have not seen any reason to
believe that in enacting DOMA, Congress meant to preclude the possibility of federal
protections for lesbians and gay men against anti-gay sex discrimination, or sex
discrimination more generally, of which sodomy bans and laws against same-sex marriage
are a part.
385. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
386. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
8, 18,20,29,42 U.S.C.).
387. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
388. The likeliest candidate here may be federal protection against hate crimes
motivated by sexual orientation-based animus or federal protection against workplace
discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Bill Ghent, What Happened to the Hate-
Crimes Bill?, 31 NAT'L J. 3616 (1999), 1999 WL 28248318 (discussing the future of federal
hate crimes law including sexual orientation as one of the bases of prohibited
discrimination). See infra note 401.
389. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, supra note 31, at 1187.
390. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Why Bork Is Still a Verb In Politics, 10 Years Later,
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congressional assent are not so strong or certain as those Congress
offered the Court in the years between Naim and Loving, a court
might correctly count on, as forthcoming from Congress, a degree of
cooperation in bringing about that necessary acceptance for the view
that a state's sodomy prohibition should no longer be treated as
"good" law. Based on what has been said, a court might well believe,
at a minimum, that there would be enough active support within
Congress to quell efforts to use Congress's authority to unravel such a
decision. Indeed, a court might even read the congressional signals I
have mentioned as an invitation to the High Court to resume its
pedagogical responsibilities in that constitutional seminar on
community and sexual identity. In the meantime, lower courts seem
at liberty to understand the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans39' as a
formal reply accepting Congress's invitation, and to proceed-
cautiously, to be sure-but to proceed nonetheless.3 9
Were these the only conditions of prudence to be described,
however, a court might remain wary of declaring a state's sodomy ban
inconsisitent with constitutional demands. But that wariness is one
that additional conditions of prudence may assuage or remove. 93 In
turn, let us consider the signals, such as they are, of executive and
federalist assent.
In the years since Hardwick, executive cooperation in the sort of
venture that striking down state sodomy laws might entail has been
emerging by drips and drabs. Without a doubt, no official support for
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, Week in Review, at 3; Timothy J. McNulty, Surgeon General.
Beyond a Medical Post, CH. TRIB., May 14, 1995, Perspective, at 1.
391. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
392. Indeed, this symbolic message may be more auspicious than the substantive effect
of Evans on the Colorado ballot initiative at issue in the case. It is for this reason that I
earlier assumed for argument's sake that the miscegenation project, for example, has not
enjoyed a single major success on the federal constitutional level. See supra note 250 and
accompanying text. Perhaps it is equally true for the lesbian and gay rights project, more
generally. This point about Evans is significant, generally, and here particularly. It helps
explain why the Court's Evans decision has played such a minor role in my text, although
its presence has been lurking all along. The Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), seems to bear out the point of Evans's (for now) largely
symbolic significance.
393. A version of hate crimes legislation was passed by the U.S. Senate as part of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, H.R. 4205, 106th Cong. (2000).
A non-binding motion to instruct conferees to accept language passed by the Senate with
regard to Hate Crimes legislation was approved by the House of Representatives by a vote
of 232 to 192. See 146 CONG. REc. H7523-41 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2000). Another non-
binding motion to contrary effect was defeated by a margin of 196 to 227. The hate crimes
legislation language, however, was eventually struck from the Defense Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 Stat. 1654 (2000), which President Clinton signed into law on
October 30, 2000.
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lesbian and gay rights was forthcoming during the Reagan
Administration-indeed, at times, the Administration's actions and
inactions were more appropriately described in contrary terms. I
cannot fail to mention, however, that, officially, the Reagan
Administration kept its silence in Hardwick. The United States filed
no brief in the case.394 Reagan's successor, President George H.W.
Bush, with the exception of his signature on the various pieces of
legislation already mentioned, likewise showed little enthusiasm for
staking out significant official positions favorable to lesbians and gay
men.
Many thought that Governor William Clinton's promises to
lesbians and gay men, made during his first, successful run for the
Oval Office, would bring about trailblazing changes on the Executive
front. One should not overlook the fact that some changes did occur
during the Clinton Administration that are important and path-
breaking in their own ways, significant not least of all for their
symbolic and historical importance.3 95 And yet, it can hardly be said
that the Clinton Administration provided the kind of national
leadership on lesbian and gay rights that President Lyndon Johnson,
for instance, provided on race equality matters. It remains, however,
too early to sum up as history what the Clinton Administration did
for lesbians and gay men.
394. See TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 22, at 56 ("Former Attorney General Meese ...
was quoted as saying that the Reagan administration regarded [Hardwick] as its major
victory of the Supreme Court's 1985 term--even though it had not been a party to the case
and had filed no brief.").
395. As early as 1993, for example, the Clinton Administration interpreted the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 to bar various forms of discrimination against lesbians and gay
men in government and government-related employment. More recently, the
Administration converted that interpretation into an independent Executive Order. Exec.
Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998) (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in the federal government); Exec. Order No. 13,152, 65 Fed.
Reg. 26,115 (May 2,2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of parental status in the
federal government and authorizing the Office of Personnel Management "to develop
guidance on the provisions of this order"). The Executive Order was sustained against
congressional attempts to overturn it. The Clinton Administration also made sexual
orientation-related changes to the requirements for federal security clearances.
Additionally, the Administration pushed (though there are serious questions about just
how hard) for the federal hate crimes legislation and broader federal protection against
employment discrimination. Other examples of Presidential action in this arena exist,
such as the nomination and appointment of the first openly gay American Ambassador,
see The Clinton-Gore Administration: A Record of Progress for Gays and Lesbians
Americans, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WHIAccomplishments/ac399.html (last visited
Jan. 1, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), and, of course, the ultimately
failed efforts to repeal the ban on gays in the military.
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The recent, historic elections, moreover, make it unwise for
courts to place much reliance on executive cooperation with a
decision striking down a state's sodomy ban.3 96 Although President
George W. Bush demonstrated no tremendous fondness for lesbians
and gay men during his bid for national office, he hardly stumped
along the way to step up efforts to legislate or enforce existing laws
that prohibit private, same-sex sex. For all the talk of gays, gay
marriage, and gays in the military that took place in the presidential
primaries and the general election campaigns, a certain silence
descended around same-sex sexual activity, once again. The setting
of that silence, however, seemed to have changed from what it had
been only years before. So long as the love that dare not speak its
name spoke privately, relatively few people on the public political
scene seriously appeared to care.397
396. Of course, the same could be said for congressional cooperation. Still Congress
has shown no interest in undoing the legislative accomplishments outlined above. The
trend here seems to be toward liberalization with the obvious caveats to be added about
DADT and DOMA. Even in the years that the Republicans have controlled either or
both Houses of Congress, years in which there has been no new legislation enacted into
law that can be classified as very "favorable" to those who identify themselves as lesbians
and gay men, there have been no broad-based efforts to turn the clock back, at least none
that has met with any stunning success. See, e.g., supra note 343 (dealing with
congressional inaction on D.C. sodomy ban).
397. One cannot entirely discount the possibility that, as President, George W. Bush
may reverse some of the Clinton Administration's efforts on behalf of lesbians and gay
men. See, e.g., Comparison Shopping: How Bush and Gore Stack Up on Gay Issues,
WASH. BLADE, Nov. 3, 2000, at 29 (reporting Bush's opposition to a civil rights bill
proposed in the Texas legislature that would have prohibited workplace discrimination
against lesbians and gay men); id. (referring to "the lead role [Bush took] in killing a bill
before the Texas Legislature that sought to add sexual orientation to the state's existing
hate crimes law," and discussing Bush's opposition to federal hate crimes legislation that
includes sexual orientation); id. (observing that Bush "[o]pposed repeal of the Texas
sodomy law, saying it is a symbolic measure upholding 'traditional values' "). However,
some of Bush's remarks and gestures during the 2000 election campaign might be
understood to indicate that he will not go out of his way to reverse all the advances that
have recently been made on behalf of lesbian and gay rights. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Is
he up to it?, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 17, 2000, § 4, at 1 ("At last August's
[Republican party] convention, Bush made all the right symbolic gestures. ... He gave a
coveted primetime speaking slot to the only openly gay Republican congressman, Jim
Kolbe."); Commission on Presidential Debates, The Second 2000 Gore-Bush Presidential
Debate: October 11, 2000, http://www.debates.org/pagesltrans20b.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (reporting Bush's response to the question, "Do you believe
in general terms that gays and lesbians should have the same rights as other Americans?",
as "Yes. I don't think they ought to have special rights, but I think they ought to have the
same rights."). Indeed, Bush indicated during his run for the White House that he had no
intention (and had not previously been in the practice) of inquiring into the sexual
orientation of those who would (or did) work under him. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye,
Gay Voters Finding G.O.P. Newly Receptive to Support, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1999, at Al
("Mr. Bush ... has said he would have no qualms about hiring homosexuals. 'If someone
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can do a job, and a job that he's qualified for, that person ought to be allowed to do his
job,' he said earlier this year."); see also, e.g., From Social Security to Environment, the
Candidates' Positions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,2000, at A44 ("Asked about gay rights and civil
unions in the second presidential debate, Mr. Bush said that 'how you conduct your sex
life' is a private matter."); Excerpts from the Debate Among G.O.P. Candidates, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at A15 (reprinting Gov. Bush's answer to the question, "Would you
appoint an openly gay person to a senior staff or cabinet position?", as "How would I
know. I don't ask. Somebody's sexual orientation is their personal business as far as I'm
concerned."). But see Nicholas Confessore, The Rorschach Candidate: George W. Bush
and the Politics of No Politics, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 31, 2000, at 34, LEXIS, News, Major
Stories, Combined File (rehearsing Bush's remarks, just quoted, and then going on to
point out that "a few months after that, during a private meeting with the Madison
Group-a clique of religious conservative power brokers-Bush reportedly promised that
he would not 'knowingly' appoint open homosexuals to any top administration post");
Alison Mitchell, Bush Talks to Gays and Calls it Beneficial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2000, at
A26 (reporting that when asked "by a Christian radio station in Charleston, S.C., whether
he would appoint an openly gay person, Mr. Bush said, 'An openly known homosexual is
somebody who probably wouldn't share my philosophy[,]' "and then observing that Bush
subsequently indicated that "sexual preference 'is not a factor' in naming someone to do a
job"). Bush's seemingly equivocal position may reflect a growing receptiveness among
certain segments of the Republican Party toward lesbians and gay men. See Richard L.
Berke, Flurry of Anti-Gay Remarks Has G.O.P. Fearing Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1998, at Al ("Prominent Republican politicians and strategists say they are troubled by a
wave of harsh anti-homosexual oratory from other Republicans, fearing it could make the
party appear intolerant and drive out moderates and economic conservatives."); Seelye,
supra ("Prominent Republican candidates for President are creating an atmosphere that is
subtly but fundamentally more inviting to gay and lesbian voters than party leaders have
been in recent memory."); see also, e.g., Marc Sandalow, McCain Welcomes Support of
Gays in GOP, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 9, 1999, at A3 ("Setting himself apart from
more socially conservative candidates, Arizona Sen. John McCain assured gay
Republicans yesterday that he welcomes their support and would work to eliminate
discrimination if elected president."). In any case, the current openness in the Republican
Party stands in contrast to the anti-gay aspects of President George H.W. Bush's
unsuccessful efforts in 1992 to defeat then-Governor William Clinton. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Schmalz, Gay Rights and AIDS Emerging As Divisive Issues in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1992, at Al (citing speeches by Patrick Buchanan and other Republicans as
evidence that "the party made it clear that it would make its opposition to homosexual
rights a major issue in the campaign, portraying Bill Clinton and the Democrats as wanting
to give preferential treatment to gay men and lesbians"); Seelye, supra ("The new message
on gay supporters is a far cry ... from 1992, when the dominant voice on the issue from
Republicans was that of Patrick J. Buchanan, whose declaration of a 'culture war' was
aimed squarely at homosexuals.").
Perhaps the sexual identity of Vice-President Dick Cheney's daughter Mary, see,
e.g., Sarah Wildman, Hiding in plain sight: Mary Cheney May Be Silent, But Her Presence
Speaks Volumes About the Relationship Between Family and Sexual Identity, ADVOCATE,
Sept. 12, 2000, at 26, 26 (noting, inter alia, sexual identity of Cheney's daughter) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review), and Cheney's own remarks about same-sex
relations, see Michael Cooper, Cheney's Marriage Remarks Irk Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2000, at A23 ("Asked at the [vice-presidential] debate [with Senator Joseph
Lieberman] ... whether homosexuals should have all the constitutional rights enjoyed by
other citizens, Mr. Cheney said that 'people should be free to enter into any kind of
relationship they want to enter into' and that the issue of gay marriages should be decided
by the states."); Anne Hull, Daughter's Gay Life May Prove Awkward for Cheney, WASH.
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In contrast to executive ambivalence if not moderate support, the
signals from the states would'seem to smile (or at least not frown) on
a principled judgment on the merits that sodomy bans are
unconstitutional. In the years since Hardwick, there have been no
radical changes in the treatment of sodomy as a matter of state law.
The trend to decriminalize private same-sex sexual activity, which
began in 1961311 continued until the early 1980s.399 From then through
the early 1990s, twenty-four states, as well as the District of
Columbia,4°° prohibited sodomy in one form or another.4"1 More
POST, Aug. 6, 2000, at A19 (quoting Richard Cheney as saying, "[g]enerally, the society is
more tolerant [on the issue of gay rights] today than it used to be and the [Republican]
party is reflective of that tolerance"), provide further reason to hope that the second
Bush's Administration will not roll the clock back much (or too much) where lesbian and
gay rights are concerned. After all, even the Reverend Jerry Falwell, who is more likely
known for his anti-gay positions than his support for lesbian and gay rights, has begun a
dialogue with those in the lesbian and gay communities. Frank Rich, Has Jerry Falwell
Seen the Light?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at A17 (discussing the October 1999 meeting
between Falwell and gays, organized, in part, by Reverend Mel White, and suggesting that
"it would be wrong to dismiss the conference as mere posturing"); see, e.g., Falwell Finds
an Accord With Gay Rights Backer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1999, at A15 (reporting that
"[tiwo months ago the Rev. Jerry Falwell, well known for conservative political and
theological views, took the unusual step of agreeing with the Rev. Mel White, a supporter
of gay rights, to convene a meeting bringing together 200 of each man's associates").
To be sure, Vice-President Al Gore was far more supportive of lesbian and gay
rights than Bush, see generally, e.g., Chris Bull, Al Gore's Gay Vision, ADVOCATE, Sept.
14, 1999, http://www.advocate.com/html/stories794/794-_gore.html (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (discussing Gore's views on gay rights); Comparison Shopping:
How Bush and Gore Stack Up on Gay issues, supra, at 29, 31 (detailing Gore's positions
on various gay rights issues relative to George W. Bush's). But even Gore's support for
lesbian and gay equality, we should not forget, had its limits. See, e.g., Chris Bull, Al
Gore's Gay Vision, ADVOCATE, Sept. 14, 1999, http://www.advocate.comhnitml/stories/794/
794_gore.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing Gore's views on
gay rights)("I'm in favor of legal protection for [same-sex] domestic partnership, but I'm
not in favor of changing the institution of marriage as it is presently understood-between
a man and a woman.") (remarks of Vice-President Al Gore).
398. As White noted in his Hardwick opinion, "until 1961, all 50 States outlawed
sodomy." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 193 (opinion of White, J.) (footnote omitted). For one
fascinating history of the sodomy project and its significance within the larger litigation
efforts of the lesbian and gay rights movements, see Cain, supra note 185, at 1589-612.
399. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1344
(2000) ("Although states continued to repeal their sodomy laws through the 1970s, the
repeal movement slowed, and two states re-regulated sodomy, for no promo homo
reasons." (footnote omitted)); iL ("The wind went out of the sails of legislative sodomy
repeal after the House vote" to veto repeal of the District of Columbia's sodomy ban in
1981.).
400. See supra note 343 (dealing with the repeal of the sodomy ban in the District of
Columbia).
401. Doubtless any explanation of the stall in the trend-there were no state sodomy
ban repeals in the years between 1983 and 1991 (plus or minus)-would have to take
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recently, the trend toward decriminalization has resumed, with
sodomy laws in six states and in the District of Columbia being erased
from the statute books,4°2 leaving, today, only eighteen states,
counting conservatively, that make sodomy a criminal offense. 3 Less
conservatively, the laws of at least four of the eighteen states-
Massachusetts,4 44 Michigan,40 5  Missouri,4 6  and Texas41--are of
Hardwick, the moral panic over AIDS, and the country's general political climate into
account. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen, The Decade of Supreme Court Avoidance of AIDS:
Denial of Certiorari in HIV-AIDS Cases and Its Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 61
ALB. L. REV. 897,907-10 (1998).
402. One of the most important symbolic victories in the movement to decriminalize
sodomy is the Georgia Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18
(Ga. 1998), declaring that the law that the Supreme Court of the United States did not
strike down in Hardwick violated the state constitution's guarantee of privacy. Powell is a
case that has some very troubling aspects to it, not least of all the facts of the case that one
can piece together from various available news reports. I leave for another day my views
on the politics of privacy challenges by the lesbian and gay communities to state sodomy
bans. See also 1998 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1999) (decriminalizing sodomy
under state law); Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 502 (Ky. 1992) (invalidating state's
sodomy law); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997) (same).
403. The eighteen states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (1994); Arizona,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1411 (1989); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie
1997); Florida, FLA. STAT. ch. 800.02 (2000); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Michie
1997); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:89 (West 1986); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272. § 34 (1992); Michigan,
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.158 (1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.355 (Michie 1990));
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
29-59 (1999); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1999); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-177 (1999); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West Supp. 2001);
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Texas, TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1999); and
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1996). See also ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra
note 51, at 362-71 app. B3 (collecting statutes).
404. Tribe, Hardwick Brief, supra note 95, at 14 n.23 (arguing that the State's brief
"erroneously" included the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in its list of jurisdictions that
then still outlawed "oral and anal sexual contacts," and citing Commonwealth v. Balthazar,
366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974), for the proposition that the Commonwealth "ha[d]
long since held its sodomy law unconstitutional as applied to the acts of consenting adults
in private").
405. Michigan's sodomy prohibition was struck down by a Wayne County Circuit
Court in 1990. Mich. Org. for Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820 CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Wayne County July 9, 1990). The State's Attorney General did not appeal the case, and
the law in Wayne County might, as a result, appear to be null. Several years later,
however, the state court of appeals upheld the statute in a decision that had effect in its
region, but not Wayne County. People v. Brashier, 496 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(per curiam). To this list might be added Maryland's sodomy law. According to William
Eskridge, a state trial court has struck down the state's sodomy ban. ESKRIDGE,
GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 337.
406. See supra note 362 (discussing the state of the law in Missouri).
407. See Garner v. Texas, No. 14-99-00111-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3760 (Tx. Ct.
App., June 8, 2000).
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somewhat uncertain legal status. Pending judicial and legislative
actions may reduce the total number of state sodomy bans still
further.48 Again, counting conservatively, only five of the states that
continue to ban sodomy target only gay sex, 40 9 down one from the
time of Hardwick. Thus, the number of laws against sodomy now
compares roughly (a few more or a few less, depending) to the
number of statutes barring miscegenation that were in force when
Loving was decided by the Court-sixteen.410  Interestingly, the
current map of state sodomy bans bears a noticeable resemblance to
the map of miscegenation bans that one could have drawn for the
Court in 1967. With the exception of the scattered outlier states,
criminalization of sodomy is most prominent, geographically, in
southern and southern-border states, ten (or so) of whose
miscegenation laws were effectively stripped from the books by the
Supreme Court in Loving.
Having spent some time looking at them, what might we say
about congressional, executive, and federalist assent in the context of
a state's sodomy law? At a minimum, they do not in any strong sense
counsel against a principled judgment on the merits that such a law is
unconstitutional.4 1 Indeed, they can reasonably, if not definitively, be
read as saying that such a judgment is warranted.
Fair-minded people can-and will-disagree whether, as a
strategic matter, the time has come for the Supreme Court to strike
down state sodomy prohibitions. But even if the conditions of
prudence here perfectly paralleled the conditions of prudence in the
miscegenation arena (which they do not), it seems to me anything but
obvious how today's (or tomorrow's) Court would regard them.
It is tempting to speculate how, with a sodomy case before it, the
Supreme Court might rule. In thinking it through, one might want to
start with questions like these: What is the Court's "mood"? How
might the prospect of striking down as many as eighteen states'
408. Arkansas's sodomy law is winding its way through the state judicial pipelines. See
Bryant v. Picado, 996 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. 1999).
409. Those five states are: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1999);
Okalahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West Supp. 2001); and Texas, TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994).
410. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967) ("Virginia is now one of 16 States which
prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial classifications." (footnote omitted)).
411. This, of course, assumes a principled judgment on the merits would favor lesbians
and gay men. And whether the principle is one of sex equality or one of privacy, for
example, or even grounds of equal protection "rationality," others have adequately
explained why the assumption of principle may very well be justified.
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sodomy laws look to the Justices who now (or soon may) sit on the
Court? How much more daunting would it look, for example, than
Evans where, as William Eskridge has colorfully described it, the
Court "pounced on a squirrelly antigay initiative adopted by narrow
margins in an outlier state[?] '' 412 How significant would the difference
be? How, if at all, might the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence
modify the significance of federalist assent within its prudential
calculations? Could the Justices look at a law against sodomy, if one
were before them, without DADT or DOMA, or both, stalking their
imaginations? Might the alternative reading of Hardwick help-by
giving the Justices a way to correct what is widely believed to be the
Court's error in Hardwick? By enabling the Court to make that
correction without sharply breaking with its decisional past? By
allowing the Court to make that correction without also promising to
strike down all laws that discriminate against lesbians and gay men?
Might the alternative reading of Hardwick help-by not committing
the Court to follow a path that would immediately disrupt cultural
and legal norms that have not changed, or have not changed very
much, in the years since Hardwick?
There seems little point in trying to predict how the Court would
decide a new sodomy case, no matter how alluring the endeavor may
seem. To borrow a phrase from Laurence Tribe, he "who lives by the
crystal ball [is bound] to eat lots of ground glass. ' 413 Prediction aside,
there is an important difference between what the Supreme Court
would do in a particular case and what a lower court, in the interim,
can and should do 14
So let us approach the interim matter somewhat more directly.
Is a lower court free within the constraints of Supreme Court
precedent to declare that a state's law against sodomy is
unconstitutional? The alternative reading of Hardwick offers one
way of understanding why the answer is "yes." Should a lower court
issue such a ruling? Others have amply explained elsewhere why-on
various grounds-a court should strike down a state's sodomy law as
a matter of constitutional principle. In addition, now, there are
412. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 51, at 229.
413. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
236 (1982) (remarks of Laurence Tribe).
414. Cf. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 165, at 126-27
("[L]ower courts do not and should not as a rule base judgment on a guess of what the
Supreme Court would do; they must follow what it has done in the past as best they can.
No doubt, this is not a mechanical process, and the lower courts have decision-making
power; but it is comparatively interstitial.").
2001] 483
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
growing prudential reasons for a court to do so, reasons that provide
a path by which a court can distinguish between a sodomy law and,
for example, a law against same-sex marriage. For, while the
conditions of prudence may (already) counsel in favor of striking
down a state's sodomy prohibition, they do not similarly seem to
recommend, for example, invalidating a state's law barring same-sex
marriage on constitutional grounds.
None of this will make much, if any, practical difference,
however, if we cannot reach even provisional agreement that, at least
sometimes, courts may properly-and not just inevitably-proceed
with an eye to prudential considerations when adjudicating cases
involving the constitutionality of laws that discriminate against
lesbians and gay men. The proposed pragmatic compromise seeks to
do just that. But is it possible? Can we achieve the agreement
necessary for that compromise to work?
Earlier, recall, I suggested that the possibility of a successful
compromise might be enhanced if those presently in or near the
center would be willing to make an initial gesture of good will to their
lesbian and gay friends.415 Its form can now be seen. At least in the
first case, where prudence presents no obvious obstacle to a
principled decision on the merits and may even be thought to
authorize it (be it a case involving a constitutional challenge to a law
against sodomy or some other similar law that discriminates against
lesbians and gay men), dedicated pragmatists should be widely heard
drumming the message that principle must be given free rein to
prevail, as we ordinarily believe it should, to put an end to that
particular form of discrimination. This even though, as is presently
the case with a state law against sodomy, the conditions of prudence
are not perfectly analogous to what they were in 1967 when the
Loving Court struck down the remaining state miscegenation bans.
Why should such a gesture be contemplated? Among other reasons,
no less than these: The Constitution demands it. Courts can afford it.
And lesbians and gay men deserve it. This is the very least they-no,
we-deserve.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I want to set forth in rudimentary sketch the
minimal commitments the proposed compromise might call for from
those within the lesbian and gay communities. Then I will share a few
thoughts on whether or not those communities should endorse the
415. See text accompanying supra note 272.
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compromise, mentioning along the way a few additional terms they
should insist upon if they do. Finally, I end by offering one
interpretation of my own text.
The compromise I have proposed likely means that there would
have to be some modifications made to the litigation agendas of
lesbian and gay rights organizations. Simultaneous pursuit of
multiple cases constitutionally challenging an array of laws and other
governmental actions that discriminate against lesbians and gay men
would have to be reconsidered. The spectrum of governmental
discriminations against lesbians and gay men, theoretically and
practically interconnected, would have to be broken down into
discrete component parts. Litigation would be pursued in a sequence
corresponding to the conditions of prudence; the most promising
claims would be advanced first, the weakest, last.
In the abstract, this sounds unexceptionable, even obvious. It is
the litigation strategy pursued in other civil rights campaigns.4 16 In
the lesbian and gay rights context, however, it may currently present
certain difficulties. It would, for example, appear to recommend that
federal constitutional attacks on DOMA or corresponding state laws
be postponed until a time in the future when the conditions of
prudence would no longer obviously preclude them. Which may
require waiting to litigate these and other otherwise powerful
constitutional claims beyond, if not far beyond, the time that might
ideally be preferred.
Moreover, the proposed compromise might call upon lesbian and
gay rights organizations at least to consider what may seem an very
unsavory possibility: to prepare themselves as a last resort to argue in
court for a prudential non-decision on the merits in certain lesbian
and gay rights cases. This course of action, however distasteful it may
be or seem, is not inconsistent with the moral suasion lesbian and gay
rights organizations have shown themselves ready to bring to bear on
individual claimants who wish to pursue a litigation strategy other
416. See GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 131-55 (1983) (documenting aspects of the step-
by-step approach to race equality litigation that Charles Hamilton Houston and others,
with him, pursued); id. at 135 ("Houston believed the step-by-step process would have
greater long-range effects [among other reasons], because it would take into account the
lack of tradition for equality within the American system."); see also LINDA K. KERBER,
No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP 202-20 (1998) (documenting aspects of the case-by-case approach to sex
equality litigation undertaken in the early 1970s by the American Civil Liberty Union's
Women's Right Project, headed at the time by then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
intersections of sex-equality and race-equality litigation).
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than the one that is nationally set.4 17 In one sense, then, making the
prudential arguments in court-if it were to be a term of the
compromise-might be nothing (or not much) more than a public
reflection of the intra-community maneuvering that we know already
does go (and has gone) on.418
But, squarely to ask the question that must certainly be on the
minds of some readers, does the compromise spell the end of the
marriage project? Not necessarily, no. The compromise need, at a
minimum, only clarify what would already appear to be the current
litigation approach: to postpone federal attacks on marriage laws.4 19
The same would hold true for various other, non-priority claims.
417. Cf. Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed?, supra note 214, at 43. Sunstein's "approach
may be appropriate for gay advocacy organizations, which choose cases to support with an
eye to long-term strategy. Indeed, these organizations sometimes employ just the kind of
strategic thinking the approach suggests." Id Recently, "Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund ... announced that it currently would not pursue gay marriage claims 'in
states where the prospect for defeat seems great,' pending the outcome of its case in
Hawaii." Id. at 43 n.31 (citation omitted); see also Halley, Gay Rights and Identity
Imitation, supra note 225, at 129 (discussing the practice in terms of "natural rights"). In
order to avoid confusion, I want to underscore that as to the particular suggestion here, as
well as the other minimal commitments that the proposed compromise might entail, I am
not presently advocating for them. I am rather trying to set them forth for purposes of
future discussion.
418. I am not prepared-and am not seeking-to defend as ethical all aspects of the
existing practice of attempting to persuade individual lesbian and gay rights litigants not to
bring cases they may be (or are) entitled on their own to bring. I am too ambivalent about
the practice, which obviously raises a series of intensely complex ethical issues, to defend it
across the board. Nevertheless, assuming for argument's sake that, at least in some
instances, lesbian and gay rights organizations can ethically engage in the practice, I do not
see how the same might not be said of its more open, public expression.
419. Evan Wolfson, the Director of the Marriage Project at the Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, has thoughtfully explained Lambda's marriage litigation strategy this
way:
Our opponents know that we are in the battle not just for the hearts and minds of
the public, but also for the map of the country.... It is a struggle that is taking
place in history-not just in one court, not just in one legal solution, not within
one legal theory, but in events, battles, and in engagement going state by state,
community by community.... Part of our challenge is to keep such engagement
going, not to let it be shut down by any one defeat or any one legal argument or
any one battle or any one problem because it is bigger than all the rest.
Evan Wolfson, The Freedom to Marry: Our Struggle for the Map of the Country, 16
QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 209, 212-13 (1996); see also Wolfson & Mower, supra note 180, at
1001 ("In the wake of Hardwick and its progeny, those of us seeking to challenge the
constitutionality of 'sodomy' statutes have, of necessity, turned to state courts and state
constitutions to secure the protection of private sexual intimacy denied by federal
courts."). The strategy may have been set as early as the day after Hardwick was decided.
See Larry Rohter, Friend and Foe See Homosexual Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1986, at
A19 (reporting that "[h]omosexual activists said that the focus of their efforts to gain legal
protection is now likely to shift from the national level to states and cities."); see also
Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed?, supra note 214, at 43 n.31 (explaining that the Lamda
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As for non-litigation legal agendas, the proposed compromise
would, on the federal level, suggest that the primary recourse for
protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
"actual" or "perceived," would be congressional and executive action.
In view of the potential constitutional implications of these forms of
governmental action, legislative and executive proposals might be
framed more consciously in ways that key into the kinds of prudential
arguments that those who are speaking to courts might find useful.420
There would probably need to be close coordination and cooperation
between the legislative and litigation wings of the lesbian and gay civil
rights communities. This kind of coordination and cooperation is, of
course, nothing new, and, in this respect, the compromise may merely
serve as a reminder of the need for what already happens to continue
to do so.
It is important to stress one last time that the proposed
compromise would first and foremost be a federal constitutional
compromise limited to the kinds of arguments made in the courts. It
should leave ample room for constitutional and other arguments from
principle to be made and gain acceptance in other social and legal
institutional fora. Moderate success in the judicial arena might be
precipitated by, and then once again amplified through, federal (and
state) legislative and executive action, helping incrementally to shift
views in the broader realm of public opinion and culture.
All things considered, should the lesbian and gay communities
accept the compromise? In candor, the most I can comfortably say is
that the possibilities the compromise holds out seem well worth
exploring in greater detail. Many have profitably spent considerable
energies outlining the various principles on which the equality project
for lesbians and gay men might rest. Looking to ways to put one or
more of those principles into operation seems to me an idea whose
time has come. I think and hope that others will agree. Still, it should
not be forgotten how impossible it would be to conceive of a
prudential compromise were it not for previous principled efforts.
Neither principle nor prudence would now be what it is without the
other.
That said, I must add that should the lesbian and gay
communities decide to proceed with the compromise, they should
Legal Defense and Education Fund would no longer proceed with gay marriage claims in
states likely to reject such claims).
420. This might take the form (as I am inclined to think it should) of defining
discrimination based on sexual orientation, actual or perceived, as a form of sex
discrimination.
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insist that it be understood as provisional. They should be clear that,
while it existed, the compromise would be subject to robust and on-
going criticism and that such criticism would be vital to ensuring that
principle was not being sacrificed in prudence's name any more than
it ever needed to be.42'
In closing, let me offer an interpretation of my own text. As I
understand it, it is a study in the paradoxes of identity. The three
most significant textual moves-the suggestion that the standard
interpretation of Hardwick has been shaped by more than text alone,
the proffer of an alternative reading of the case, and the use of that
reading as the basis for the proposed constitutional compromise-
converge on the paradoxical identities of Hardwick and of the
Constitution.
We do not usually think this way, and so it may sound strange.
But judicial decisions have identities. Where Hardwick's is
concerned, we have largely tended, and largely continue, to interpret
the case as if its holding-the "essence" of its identity as a matter of
legal doctrine-were fixed, determinate, knowable, and known.
Part I began the effort to draw that thinking into question, contending
that something beyond text alone has generated (and perpetuated)
the standard interpretation of Hardwick. Part II continued,
highlighting that Hardwick does not necessarily mean what the
standard reading posits it does. Establishing the plausibility of an
alternative reading of Hardwick thus cast light on the interpretive
421. The suggestion of the sacrifice that "need (or need not) be," of course, begs
questions, some of which will have to be worked out in the conversation over the
compromise itself. Among them, there are these: How will we, those of us party to the
compromise, figure out how to negotiate the inevitable disagreements among us? Will
that be simply a responsibility of the courts? Or should we create mechanisms by which to
attempt to resolve these matters more informally, before remitting them to the courts?
How will we continually re-evaluate the compromise-both in terms of the balance it is
striking, as well as its continuing utility? Will we do so "objectively" or "subjectively?"
Democratically? Will the voices of centrists trump others'? The voices of lesbians and
gay men? What happens as the compromise, if it does, yields success? Who will then
occupy the center? Should the compromise be extended now--or later-to include others
who are often counted as members of the lesbian and gay communities, such as bisexuals
and transgendered people? How will we deal with problems of collective action or
decisionmaking? Recognizing that questions like these perhaps need to be answered does
not require them to be answered today. If no compromise can actually be forged along
the imagined lines, they are effectively moot, although whether that compromise can be
forged, in the end, may depend on the answers one has for these questions.
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choices that are ultimately involved in speaking of what Hardwick
does or does not say. Together, these moves reveal Hardwick as the
congealed product of an interpretive process and not the simple
deduction of "some stabilized preinterpretive something" already
imbedded in the text of the Hardwick opinions."
Once we see these interpretive choices for the choices they are,
we might begin to appreciate the paradoxes of Hardwick's identity.
Hardwick both is and is not a case that held there is no substantive
due process right to engage in homosexual sodomy. It both is and is
not a case that decided not to decide the merits of the substantive due
process arguments that Michael Hardwick made.
Choices about how to interpret Hardwick, of course, cannot
properly and entirely be separated from choices about how to
interpret the Constitution. Accordingly, to be interesting and
meaningful, it would not have been enough to leave off with the
alternative reading. Something had to be said about how the
alternative reading of Hardwick might be related through an
interpretive method to the Constitution itself. The criticisms of the
miscegenation analogy provided the occasion for exploring the
relationship between Hardwick and the Constitution. As to the span
between them, the conditions of prudence provided a suitable bridge.
But as an interpretive method, or to put it another way, as a process
of constitutional interpretation, the conditions of prudence reveal, if
there had been any doubt of it after Evans, that the Constitution does
not simply authorize the state to legislate sexual identity-or to
legislate on the basis of sexual identity. Like Hardwick's, the
Constitution's identity is a paradox.423 It both does and does not
authorize the state to define-and discriminate-against lesbians and
gay men.
If my text is understood as a study in the paradoxes of identities,
one might be inclined to ask, are sexual orientation identities choices,
too? The answer, naturally, is that they are-at least in the following
sense: we choose to orient our thinking so that sexual orientation
identities have, and continue to, become meaningful axes of self-
understanding and discrimination. As with Hardwick's and the
Constitution's, however, we often only notice sexual orientation
identities' revealed forms. We more commonly see "lesbians" and
"gay men" (or "dykes" and "faggots") than the processes by which
422. Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1681, 1687 (1996).
423. IL at 1681 ("For some, the Constitution is fixed. For others, it is changing. For
still others, it is both fixed and changing.").
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they are created, among others, by individuals, by ideology, and
through law.424 And yet, focusing on those processes can lead us to
overlook, if not social identities themselves, then the harms worked
and experienced through them.4' It may be that those harms are just
another form of text whose meanings we create, but saying so will, to
many,2 6 often sound like basic, cruel indifference. On either side,
then, there are risks which, properly considered, remind us of the
importance of "practice with paradox."
424. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561, 567-83 (1997); id. at
563-66 n.12-13 (collecting sources); id. at 585-644; see also Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian
Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
43, 61-68 (1994) (discussing ways to think about the existence of a core lesbian experience
shared by each individual); Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding
A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1853-55 (1994)
(examining the difficulties and problems associated with having a unified "voice" for an
outsider group); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 547 (1994) (examining
the differences between essentialism and constructivism with respect to sexual
orientation); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283, 297 (1994) (noting that
assuming every member of a protected civil rights group has a single experience that
stands for the multiple experiences of its members may discount the "vertical" differences
within the group); Kendall Thomas, "Ain't Nothin' Like the Real Thing:" Black
Masculinity, Gay Sexuality and the Jargon of Authenticity, in REPRESENTING BLACK MEN
55, 66 (Marcellus Blount & George Cunningham eds., 1996) (explaining that the search for
an independent and autonomous sexual identity is ill-advised).
For related thoughts in the gender identity context, see generally Kimberl6
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1241-99 (1993) (analyzing the doctrine of
intersectionality and its application to women of color); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 581, 581-616 (1990) (arguing that
feminist legal theory, or a certain important strand of it, is "essentialist" and has largely
silenced the "voice" of black women). For an especially well-written and thoughtful
account of the equally ugly "Dahmer" case that builds on related insights into the social
(and legal) construction of identity, see Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis
of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1280-90 (1997). For additional commentary
touching on the relationship between identity and law, see Francisco Valdes, Queer
Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and
Politics of "Sexual Orientation, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1335-40 (1997), as well as many of
Valdes's numerous other publications.
425. See Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, supra note 14, at 1502 n.249 ("I do not
believe that 'we' can simply 'give up' the idea of homosexual identity. [It] is certainly
correct to say that the idea of a 'homosexual' identity is an ideological category and thus
false; it by no means follows from this observation, however, that 'homosexual' identity is
therefore not real.").
426. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 687 (2000); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb.
22, 1999, at 37, 45 (criticizing Butler's work for its indifference to material conditions of
women's (and others') subordination).
REORIENTING BOWERS V. HARDWICK
Something Martha Minow has said about the paradoxes of
identities bears repeating here. It may also serve as a near-final
thought on the constitutional compromise I have offered for initial
consideration:
Identity politics ties us in knots. Yet even without unity in
the sense of a single, shared American identity, the peoples
of this nation can recognize and deepen ties, sufficient to
enhance self-governance. Those ties are enlivened by the
paradoxes of our shared experiences as unique individuals
with varieties of affiliations. We have all made differences
matter; we all must sense freedoms for self-invention would
help. Promoting daily contact across lines of differences in
schools, jobs, and communities would strengthen the kind of
ties that permit a solidarity sufficient for sustaining debates
over the future. The important question is not just what to
do, but when.427
This year, we mark the fifteenth anniversary of the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. For fifteen years, as the
Court's understanding of the Constitution, Hardwick has ruled the
land. But as an interpretation of the words and principles that bind us
together as peoples, it has also done something more. Hardwick has
helped define who we think we are.
Still, anniversaries being moments to remember, we should not
forget. It is something that fifteen years should enable us better to
see. We play a part in defining Hardwick, and we can play a part in
redefining it, and like Hardwick-indeed, through it-ourselves.
Recognizing this may enable us not only to apprehend the seriousness
and the import of the business the Supreme Court left unfinished in
Hardwick, but also to find creative ways of finishing it and, in doing
so, finally to move on.
Anniversaries prompt reflection-on the future, as well as on the
past. Hardwick's fifteenth this year thus invites us, with Minow, to
pose the question Hillel is famed for having asked: If not now, when?
427. MINOW, supra note 374, at 157-58.
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